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Globalising Democracy
Globalising Democracy brings together expert contributors to explore the
intersection of two major contemporary themes: globalisation and the
contribution that both domestic party politics and international party aid,
in particular, make to democratisation.
This new volume clearly shows what globalisation means for domestic
and international efforts to build effective political parties and competi-
tive party systems in new and emerging democracies. Contrasting
perspectives are presented through fresh case studies of European post-
communist countries, together with Turkey, which at first glance seem to
tell a positive story, and of sub-Saharan Africa, where the problems and
the challenges are more complex. The reader is clearly shown how inter-
national party assistance is one manifestation and vehicle of globalisation,
understood in the political sense: as the global convergence of a distinc-
tive set of (Western-derived) political values and institutions takes place.
This book also shows how globalisation assessed in terms of global
economic integration, the growth of global communications and the devel-
opment of multilevel (or polycentric) governance poses serious implications
for party politics almost everywhere. Such themes are highly relevant to
how new and emerging democracies can find a set of party politics fit for
the purpose of improving and consolidating their respective systems.
This book will be of great interest to all students of globalisation,
governance, international relations and politics.
Peter Burnell is a Professor in the Department of Politics and International
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1 Globalising party politics in 
emerging democracies
Peter Burnell
The aims of this book are threefold. The first is to draw greater atten-
tion to the idea that globalisation matters to the way party politics develops
in new and emerging democracies. The second, and more emphatic, is 
to critically review international political party aid as both a vehicle and
manifestation of the globalisation of party-based democracy, which itself
is an aspect of globalisation understood in its broadest and most political
sense – meaning the global convergence of a distinctive set of (Western-
derived) political values and institutions. The third aim is to make the
case that if international party aid is to become a more effective instru-
ment for promoting democratisation in new and prospective democracies,
then it should take account of the ways globalisation touches on demo-
cratisation and the development of party politics specifically. If the book
helps to confirm that both the connections between political parties 
and globalisation and their consequences for democratisation, and the
performance of international party aid, merit further and more detailed
investigation, then it will have achieved a worthwhile objective.
For the purposes of this book, then, the term ‘globalisation of party
politics’ has the following reference points. The first is the spread of
political party-based forms of political activity and (in varying degrees 
of competitiveness) party politics as a form of political organisation,
connected with the increasing adoption by states of more or less demo-
cratic forms of government. The second is the efforts of foreign, inter-
national and supranational organisations to promote party-building and
consolidate liberal democratic norms and practices among competing
parties in emerging democracies. This feature is given special prominence,
not least because it has been so little researched and commented on else-
where. Third, the term refers to how the development of party-based
democracy is affected by certain aspects of globalisation such as national
economic integration into one global economic space through the stand-
ardisation on neo-liberal economic policies and institutions at national
and transnational levels. For there is a view that globalisation in the sense
of economic integration, along with the growth of global communications














































serious implications for political parties almost everywhere. And it has
particular resonance for those countries currently addressing the challenge
of institutionalising a system of party politics fit for the purpose of
improving and consolidating a new democracy. Finally, the terms of refer-
ence here embrace the impact of regionalisation, more specifically
Europeanisation, on the development of political parties and party politics
in post-communist countries, in as much as regionalisation still exhibits
some of globalisation’s central characteristics even where it is conceived
as an instrument to protect member states’ interests against the more
threatening consequences of globalisation manifest at the global level.
Introduction
In Western Europe there is now a widely held view that the golden age
of mass party politics is over. This is part of a larger contemporary
scenario that has seen patterns of political participation move in the direc-
tion of declining party membership and electoral turnouts, reductions in
partisan attachment and increasing voter volatility. Some historians now
even question whether the golden age ever existed in the first place. One
inference echoed in the literature is that it would be unrealistic to expect
today’s new and emerging democracies – even in parts of Central and
Eastern Europe where new democratic forms are now already well
stabilised – to reproduce in full the models and trajectories of party politics
hitherto associated with what may look like a mythical past in Western
Europe – and that it would be doubly unrealistic for any new democra-
cies that lack such predisposing conditions as substantial industrialisation,
urbanisation and high literacy levels that fuelled mass participatory politics
in the West, or for societies such as those in Africa where ‘traditional’
neo-patrimonial and clientelist cultures still exert a strong influence –
contrary to the ‘modernising’ trends associated with globalisation in other
parts of the world.1 Thus although in one sense we might expect party
politics to develop somewhat differently in today’s new democracies simply
by virtue of being able to take advantage of lessons the politicians acquire
from the history of party development in longer established democracies,
there may well be limits to what can be understood – and to any predic-
tions that might be ventured – in this way.
This insight is far from new. However, there is a yet further but less
often remarked upon complication, owing to the fact that a great deal of
our understanding of party politics begins and ends at the level of the
nation and state. But the context that contemporary globalisation now
provides to the development of parties and party systems everywhere and
in new democracies in particular differs profoundly from the external
environment that faced political parties in the formative days of today’s
long-established democracies, and that was much less important to them.
It suggests another powerful reason why we cannot identify all the
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influences upon party politics in today’s new democracies simply by
studying patterns from the past. And for those international actors who
make it their business to support the development of parties and party
systems in today’s newly emerging and prospective democracies so that
party politics is ‘fit for purpose’ of consolidating and improving democ-
racy in the years ahead, then it could have significant implications for
how they structure their activities and what they can hope to achieve. Thus
the study of party politics in new democracies must be alert to the role
of international factors including international party support. And any
critical assessment of international party support must take account of
globalisation rather than view party politics or party support in isolation.
Globalisation is, of course, a much contested concept, but invariably
portrayed as multifaceted or multi-dimensional. The degree of novelty in
the current era and its full extent and significance are all subjects of
enormous debate. At its simplest globalisation refers to the widening, 
deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness. More than
that, McGrew (2005: 23) says that in the political sphere globalisation
comprises: the stretching of politics across frontiers – the interests of a
community can be significantly affected by decisions taken by others 
at a remote distance; a thickening of the infrastructures of worldwide 
political interaction, especially those engaged in rule-making; acceleration
of political processes in part due to expansion of global communications;
and a blurring of the local–global, or domestic–foreign, divide. A marked
feature of globalisation in its political aspect refers to the way a distinc-
tive set of political ideas, norms and institutions revolving around familiar
Western conceptions of democracy are together becoming increasingly
more common throughout the world, even if the reasons for this conver-
gence, its normative implications and future sustainability are all in dispute.
In fact democratisation as a phenomenon that has occurred increasingly
across different countries, regions and cultures in part due to international
and supraterritorial influences is a feature of contemporary globalisation 
that is quite distinctive from all of contemporary globalisation’s previ-
ous stages, forerunners or antecedents. And yet this is happening at the 
very historical juncture when certain other leading features or primary
manifestations of globalisation – global economic integration (furthered 
through a delinking of markets from states and the application of stand-
ard neo-liberal economic solutions); the emergence of multiple locations
of (sometimes called multi-level) governance; and the growth of a global
communications network – are all thought by some to severely challenge
the worth of democracy in its established heartland, the sovereign
nation(al) state. Even the less expansive notions of globalisation such as
those that identify it more narrowly with increase in supra- and trans-
territoriality do not differ fundamentally: they too herald a combination
of some positive and some negative connotations for democracy and its














































Party politics in emerging democracies 3
an erosion of their powers and authority, and yet on the other hand,
various sub-state, non-state and multinational actors come to co-operate
across borders for purposes that expressly include the promotion of funda-
mental human rights central to democracy and other democratic goals
and objectives.
The political parties dimension
The literature on contemporary democratisation is no less voluminous and
rich in internal debates than is the literature on globalisation, but certain
core assumptions can be found in most accounts. In a world where it
seems democracy has to mean representative government, one of the most
commonly assumed – and frequently restated – propositions is that polit-
ical parties are central to democracy. For example Diamond and Gunther
(2001: xviii) say that in the effort to consolidate new or recent democ-
racies, ‘parties remain dominant in structuring the electoral process,
governing, and perhaps even in “symbolic integration” of citizens into the
democratic process’. Yet at the same time in the newer democracies there
are clearly ‘problems of performance and legitimacy’ with the parties
(Diamond and Gunther, 2001: xxxi). Strong parties and effective party
systems are essential to good democracy, not least so as to furnish govern-
ment that is capable of managing and responding to the forces of
globalisation in ways that serve the needs of the people and their entitle-
ment to self-rule. And plural politics are important to ensuring that
whichever party or parties make up the government they will be rendered
accountable by other parties for their exercise of the power that comes
with public office.
Indeed the global spread of party-based democracy is no mere accident.
Increasingly, observers are coming to recognise the considerable influence
on democratisation of a range of international factors in addition to 
the direct effects of the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet
Union. External imposition appears to be one route to bringing about
democracy, although its effectiveness is probably confined to very few
cases. Diplomatic pressure and the attachment of democratic and human
rights conditionalities to offers of financial support or development aid
and to the qualifications needed for membership of valued and prestigious
regional trade and other groupings or clubs offer further well-developed
strategies. And yet another approach that is often practised in combination
with the other measures is the provision of practical forms of democracy
assistance. The number and variety of organisations – governmental, inter-
governmental, and non-governmental – involved in such activities grew
dramatically in the 1990s to include special institutes and foundations 
in some of the newer democracies as well as the older democracies, all
oriented towards what has become a very cosmopolitan enterprise, the
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promotion and protection of democracy abroad. Not all of them have
‘gone global’, for some choose to concentrate their limited resources on
but a few countries. And yet some do increasingly recruit their personnel
– advisers and ‘democracy trainers’ – from a global labour market; and
seek to match the kind of people they put in the field with the societies
where they become operational. There is some measure of transatlantic
co-operation and a somewhat larger amount of transnational discussion
among the various democracy assistance organisations. In the established
democracies public support for democracy promotion appears to be strong;
the likelihood is that democracy assistance is here to stay, for the fore-
seeable future anyway.2
Within this increasingly multinational community of policy organisa-
tions, practitioner bodies, think-tanks, commercial consultancies and the
like all having an interest in the provision of democracy assistance, there
is growing recognition that just as we conceive democracy to be party
based, so support to the development of appropriate parties and party
systems must become a more important feature of democracy promo-
tion in emerging and prospective new democracies.3 One compelling reason
is that the bias that international development co-operation has shown 
in recent decades towards promoting economic markets (‘Washington con-
sensus’ and other neo-liberal solutions) and to furthering ‘good governance’
(even if not ‘bringing the state back in’), fails to address the condition of
political society, where parties are a major component. This has enor-
mous significance both for the functioning of markets and for governance
– the two of course being intimately connected – through such variables
as the quality of political leadership and the attitude politicians take to
the exercise of political power. These can range from essentially short-
termist and particularistic inclinations to more worthy ideas of ruling for
the long-term public good. The ability of party politics to channel under-
lying social and economic conflict in peaceful ways is another critical
element to both markets and governance, especially in societies that 
have a violent past. If party politics can be said to provide a public service
for democracy and democratisation,4 then the risks attendant on an in-
appropriate expression or under-provision or some other sign of market
failure may be nowhere more threatening than in new democracies, which
have yet to acquire the stability and depth associated with the longer
established democracies. The longer established democracies’ own prob-
lems with what many political analysts now perceive to be a decline in
party politics may be far less damaging. Needless to add, the develop-
ment and maintenance of well-institutionalised parties and party systems
should improve a society’s chances of extracting the potential benefits
globalisation offers to democracy and democratisation. Conversely, weak
parties that are subservient to highly personalist forms of leadership, or














































Party politics in emerging democracies 5
contrary, the proliferation of parties and factionalisation are rife, could
all render democracy and democratisation more vulnerable to the poten-
tial harm that increasing exposure to globalisation may bring.
Democracy assistance institutions
The institutionalisation of organisations at the regional and global levels
in addition to more localised and national initiatives for the promotion
and protection of democracy around the world is a distinctive feature 
of the current age. An example is the Community of Democracies (CD),
a loose agreement among more than 100 countries that met for the first
time in 2000 in Warsaw, and that some observers see as a basis for
elevating the idea that the people are sovereign over more traditional ideas
that privilege the sovereignty of the state. CD actors are invited to rush
collectively to defend a society’s choice to be a democracy against threat-
ened erosion, coups or autocoups, in any of the member states (see Halperin
and Galic, 2005).
Taking party politics as a central feature of democracy and demo-
cratisation, organisations as different as the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) are now joining the chorus led by more specialised democracy
assistance providers in seizing the importance of extending support 
to party political development. They include organisations that have a 
lengthy history of involvement in the issues of party support, most notably
Germany’s political foundations, or Stiftungen (examined in detail in
Chapter 10). Prominent examples in the United States are the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) created in 1983 and two of its main
grantees – the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International
Republican Institute (IRI) – as well as the government’s own official Agency
for International Development (USAID). The last offers to provide support
to (in principle all significant) democratic parties in a country, subject
only to some exceptional waivers. Very recently the NDI, which claims
to have worked with parties in more than 50 countries including nine in
Central and Eastern Europe and 15 in black Africa, has taken a particular
interest in the regulatory mechanisms that directly impact on parties (party
law; party finance), internal party governance and communications
outreach. In this book (Chapter 4) Carothers critically examines party
aid, especially but not only from the US, bringing out findings from his
detailed observations in the field and also the assessments made by actors
directly involved in party aid.
Britain has the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and
Australia the Centre for Democratic Institutions, established in 1998 with
core funding from the government’s Agency for International Development,
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which has a particular interest in the distinctive party politics as well as
the parliamentary governance of small Pacific island states, and a focus on
Indonesia, too. The Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), which is
based on inter-party co-operation in the Netherlands, is even more tightly
focused on party support and on developing systems of party politics char-
acterised by trust in the democratic process. For the IMD, that means a
special commitment to cross-party projects and being impartial among
parties, contrasting with the bilateral party work that some other actors
are engaged in. Clearly a number of the organisations are part of the
machinery of government, USAID for instance; others enjoy an ‘arm’s
length’ relationship even though much or all of their funding ultimately
comes from the public purse, as in the case of the NED and WFD. The
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
based in Stockholm, is rather different, as it is an inter-governmental body
of 23 members drawn from both the developed and developing worlds
that seeks to promote knowledge and understanding, instead of being a
supplier of more concrete forms of assistance. It has a substantial research
programme on the role of parties, including the way political party funding
is regulated around the world.5
In addition to government departments, independent foundations, think-
tanks and policy advice bodies such as the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington DC, there is the web of relations among
political parties in new and older democracies or with affiliates of parties
such as Germany’s Stiftungen and the Olof Palme International Center 
in Sweden. Some parties in newer democracies in turn are setting up
similar outreach activities albeit on a much smaller scale – for example
parties represented in Hungary’s parliament made the decision to estab-
lish state-sponsored foundations modelled after Germany’s Stiftungen.
Various forms of support and collaboration take place, including in some
cases the distribution of public money. Parties collectively network among
themselves also in formally constituted party internationals (Chapter 8
surveys African examples). Finally a handful of academics in several
countries and a number of commercial consultancies especially in the US
complement the informal membership of this rather distinctive ‘trans-
national knowledge elite’.
The closer attention that is now beginning to be called for in respect
of the political party component of democratisation and of democracy
support was not always thus – and in terms of the resources allocated it
starts from a very low base. Precise figures are difficult to calculate because
of definitional and recording difficulties, but they lie in the millions rather
than the billions of euros, pounds or dollars. Van Wersch and de Zeeuw
(2005) calculate the combined budgets in 2004 of the main European
democracy foundations – the great majority of them formed within 














































Party politics in emerging democracies 7
70 per cent is allocated to expenditures broadly related to political parties,
including training, organisation of conferences and workshops, advice and
technical assistance. Although Germany’s political foundations account for
the lion’s share of all expenditure, their proportion devoted to party work
appears to substantially less (see Chapter 10). In the US the International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute had a combined
overall budget equivalent to around 75 million euros in the same year.6
In part the growing interest in party politics has come about as a conse-
quence of realising that elections alone do not make a democracy and
that the attractive proposition that involvement with a country’s civic
associations offers a politically safe, diplomatically non-embarrassing way
of boosting democratisation is also flawed. First, although there are notable
examples where action by civil society and protest movements have
seriously weakened or brought down an authoritarian regime, their poten-
tial to meet the political requirements of democratic construction and
consolidation should not be exaggerated, especially where, as sometimes
happens, the energy civil society displays during a ‘democratic revolution’
subsequently dwindles or allows democratic reversal to take place. Second,
a belief that engagement with civil society enables external actors to main-
tain a safe distance from involvement in domestic political conflict has
turned out to be misplaced. Moreover the likelihood that support to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) can make a significant contribution
to meaningful political change has come to be questioned in many cases,
by observers noting typical NGO weaknesses such as acute dependence
on foreign funding. So, while the early years of international democracy
support gave considerable attention to elections observation and moni-
toring (complemented recently by a firmer appreciation of the need to
consolidate competent, non-partisan management of the electoral process)
and invested quite heavily in civil society capacity-building, the limita-
tions of these endeavours are now widely understood. For these reasons
the globalisation of party politics as an objective and programme of action
is now more firmly in the sights and thinking of democracy aid organ-
isations than perhaps at any previous time. However, what the democracy
aid industry has not yet brought fully into focus is how the goal of
promoting party-based democracy is affected by the forces of globalisation
understood in either a narrow or larger sense.
Globalisation and party politics
Researching the globalisation of party politics in new and emerging democ-
racies must draw on the insights of several literatures, some of them very
substantial, such as those on globalisation, democratisation and com-
parative political parties, along with a much smaller literature that has
appeared only in the last decade or so, namely on democracy promotion.
There is a barely visible sub-literature on party assistance specifically. 
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As recently as 2005 Kumar concluded an overview of international polit-
ical party assistance with the claim (only a slight overstatement) that the
‘academic literature on the subject is almost non-existent; there are no
scholarly articles, graduate theses, or books . . .’. Writing as a practitioner,
he argued, ‘This information gap urgently needs to be bridged in order
to promote sensible policies and effective programming’ (Kumar, 2005:
526).7 Even on party-based democratisation the relevant literatures do not
talk to one another very often. Very little of the enormous body of scholar-
ship devoted to making sense of globalisation dwells primarily on issues
of party politics anywhere, which contrasts with the large amounts of
material on civil society and social movements.8 And even a substantial
part of the extensive literature on party politics in the developed world
does not overtly and directly touch on the impact of globalisation, although
there are notable exceptions, where connections are often drawn impli-
citly as much as explicitly (such as Schmitter, 2001; Katz and Mair, 2002;
Blyth and Katz, 2005; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). It offers even less on
how party politics (construed as independent variable) has consequences
for globalisation (as dependent variable). This is something that the
confines of this book can do little to redress even while it states the case
for international party aid to do more to equip parties in emerging democ-
racies to relate to globalisation as autonomous actors. As Scholte (Chapter
3) observes quite correctly, the effective democratisation of globalisation
probably requires concurrent initiatives from multiple complementary
agendas: changes in the organisation and activities of political parties
could potentially make a worthwhile difference, but would by no means
be sufficient. However, it is true to say that US party support specifically
and a one-dimensional conception of globalisation that emphasises
economic liberalism have been brought together by Robinson (1996). But
his neo-Gramscian perspective, which leads him to interpret democracy
promotion as a means to further the hegemony of US transnational 
capital, reflects neither the declared goals of party aid practitioners nor
the tone of much academic research in Europe, where transnational party
co-operation has been studied by Pridham in some detail.9
What does globalisation mean for the complex challenge of building
viable and effective political parties and stable, competitive and effec-
tive party systems in emerging and prospective new democracies? How
does globalisation affect the ability of new parties and party systems to
make a constructive contribution to democratisation? Given the paucity
of published evidence about the actual practice of international party
support, what can be ascertained about the performance of this distinc-
tive feature of democracy assistance and its effectiveness in furthering
democratisation, in countries where non-democratic forms of rule have
prevailed until recently? What do advocates of such support need to know
about globalisation and its implications for party politics, if they are to














































Party politics in emerging democracies 9
appropriate methodologies for judging the results? These are the kinds of
questions that have not been posed often enough. The chapters in this
book offer a variety of responses; inevitably there is only a small selection
of all the possible cases.
The cases
Globalisation’s reach varies greatly from one society to another, and within
individual countries too its impact tends to be uneven. As a historical
process of change globalisation continues – will continue – to unfold;
most countries are on a moving train. The suggestion sometimes made
that certain countries, whole regions even or particular sections of society
(an ‘underclass’, for instance) are largely untouched by globalisation –
and will remain in that condition indefinitely – may be rephrased differ-
ently: it is correct that they have yet to share in the economic benefits of
globalisation, defined in largely economic terms. Yet it is quite conceiv-
able they are among the casualties of globalisation; they incur certain
disadvantages as a result of the way other countries and communities are
being integrated into the global economy more rapidly. At the same time
there are people in every country who are ‘winners’ from globalisation,
and many more who derive no great economic benefit or loss but never-
theless are touched by aspects of globalisation that the most restrictively
economistic conceptions of that phenomenon unreasonably neglect.
The cases in this book are drawn from East-Central Europe, south-east
Europe, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. A larger book would include
other regions, among which Latin America poses as a very strong candi-
date because of its relatively lengthy history of involvement with party
politics and the larger political effects of recently coming to terms with
closer integration into world economic markets.10 The cases here, however,
merit consideration on a number of criteria: as new or emerging democ-
racies (although that does not necessarily mean full Western-style liberal
democracy); as countries where party politics is in flux; as countries where
international democracy assistance has paid attention to political parties
or, alternatively the evolving party scene is being influenced either by
globalisation directly or globalising trends expressed through regionalisa-
tion and other means.
First, post-communist Europe and black Africa are two regions where
transitions (back) to some kind of democracy began at the end of the
1980s, later than in the first rounds of democracy’s ‘third wave’ in southern
Europe and South America. By 2005 South Africa, Namibia and Ghana
for instance were reckoned to be ‘free’ countries by Freedom House in
its annual survey, as were Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia (all bar Namibia were given the highest possible score – 1 – for
political rights). Serbia and Montenegro, and Romania too, qualified as
free, whereas the ratings given for Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina – like
10 Peter Burnell
those for Kenya, Malawi and a number of other African countries – lay
just outside, in the ‘partly free’ category. Although these judgments refer
to the state of political rights and civil liberties and the methodology used
to arrive at them is criticised by some analysts, Freedom House ratings
nevertheless are widely cited in the democratisation literature as guides
to democratic performance.11 Mohamed Salih in Chapter 8 maintains that
globally informed quasi-polyarchical democracy has now become the norm
in much of Africa, notwithstanding a few exceptions such as Zimbabwe
(see Chapter 9) that have travelled in the opposite direction and are now
judged to be ‘not free’. As a leader in the continent South Africa receives
close scrutiny in Chapter 9.
Both sub-Saharan Africa and post-communist Europe have been the
focus of considerable interest among actors keen to assist democratic
progress: for instance Eastern Europe and Euro-Asia plus sub-Saharan
Africa account for close to a half of all project expenditures by Europe’s
political foundations (van Wersch and de Zeeuw, 2005). Central and
Eastern Europe since 1989 has been the site of the greatest concentration
of international party support – in the 1990s probably receiving as much
as half of all party support, with a particular concentration from US
sources. The region also enjoys the reputation of being a great success
story for democracy promotion by the West and in particular the efforts
of the European Union (EU), as reported in for instance Vachudova’s
(2005: 179) account of ‘active leverage’ by the EU that ‘empowered
opposition political parties’, providing a focal point for co-operation, 
transmitting liberal democratic norms and values and promising tangible
benefits from EU membership. The interplay between the EU and liberal
pro-reform parties in candidates for EU accession was a major force 
for political system change. But Africa too has witnessed a past history
of significant contact with foreign actors in areas of both civil society and
political society, including the Stiftungen whose involvement there goes
back far enough for them to have come to the view that co-operation
with African political parties can be a ‘risky business’ (see Chapter 10).
In short, Africa seems to offer a good contrast to East-Central Europe,
in particular because of the belief that in terms of building Western-style
parties and party politics it offers more difficult terrain: stereotypical
European or Western models do not apply in Africa. And so by the same
token there is still much work to be done by the international partners
in democracy support.
The colonial impact in the nineteenth century and first half of the twen-
tieth century could be said to have introduced Africa to aspects of
globalisation and impacted on their society, politics and culture long before
the word gained its current popularity. Since then African countries have
acquired extensive experience of dealing with such institutions of global
governance as the Bretton Woods organisations (International Monetary














































Party politics in emerging democracies 11
situation. Most of them are very familiar with the implications for polit-
ical self-determination. Over the last decade or so, the countries of East-
Central Europe (and in the Balkans) as well as the majority of African
states have a shared experience of making rapid adjustments towards a
smaller direct role for the state in economic affairs, by privatising state
owned enterprises and by trade liberalisation, for example, and steps to
increase inter-regional trade have also been common. However, in terms
of both present levels and current trends of global economic integration
there is a clear contrast between the two regions: the majority of European
countries are well ahead. Africa accounts for only tiny shares of world
trade and corporate investment flows, in absolute terms and on a per
capita basis. But aside from most African states’ close links with multi-
lateral aid organisations, some countries such as South Africa have made
dramatic strides in recent years to enter more fully the mainstream of
global finance, commerce and trade even if for others this still remains
just an unfulfilled aspiration. Yet neither Africa nor the post-communist
states have been among the greatest winners of globalisation defined in
term of economic growth or increase in average real per capita incomes;
this accolade must go to countries such as China and India in recent years
and to East Asia’s ‘tigers’ or ‘dragons’ such as South Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore in an earlier period.
Where many of the European countries can claim to be most distinc-
tive is in respect of the Europeanising effects of their membership – both
actual and prospective – of the EU. This point applies in some measure
to Turkey too, which – in part due to its long cherished ambition to join
the EU and to some very positive developments lately in the long-drawn
out accession process – has witnessed significant recent developments in
its party politics (explored by Öniş in Chapter 7). Turkey is quite highly
placed in the political ranking of globalisation – higher than Hungary,
for instance12 – and as its relations with the EU intensify, Turkey’s engage-
ment with features of globalisation more generally, it is likely to increase,
too. There are many arguments about the exact relationship of regional-
isation (increasing interconnectedness among a contiguous group of states)
and Europeanisation (as one specific example) to globalisation. For instance
are these processes complementary or contradictory? Does regionalisation
express in miniature – on and within the regional level – facets of the
more wide-ranging phenomenon that is globalisation? Is regionalism just
a precursor or a stepping stone to broader integration into the worldwide
processes of globalisation, or can it serve as a permanent vehicle for
resisting global pressures? Here is not the place to offer a résumé of such
large and complex debates. Suffice to say EU membership may act as a
filter of globalisation while at the same time applying to its members –
and candidates for membership – some of the pressures and opportun-
ities that globalisation itself may bring to bear. At the same time it adds
some very distinctive features of its own. This applies especially in the
12 Peter Burnell
field of party politics.13 In fact Ágh (in Chapter 5) argues strongly for
countries in East-Central Europe for which, notwithstanding their appar-
ently successful transition to democracy, Europeanisation since EU
accession has entailed some serious drawbacks for party politics. The
features, if not their origins, in part resemble the effects that might be
more directly attributable to globalisation in other parts of the world.
Turkey’s story, at an earlier place in the cycle of EU engagement, appears
in a more positive light even though, unlike parties in East-Central Europe,
there has been no specific democracy aid to the parties. Whether the East-
Central European examples hold up a mirror to Turkey’s future or whether,
instead, Turkey offers a model that might travel to other societies in the
Islamic world where international democracy assistance organisations are
now starting to take more serious interest are certainly intriguing issues.
Like the question of whether Political Islam constitutes a globalising force
of its own that is in serious competition with Western-based notions and
manifestations of globalisation, they must lie beyond the confines of this
book.
For sure, a more broadly based comparative study of countries than
can be accommodated in this collection will be needed in order to take
further forward our understanding of the full significance of globalisation
for party politics. And that means a more extended collaboration among
different area specialists. But studies in this collection have special rele-
vance to that very specific and rather distinctive feature whereby the party
politics component of party-based democracy is coming to be more wide-
spread, notably in newer and emerging democracies through the ways and
means of international party support.
Notes
1 On these grounds Van Cranenburgh (1999: 104) goes so far as to question
the point of extending international support to parties in African countries,
because of their personalistic and clientelistic nature: ‘The idea that direct
support to African political parties as they function at present is an instru-
ment to further democracy assumes, mistakenly, that they are actually “agents
of democracy” or can be made to function as such.’ For a critical assessment
of African parties’ performance of basic functions for democracy and demo-
cratic consolidation, see also Randall and Svåsand (2002b).
2 The German Marshall Fund of the United States (2005) reported that 74 per
cent of European respondents and 51 per cent of Americans expressed support
for democracy promotion, and that although US Democrats were much less
supportive than Republicans – probably because they associated the idea with
the Bush administration – a majority even of Democrats supported the use of
‘soft power’ to promote democracy, such as monitoring elections and support
to independent groups.
3 One example is the conference on ‘Achieving sustainable political change in
emerging democracies: the political party challenge’, organised in London,
March 2004, under the auspices of the UK’s Westminster Foundation for














































Party politics in emerging democracies 13
including senior representatives from several major democracy foundations and
development organisations. Burnell (2004) contains a report of the discussions.
4 Van Biezen (2004) describes parties as ‘public utilities’.
5 All these organisation have websites that detail their activities. A general intro-
duction to their world is Burnell (2000), which inter alia contains Mair 2000a
on Germany’s political foundations. Scott and Walters (2000) offers more
detail on the NED in particular.
6 Germany’s foundations are documented more fully in Chapter 10. The IMD,
founded in 2000 and funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spent
6.6 million euros on its 14 country programmes in 2005 (over half of them
in Africa) and now looks set to consolidate its position. In Britain around half
the WFD’s spending on political party projects overseas from its total annual
budget of around £4 million from the government’s Foreign and Common-
wealth Office (FCO) takes place through Britain’s political parties. A portion
of the rest goes on cross-party projects, which the WFD would like to expand.
In recent years up to 87 per cent of project spend has been in Europe and
Africa. Average project cost is under £10,000. A generally critical report by
River Path Associates (2005) commended the WFD’s investment in inter-
national networks of political parties, and the value of the WFD’s ability to
work with certain partners and environments where diplomatic sensitivities
preclude direct FCO involvement was underscored in the government’s response
to the report. In the US, it was not until 2003 that the NED’s core appro-
priation for all spending exceeded US$40 million for the first time (plus a
further US$10 million of ‘special funding’). The NED’s grant allocations to
political parties have historically accounted for only around 15 per cent of
the total expenditure on overseas partners abroad, or little over half the propor-
tion allocated to civic organisations.
7 Exceptions to Kumar’s generalisation include Carothers (1999: 140–55;
2004b), Burnell (2001) and Kumar (2005) – the most widely available study
to date, although based exclusively on US experience. However, Carothers
(2006) will be a major new addition to the literature and should be read
alongside this book.
8 Exceptions include Garrett (1998), which argues from evidence in the advanced
industrial countries between 1966 and 1990 that globalisation does not harm
the possibilities of ‘social democratic corporatism’, and Clift (2002). Garrett’s
reasoning that the economic gains of globalisation can be reaped without
reducing the ability of citizens to choose how to distribute the benefits and
costs of the market runs counter to the assumption frequently found in the
political economy literature that globalisation understood as increasing trade
and financial openness shrinks the policy space, moving the centre ground 
of programmatic competition between parties further towards neo-liberal eco-
nomic strategies and policies. These and similar analyses are more concerned
with globalisation’s implications for public economic and social welfare policy
than for party politics and aspects of the party system other than policy conver-
gence, even if they do have some relevance outside advanced post-industrial
democracies with their strong social democratic traditions. Even the writers
in international political economy who say globalisation should not be viewed
as a dominating and independent variable and argue instead that the state
exercises an independent influence on policy in the main ignore the party
dimension. A tiny literature on developing countries suggests that even there
collective action can make a difference to the policy mix, influencing it in a
pro-poor direction, for instance Kurtz’s (2002) comparison of post-Pinochet
Chile and Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party. Kurtz accounted
14 Peter Burnell
for the differences in welfare policy regime in terms of party system dynamics
and levels of political inclusiveness.
9 Pridham, who has investigated these matters most closely, found transnational
party co-operation in East–West Europe ‘has played a not insignificant although
low-profile part in the democratization process at the level of party develop-
ment’ (Pridham, 1999a: 73).
10 The role of external support to parties, human rights organisations and other
forms of organised political protest against pre-democratic authoritarian
regimes in countries such as President Pinochet’s Chile has already been the
subject of some attention. See for example chapters in Whitehead (1999); also
Keck and Sikkink (1998).
11 Data from Piano and Puddington (2006), based on events December 2004 to
November 2005. ‘Free’ countries are those with combined ratings for polit-
ical rights and civil liberties that average 1.0 to 2.5; ‘partly free’ countries
average 3.0 to 5.0; ‘not free’ countries average 5.5 to 7.00.
12 The Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) global-
isation index for 2001 ranks Turkey in 28th position; available at www.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index.
13 Ladrech (2002) proposes an analytical framework to assess the impact of
‘Europeanisation’ on parties but does not prejudge the empirical findings, 
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2 Political parties, international party 
assistance and globalisation
Peter Burnell
This chapter introduces the challenge facing international democracy assist-
ance in its endeavours to support political parties’ contribution to
democratisation, given the constraints and opportunities posed by global-
isation. To understand the role that democracy assistance can occupy 
here, it is first necessary to identify the relationship of party politics to
democratisation, before going on to distinguish the different approaches
that assistance can take. The chapter explores what globalisation means
for the challenge of establishing democratically effective parties and party
systems in new democracies, distinguishing potentially positive and nega-
tive effects. Some implications for how assistance to party-based democracy
might respond are raised in Chapter 11.
What political parties do
From the perspectives of democracy and democratisation party politics is
not an end in itself. Although the purveyors of party aid have the devel-
opment of parties as their primary object, it is what parties do (or cannot
do) for democratisation that is of more importance. Parties collectively
provide public virtues for democracy, but individually the parties and 
the politicians who make them work have private vices – power, and 
the various purposes to which they want to put power, are the main
motivators, and a disinterested commitment to advancing the cause of
democracy may not feature high on everyone’s agenda. That said, there
is a distinction between parties and party systems. The latter refers to the
number and distinctiveness of effective parties, and the nature and extent
of their differences, such as whether highly polarised or not, their rela-
tions to one another and society. And it is the institutionalisation of the
party system that may have the greater significance for the quality of
democracy and its consolidation in the long run (Mainwaring, 1998).1
However, as Randall and Svåsand (2002a) have shown, what tends to be
understood by institutionalisation in respect of parties may not coincide
with institutionalisation – or its requisites – at the level of the party system.
Indeed, the two may actually conflict. Other useful distinctions are between
the attributes, capabilities, roles and functions of parties. The last can
refer specifically to functions for democracy and democratisation. To say
that if parties gain, for example, from international support, then demo-
cratisation must advance is a non sequitur.
Whereas what parties really do and the consequences of their actions
are matters for empirical inquiry, questions about what they should (be
helped to) do cannot be answered fully outside some normative frame-
work, such as one that identifies democracy’s meaning, purpose and value.
In short, what is democracy for? Why is democratisation a good thing?
The responses to such questions are bound to vary. Some lay emphasis
on the provision by parties of means for people to participate in the polit-
ical process (participatory function), although views differ on why that is
so important – ranging from fulfilling the requirements of representation
to the belief that participation develops good citizens (educational goal).
Yet others place more weight on the ability of competing parties to make
elected government accountable (control function), in the interests of
securing government that both possesses legitimacy and tries to practise
good government. These functions are a sub-group of a wider set of roles
that are associated with parties but may not be exclusive to parties or
even unique to democracies. Examples are the recruitment of effective
leaders for public office, policy formulation, expressing social solidarity
and furthering the cause of social and political integration by influencing
how citizens behave. Parties may also do the ‘vision thing’, that is, artic-
ulate a view of the kind of society that is desirable, which can vary widely
from, for instance, ideas about social justice to ethno-nationalist purity.
In the democratic context a constantly recurring theme is that parties
supply the main bridge between state or democratic governance and society
or the citizens, and that this lies at the heart of their contribution to both
national integration and democratic consolidation.
In order to perform any of the roles and in particular the functions 
for democracy and democratisation, parties and party systems need certain
capabilities. For example, policy research competence is needed if parties
are to be able to review and initiate solutions to problems arising in 
the public sphere. Capabilities in turn rest on the possession in some meas-
ure of a number of attributes, properties or qualities, such as financial
resources, organisational strengths, communication skills, public trust and
so on, all of which might be deficient, especially in the early days of new
parties or brand new democracies. In respect of the party system, conti-
nuity of some of the parties over time is desirable if the voters are to 
be able to enforce accountability through periodic elections, although a
stable party system does not require the entire membership to remain
constant – indeed, that can be a drawback for democratic development.
Furthermore the roles most commonly associated with parties and party
systems in the established democracies may not be identical with the func-














































Political parties and international party assistance 17
This is the difference between running politics in a stable democracy and
helping to move the polity towards democratic consolidation, however
defined.2 So, for example, while helping parties to become effective at con-
ducting election campaigns could be essential to a democracy, it will not
necessarily further democratisation, especially if the parties themselves 
are not all committed to democracy’s purposes, values and practices.
Conversely, there is the failure to promote civic education that has recently
been diagnosed as a specific weakness of the parties in the established
democracies.3 While not necessarily threatening the persistence of democ-
racy in Western Europe and North America, such failure might be cause
for much greater concern in emerging democracies that lack other instru-
ments to perform this vital task, and where there may be no historical
memory of widespread democratic participation. Democratisation could be
at risk.
Debates over which of the parties’ roles or functions can be said to be
‘core’ and which ones only parties (or certain kinds of party) can perform
– and which activities are merely ancillary ones that certain historically
contingent forms of party have contributed in the past – provide useful
distinctions, all of which may need to be revisited from time to time 
and recast in the light of a globalising world. We should not assume 
that the division of labour between different categories of organisation is
– or should be – set in stone,4 although apart from competing for public
office and furnishing governments (and even then it is not unknown for
political figures to be elected to high office without having strong party
credentials), there is much room for debate over where the comparative
advantage of parties does now lie. For instance, while it has become very
common for an assortment of civic associations to articulate particular
interests – a role formerly assigned to parties – interest aggregation 
might be considered to be both a higher order requirement of democratic
politics (albeit one that depends on interest articulation) and a democratic
function where parties collectively still (should) have the edge. This is
neither to say that parties monopolise the role nor to deny that certain
types of party, ethnic parties for instance, make very poor candidates 
and may behave dysfunctionally for democratisation.5 Put differently, it
is for parties to unite society and contribute cohesion whereas at least
some civil society groupings and new social movements might prove more
conducive to societal fragmentation. In divided societies seeking to estab-
lish democracy out of the ruins of violent conflict, interest aggregation is
one of those most vital public goods that can easily be undersupplied.
That gives the construction of party politics there a special mission, and
one that has significant implications for determining the best form of party
system. To illustrate, collusive inter-party relations may facilitate demo-
cratisation through a transition period. But if that arrangement creates a
static and restricted pattern of political competition that leaves wide open
spaces for the rise of ‘anti-system’ parties (parties that do not subscribe
18 Peter Burnell
to democracy and the rule of law), then the consequences could be less
favourable to democracy later (Norden, 1998).
If what parties do and what the parties look like cannot be separated
from one another, then inevitably the border between parties and embry-
onic parties, proto-parties and other party-like organisations may be as
fuzzy in practice as it is intriguing in theory. At minimum, parties seek
public office. But judging which civic groups, social movements, protest
movements and other sorts of collective actors in political civil society
will develop into parties during major episodes of political regime change
can be every bit as hazardous as forecasting which new parties will go
on to thrive, or wither away or suddenly collapse. In reality, the emerging
and prospective new democracies differ greatly in respect of both their
present condition (from dominant party systems to very fragmented party
systems) and the antecedents, which vary as widely as no-partyism (as in
Uganda’s experience of ‘movement politics’ under President Museveni) to
some of the post-communist cases where a de jure one-party state suddenly
gave way to a very fluid situation and ongoing flux of the parties (some
might almost say a non-system, for example, in Poland). In many coun-
tries brand new parties are formed but have to coexist alongside other
parties that, in one guise or another have been very significant actors in
the past. But in contrast to situations where opposition-party led dissent
contributed strongly to the redemocratisation of an authoritarian regime
are the episodes of democratic breakthrough in which political parties
were not major actors at all, possibly because they had been ruthlessly
suppressed.
Strategic approaches to assisting parties’ role in democratisation
Identifying what parties and party systems actually do in today’s estab-
lished democracies is not the same as conceptualising their roles and
functions for democratisation. The order of importance among tasks and
the sequencing during the larger processes of political change may differ
among societies, from one phase or episode of democratisation to the
next. If external actors are not to overload the absorptive capacity of
parties to receive support and the demands placed upon them it may be
essential to establish some relevant priorities. Van Biezen (2003) has argued
that the sequence of events in democratisation can influence the sequence
of organisation building by parties and the incentive structure concerning
whether or not to invest in developing the party on the ground. The
timing of the creation of central party organisation vis-à-vis popular
involvement may mean the difference between a largely instrumental
approach to political mobilisation by political elites on the one side and
a more grass-roots approach to participation in ways that hold party
leaders to account on the other. An analogous chain of reasoning would














































Political parties and international party assistance 19
could critically affect how well and in what ways it serves (or hinders)
democratisation. Knowing the optimum balance of roles and functions 
at any one time and getting the timing right are challenges for designing
party support just as they are for the parties themselves. In the course 
of political development parties and their international friends should be
prepared to make adjustments in the contribution they seek to make to
democratisation, especially if they find that the particular strengths 
they previously offered or supported are now outmoded or have become 
inadequate to the evolving new requirements.
In Chapter 4 Carothers paints the reality that although much inter-
national party assistance is founded on a shared idea of what a good
party looks like, it has little strategic sense of what is to be expected at
the end of the process of party support. Setting out in this way by
prescribing a universal model of what political parties do and then seeking
to advance that model irrespective of time, place and circumstance has
the appeal of simplicity. The same is true where there are firm assump-
tions about the respective worth of the different roles and functions that
party politics might perform, for instance a conviction that maximising
participation should take precedence, and that furnishing stable national
political leadership or providing effective economic management should
always carry lesser weight. However, there are at least two alternatives
to such simple ways of proceeding. One is a stageist approach. This main-
tains that the requirements that democratisation needs most from party
politics and the optimum order in which specific functions should be
prioritised will vary according to the stage or level of democratic devel-
opment already achieved. For example, holding government to account
might become one of the most important functions in the longer run, and
that in turn might be served best by encouraging an adversarial form of
party politics underpinned by the notion of a democratically ‘loyal oppo-
sition’. But to seek this might be appropriate only after other basic features
of democratic stability have already been achieved, especially if vehicles
for social reconciliation and political integration are in short supply. And
that in turn could invite approaches to party system engineering that lean
more immediately towards a form of consociational or consensual politics
(Reilly, 2003).
The second option – and seemingly more democratic approach to strat-
egising party assistance – is to say that the people themselves must decide.
This is an appealing answer when considered against the background 
of those critiques that characterise international democracy assistance as 
being too supply-driven (that is, donor-driven) and excessively prone 
to elite-led, top-down initiatives that smack more of imposition than
popular ownership. An illustration of this is the complaint made by local
partners in Serbia and Montenegro that ‘some donor activity is designed
to meet objectives set in Washington, London or Berlin’ (River Path
Associates, 2005: I, 74). But the alternative could mean canvassing the
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different social groups’ views on democratisation, the value they place
upon it and why and what they most expect to gain, and how they
conceive the contribution of party politics to this process. We should 
not be surprised if a variety of answers as uniquely meaningful as peace,
prosperity, liberty, empowerment and social justice actually frame the
respondents’ replies. The practical difficulties of ‘asking the people’ should
not be underestimated either. In more authoritarian climates the conduct
of truly revealing attitude surveys is problematic. People’s views about
democratisation and more particularly the role of parties may differ
depending on the time horizon they are asked to consider. And views
could change over time, not least if the political situation develops and
(for good or ill) society becomes more familiar with the operation and
the actual merits and disappointments of political pluralism in the interim.
Moreover, it would be important to access the views of ordinary people,
including the politically unengaged, and not just the political elites. After
all, the party leaders (some of them, at least) may themselves be part of
the problem, harbouring attitudes inimical to democracy, even though
strengthening parties is a crucial part of the solution to democracy’s weak-
ness. Thus in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the UK’s Westminster
Foundation for Democracy has observed the persistent domination of
parties by their leaders and undemocratic decision-making, leading it to
believe that the way to challenge excessive ethno-nationalism in Bosnian
politics is through changing the outdated, communist-style models of party
organisation that sustain it (River Path Associates, 2005: I, 60). Of course,
none of this gives specific guidance over what to do in situations where
the party elites obstruct change or where survey respondents prove suspi-
cious of or even hostile to democratically organised party politics other
than to suggest that such societies are not the most obvious candidates
to receive international democracy support. Alternatively, democracy
assistance in such places could concentrate first on exploring the reasons
that lie behind such unfavourable attitudes, and tackle what may be more
fundamental democratic deficits than political party issues, perhaps giving
priority to addressing even more serious weaknesses such as state collapse
or the breakdown of law and order.
The parties dimension of democracy assistance
What might party aid do that could help party politics serve democrat-
isation or more indirectly improve the conditions that in turn influence
how far parties and party politics can live up to the requirements of demo-
cratisation in a globalising age? A preface to an answer should perhaps
say that whatever else is considered all initiatives must be grounded in a
sound understanding of the principal determinants of the number of polit-
ical parties and other key features of a party system. However, in such
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structure and agency, the importance of institutional conditions and
preconditions (formal and informal) and the shadow cast by history – the
preceding regime and the manner of democracy’s coming (violent, ‘pacted’
and so on) – the literature on party politics shares much of the ambiva-
lence found in theorising about democratisation generally. Party politics
seems to take its shape from a complex web of ‘causes’: no single general
theory is trumps – instead there is a well-tilled field of partial and contested
propositions and middle-range debates. This means that democracy assist-
ance faces several options for supporting the growth of party-based
democracy. The following account indicates a broad menu of possibilities;
a more detailed assessment of what has actually transpired can be found
in Chapter 4.
Parties at election times
In the past much support has gone on an ad hoc basis to selected activ-
ities by parties as and when the immediate need has presented itself, most
typically in ‘founding/transition elections’, the most pressing being the
capacity to campaign for electoral support. There was probably little
thought about the consequences in terms of party system or more subtle
democratisation objectives for the longer term. Although decidedly oppor-
tunistic and short term, such interventions can still be appropriate where
the success of just such an election – or perhaps even a specific electoral
outcome (victory for pro-democratic forces) – and the formation of a legit-
imate government in this way are critical to the chances of completing
an orderly changeover to democracy. Much of the party support has taken
the form of advice and training although there have been instances of
financial transfers, too. But much of the large scale international financial
assistance has been reserved for making elections possible, by underwriting
the infrastructure for organising the electoral process and staging elec-
tions, without which party competition would be meaningless.
Parties between elections
Kumar (2005: 520) reckons that probably more resources continue to be
devoted to election campaign-related activities than any other party object.
But with the move from a democracy’s inauguration towards placing it
on a secure footing and improving the substance – most notably in ensuring
that electoral democracy blossoms into liberal democracy complete with
universal respect for wide-ranging civil liberties and minority rights – the
organisational development of the parties starts to attract more attention.
This means support for objectives such as organisational durability and
structural innovations to promote intra-party democracy, and entrenching
equal opportunities (or, possibly, positive discrimination) for women.
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Given that what parties do between elections is so important to democ-
racy, offering long-term support that both helps build a firm base in the
country and supports effective participation in the legislature can have
particular value where the country’s political constitution inclines towards
executive predominance (a feature even of some parliamentary systems).
That tends to give incentives to parties to spring to life at election times
only. Cross-party projects such as those that aim to influence political
behaviour across all parties, for example in countries coming out of violent
conflict, also are as much about the party system as parties individually.
In reality, however, the evidence from some countries attempting to
build democracy after conflict – Mozambique, for instance – is that democ-
racy promoters have shown more willingness to offer support to parties
as a peace-making strategy, operating with a short-term horizon, than to
follow up afterwards with substantial sustained assistance for the longer
haul (de Zeeuw and Kumar, 2006). Nevertheless, a rather distinctive
mission that international actors can volunteer at the outset – Northern
Ireland (Sinn Féin) and Palestine (Hamas) are topical examples – is to
persuade any parties that have links with movements that practise or have
practised political violence to sever their links with those organisations
and/or renounce the use of violence, so as to help build social capital
among the different politicians and ensure that democratic political partici-
pation alone will prevail.
Institutional influences on parties
A third option is to address the wider institutional context that influences
not just parties individually but the party system, with a view to achieving
a multi-party system that is both inclusive and competitive. That can mean
advising on the technical specifications of alternative electoral systems
(although the ability to determine the party system through tinkering with
the electoral system should not be overestimated), and rendering technical
and financial support to the office of elections management (professional
competence and political autonomy there being essential). Investing in a
credible apparatus for non-partisan management of the entire electoral
process can be important for preventing manipulative game-playing by
some parties who, just because they know they are relatively unpopular,
will cry foul and, possibly, boycott an election, or alternatively dispute
the validity of an election after another party is declared the winner –
cynical tactics that can erode public confidence in, and support for, the
politicians generally. In some countries influence might have to be brought
to bear on the government to liberalise the framework of laws and regu-
lations if it restricts unduly the association, assembly and registration of
parties by political opponents.
That larger constitutional issues might also have to be considered in
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highly presidential the system the weaker will be the parties – something
that can drive elected members of the legislature to concentrate on doing
local constituency work and become increasingly divorced from nation-
ally important international affairs. The timing of presidential and par- 
liamentary elections (concurrent or otherwise) may modify these effects
on how important a role the parties play. But of all the different insti-
tutional influences the funding regime for political parties is the one that
seems to have attracted most interest from external democracy promo-
tion actors, although on this it is much easier to give advice than to be
confident that any democracy anywhere has found the ideal solution (see
Burnell and Ware, 1998; International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance, 2003).
Social and cultural engineering
Of course, very different and less direct approaches to influencing the
development of party politics are indicated if the social cleavages struc-
turing political representation are believed to hold the key, or if the main
emphasis has to be on changing political attitudes. On the former there
is some support for the idea of greater collaboration between democracy
assistance and the efforts in more conventional international development
co-operation, for instance with a view to achieving more equal political
participation by differentially advantaged/disadvantaged socio-economic
groups. However, the danger is that democracy assistance and its dis-
tinctive objectives might then become harnessed to the cause of economic
development because of the vastly greater financial and human resources
and the leverage that traditional development aid bureaucracies invariably
possess. And the fact remains that in many of the developing world democ-
racies left–right distinctions based on income, wealth and occupation are
relatively unimportant or must compete with other stronger forces shaping
political allegiance, such as ethnic and linguistic factors. Yet although it
is in parts of post-communist Europe (and Latin America) that the influ-
ence of class, occupation and related considerations on voting behaviour
and on party system development might be thought likely to be strongest
(stronger than in Africa, anyway), party system outcomes even there have
been influenced by the interventions of agency and party strategy. These
appear to play a role in shaping ‘underlying’ social cleavage formation
and people’s perceptions about the social cleavages, too. So we should be
wary of dramatising severely independent variables whose effects on party
politics are (mis)conceived to lie wholly beyond the capability of inter-
national party aid or other external interventions to affect.
In respect of civic education, there may be opportunities for construc-
tive involvement by democratic assistance in activities as specialised as
the redesign of school curricula or devising regulatory frameworks for
public service broadcasting. Encouragement to strengthen the legal backing
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for basic rights and freedoms such as the rights of women and vulner-
able minority groups can also be highly relevant to the parties. And the
aphorism familiar in the democratisation literature that claims ‘no civil
society, no party politics’ directs our attention back to civic associations
and to cultivating stronger relations with the parties. This is an endeavour
where parties may be able to learn much from the greater experience that
some civic actors and non-governmental organisations have in dealing
with global networks and in treading the corridors of regional or global
institutions of governance and power. Party–civil society relations are very
much on the contemporary agenda of some democracy support agencies
(Gershman, 2004; Kumar, 2005: 523).
Inter-party relations
A further possibility is to pay more attention to the relations between
parties at both the national level on the one side and in supra-territorial
forums on the other. At the domestic level the objective is to help with
the construction of a party system in which the competition between the
parties is neither so combative nor so collusive as to put democracy in
the long term at risk. The development of amicable cross-party dialogue
might lead on from agreeing on matters such as codes of conduct to
considering how institutions such as the arrangements for political funding
might enhance party politics’ capability to serve democratisation more
effectively in the future. At the same time there is some evidence that, if
given the choice, many parties prefer to receive bilateral aid to sharing
support in collaboration with other political parties or with civil society
organisations.
Investment in the development of transnational party relations among
countries facing comparable challenges in democracy building and similar
pressures from economic forces of globalisation and institutions of global
or regional governance (Chapter 8 gives African examples) is an option
that receives little support in practice. But practical opportunities for
parties in new democracies to co-operate and coordinate transnationally
among themselves might enhance their ability to engage with the inter-
national democracy promotion organisations and party aid practitioners
specifically on more equal terms. Clearly whatever is done at these levels
should not be at the expense of levels below the national state. Indeed,
in post-conflict environments it is often at the sub-national and local
community level that real advances in peace building are – or must be –
made. And the encouragement that international donors with ‘governance’
agendas are giving to programmes both for privatisation and administra-
tive decentralisation makes the case for corresponding initiatives to assist
political society at sub-national levels that much more compelling. Indeed,
there is a view that where it has been adequately constructed local politics
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terms the forces of globalisation are now restraining what historically was
a significant social force for democratisation, the nationally-organised
working-class (Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist, 2005). However, the fact
that the challenge – even at levels below central government – is anything
but straightforward is apparent from Gallagher’s account of the Balkans
(see Chapter 6). Well-intentioned interventions by external actors such as
the European Union appear to have fuelled political fragmentation, which
now obstructs the construction both of strong democratically organised
parties at the national level and effective central political authorities.
In conclusion, none of the above options for engaging with the sphere
of party politics are mutually exclusive, although some involve working
directly with parties whereas others concentrate more on changing the
surrounding conditions. And there is a possibility that different kinds 
of involvement by external actors will operate at cross-purposes. Of course
doing nothing should not be ruled out either, for it is a legitimate ques-
tion to ask when/where is not the right time or place to party. The absence
of (prospective) suitable partners suggests one such situation. Another is
where there is a real risk of delegitimating party politics altogether through
association with foreign interventions and especially where anti-foreign
sentiment already runs strong. We should reflect on situations where
‘pushing the envelope’ for political parties could breach the principle of
‘do no harm’, and on circumstances where attention to parties simply will
not touch the underlying determinants of a highly unequal distribution of
political power. By offering a distraction, party support could jeopardise
strategic thinking about alternative approaches to promoting democracy.
But for all the courses of action (and inaction) that have been identified
it is reasonable to say that in the endeavours of the democracy assistance
practitioners a limiting horizon tends to stop at the national state, and
globalisation’s other implications hardly feature at all.
How does globalisation impact on political parties?
Globalisation’s impact on party politics is a dauntingly large and complex
topic, our understanding necessarily contingent on what we mean by
globalisation and on distinguishing direct, first-round effects from any
indirect consequences that follow from its impact on the wider political,
social, economic and cultural parameters. The effects will not be uniform
across all societies or all parties. Distinctive issues face parties in coun-
tries that are formally pooling certain powers of political self-determination
to regional or other supraterritorial institutions of governance, the Euro-
pean Union for instance. But the overbearing force that some of the more
populist accounts attribute to globalisation should put us on guard against
undervaluing the influence of domestic sources of party weakness or party
strength; we should not rule out the possibility that parties may make use
of globalisation to their own advantage, just as they manipulate external
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recognition and other forms of international support (including democ-
racy assistance) to advance their own particular interests within the dom-
estic political arena. Put differently, if, as at least some of the literature
already recognises, states still mediate the impact of globalisation and are
one of the factors constitutive of globalisation, then research may discover
similar findings about party politics rather than just number party politics
among globalisation’s effects.
More illuminating than posing one simple question about whether
globalisation is favourable or unfavourable to the institutionalisation of
party politics would be a willingness to disaggregate globalisation’s conse-
quences for different aspects of party politics, such as by investigating 
the specific consequences for how the parties conduct themselves, the party
system, the policies they offer the electorate and so on. Exactly the same
point applies to very narrow specifications of globalisation, such as the
definitions that reduce it to a purely economic process, compared with
globalisation in its entirety, which could be more enlightening. So, for
example, there is the familiar claim from the established democracies 
that responses to globalisation and economic marketisation specifically
have brought a narrowing and a rightwards shift of the ideological spec-
trum offered by the parties. In addition, the parties themselves have
changed away from the ‘catch-all’ type and towards a ‘cartel’ model (Blyth
and Katz (2005). Other analysts have offered slightly different views, for
instance Kitschelt (2004: 21), who shares some of the concerns about 
the implications of globalisation for social democracy but says parties and
party systems are evolving ‘from encompassing department stores to
specialized boutiques, as consumer demands become more discriminating:
from the diversified task structure of holding companies to a concentration
on “core competences” and comparative advantages . . .’. Indeed global-
isation’s multifaceted nature combined with a discerning approach to
investigating its effects may reveal both bad news and good news for
party politics in emerging democracies. In fact, it is entirely possible that
a particular feature or similar features of globalisation might have both
some positive and some negative effects. These claims are illustrated below.
Bad news
The role of political parties as bridge between democratic governance
and society is being undermined at both ends
One of the major political themes in the globalisation literature is that as
power is increasingly being exercised on a trans- or supranational basis
so political power is being externalised or ‘denationalised’, and in some
respects is ebbing away from the state. The simple idea that power is
shifting to global and other forces outside the control of states individu-
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emphasise more the transformation of the state, and a few even point out
how globalisation may be reinforcing or augmenting, as well as displacing,
state power (Weiss, 2005). And yet even in the transformationist camp
there is some recognition that many developing countries are less favour-
ably situated in this regard. More particularly, then, specified powers and
authority over agenda-setting, rule-making and rule application in certain
vital public affairs are being transferred to multiple sites of governance
situated outside, above and even below central government. With the
coming of what has been called a ‘global governance complex’, state
autonomy in many countries is in decline at least relatively, even if not
every state in the world is seeing its power decline absolutely. Many of
the emerging democracies and especially the smaller, weaker and poorer
states have most reason to feel exposed. For example they can find in
their dealings with the Bretton Woods institutions that even when those
institutions’ enormous financial leverage does not of itself demand compli-
ance with the policy advice they offer, they do nonetheless influence how
policy discourse on the management of economic and financial affairs is
framed at the national level. It is easy to see how all this can engender
concern about the limits of democracy possible at the state level and about
the threats to democracy from the activities of non-accountable mechan-
isms of governance that have arisen in the world outside. This has
ramifications for party politics.
Almost everywhere and certainly in democratising countries of Central
Eastern Europe and Africa observers claim that the parties’ connections to
state and government either already do dominate, or are coming to dom-
inate, vis-à-vis the parties’ links with society. Even in the longer established
democracies observers such as Katz and Mair (2002) note that the ‘party
in office’ or ‘parties in the state’ are now in the ascendancy over the ‘party
on the ground’, the ‘party in the country’. As political elites become more
dependent on the state, not least for resources for the party, so they sac-
rifice – or do not even attempt to cultivate – a solid basis for the party in
society. In some non-Western societies this state of affairs is intimately
connected with the greater displacement that neo-patrimonialism and the
role political patronage have in party politics.
The great irony is that the movement towards a relatively closer rela-
tionship of parties with the state than with society is happening at the
very time when the ability of many states and/or their entitlement to rule
independently within their own territorial domain appears to be frag-
menting, losing purchase or ebbing away. As elites fall in with the state
more than with society, so globalisation appears to threaten their ability
to use the instruments of state to deliver the public good (or, perhaps,
even to use public projects for partisan political gain). Governments of
many developing countries, even those that are not oil-rich exporters,
formerly were able to rely on import tariffs and similar trade-distorting
measures to provide revenues that would underpin the politics of patronage
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or fund larger developmental purposes. The parties in office derived some
political benefit. Increasing trade liberalisation driven by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has now eroded that facility.
All in all, not only do party leaders now seem to be more remote from
societal control, but the very institution they choose to align with (the
state) may be coinciding less and less with the real sites of power. At
minimum, far more is now required of the state’s role as a filter or buffer
towards the rest of the world, even if that role is not being brought into
question in identical ways or to the same degree everywhere. This con-
tradiction is sharpest for many of the newer democracies, who can claim
little responsibility for the decisions made at global and regional levels
that lie behind the vesting of powers in supranational institutions of
governance. In so far as governing elites are actively engaged in managing
these external relationships, their autonomy and power vis-à-vis their own
party and not simply of the parties vis-à-vis society seem bound to increase
with regard to the state’s business and the party management and party
policy-making. This is part of what Poguntke and Webb (2005) call the
‘presidentialisation’ of politics.
‘Choiceless’ democracy’
The irony noted above is being compounded by deliberate manipulation.
Political parties – more especially parties in office – are not shy of using
the presence of external influences and the existence of extra-national
agencies of restraint to structure and confine the policy and institutional
choices they offer to electorates – while disowning responsibility for any
outcomes that seem likely to provoke dissatisfaction (the retrenchment of
public sector workers at the behest of the IMF pressures to reduce recur-
rent public expenditure is an example). This kind of scenario undermines
political accountability and is not unfamiliar in the heavily indebted states
that are most beholden to the Bretton Woods institutions and other foreign
creditors, whose ‘discourse power’ may be deployed by governments to
assail the credibility of their domestic political opponents. But similar
tendencies to what Mkandawire (1999) called ‘choiceless democracy’ have
been detected in other countries too.6
At the same time some of the institutional reforms that the international
financial institutions typically require in return for their support aim to
improve public sector efficiency and effectiveness. This can mean an
increase in some of the capabilities of government to exercise control. 
An example is regulatory authority over economic activities and over those
in the informal sector especially, with an increase in tax-raising powers
being a particular example. The term ‘capacity-building’ is often used to
describe such endeavours in international development co-operation; the
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governance’ even as it aims to secure a ‘downsizing’ of the state, to the
end of creating a more favourable political environment for the working
of the economic market. Meanwhile the political elites’ own position rela-
tive to the rest of their party, its middle-rank officers and grass-roots
activists may also be enhanced, such as when the benefits of privatisation
programmes are shared out among the top leadership.
The claim that globalisation’s neo-liberal economic agenda reduces the
scope for parties to differentiate among themselves in terms of economic
policy is part of this debate. There is disagreement in the literature on
advanced post-industrial democracies over how far and in what respects
policy choices regarding social welfare are actually being constrained. And
even with respect to some developing countries it has been argued that
even though closer economic integration narrows the policy space, 
some room for policy variation still remains (Kurtz, 2002; Mosley, 2005).
Be that as it may, one of the consequences that Mkandawire (1999) and
others bring to attention is the way parties may sometimes feel compelled
to turn to other ways of differentiating themselves in the political market.
At best the competition between parties may then revolve around their
respective claims on competence to govern and reputation for integrity –
not an ideal solution for democracy if it is seen to privilege manageri-
alism and technocracy over political debate and drives out engagement
with alternative values-based perspectives on the public good. But there
are other possibilities that can be much less benign for democratisation
and/or for political stability, as when politicians resort to ethno-nationalist,
religious or some other divisive platforms, for the purpose of mobilising
support. In substituting for the programmatic void, the politics of com-
munal identity and its most troubling manifestations such as sectarianism
can fuel the potential for violent conflict even in societies that previously
had been at peace (former Yugoslavia is an obvious example).
Yet if as a substitute for programmatic differentiation the language of
competition between parties revolves instead around the personality of
their leaders – something that looks fairly harmless – the outcome may
be hardly edifying. It moves democracy closer to soap opera, or at best
the rather minimalist definition Joseph Schumpeter offered in Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy (1942) that privileged occasional competition
among elites for the people’s vote. The approach of personalist-based
parties that rely on emphasising populist credentials to pave their way to
power may serve democratisation no better if the effect is to thwart the
institutionalisation of political parties and prevent the emergence of a
reasonably stable party system.7 It seems globalisation’s effects on party
politics could have larger adverse implications for democratisation than
just its potential to influence the economic and social policies that parties
pursue.
Furthermore, the thesis summed up as ‘choiceless democracy’ runs seam-
lessly into the belief that globalisation’s economic manifestations are
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disempowering particularly for the most vulnerable sections of society:
the very poor, disadvantaged minorities and women. It is their interests
that are most likely to be underrepresented by political parties if the policy
space shrinks and takes on a pro-market bias. Where globalisation in
effect means material impoverishment for the very poor there is a strong
chance they will be demobilised out of – or, more accurately, not mobilised
into – politics. The preoccupation of addressing basic material needs 
takes priority.
Against this it can be argued that the ‘post-Washington consensus’,
which from the late 1990s came to over-layer the neo-liberal orientation
of the Bretton Woods institutions, exhibits a more sympathetic interest in
meeting the needs of the poor. The current era of Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and accompanying ‘process conditionality’ bears
witness to that. However even if this recent development has allowed
political parties more latitude to incorporate pro-poor policies in their
election manifestos (which some critics claim is only superficially the case),
where this comes about in response to external prompting or pressure
exerted through donor conditionalities, the question remains: what are
parties for if they must dance to someone else’s tune? In reality the picture
is less reassuring. For so far the typical format of PRSP tripartite consul-
tations that have involved international donors, national ministries of
finance and civil society in many developing countries including in Africa
have tended to marginalise the parties and legislatures, confirming a quasi-
technocratic approach to policy-making with little democratic account-
ability to poor people. Parliamentary approval is not included among the
terms and conditions of the PRSP process that countries that seek financial
help from the World Bank and the IMF must now undertake.
Globalisation increases complexity
Globalisation as the compression of time and space makes the task of
governing more difficult where growing interconnectedness and increasing
velocity leave economies and societies more vulnerable to external shocks.
It adds more burdens to the increasing complexity of public issues and
challenges of governing that parties must be equipped to respond to.
Whether or not the shocks were intended or planned is irrelevant. Wars
spill over into neighbouring territories; world commodity price fluctua-
tions impinge on the public finances; speculative flows of ‘hot’ money can
reverse direction across borders without warning, dictated by machinations
in the global derivatives markets for government bonds and currencies.
Major (new) risks to public health such as the spread of HIV/AIDS or
‘bird flu’ can travel almost anywhere, virtually overnight. Increased vulner-
ability to international terrorism is yet another feature of today’s more
interdependent world. To be more than just passive figures in this land-
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highly technical; they have to be familiar with many different kinds of
professional expertise. Parties cannot rely on purely political skills.
Moreover polycentric governance with its patchwork quilt of overlap-
ping institutional mandates and gaps between organisational responsibil-
ities generates areas of confusion and adds to this environment of complex
uncertainty. Political parties have to be imaginative and adaptable if 
they are to maintain credibility. In place of parochialism, the ability to
relate to regional and global policy networks becomes increasingly import-
ant. Of course, if something like an economic crisis leads to renewal and
replacement in the party system because the existing parties show they
have no answers, then the consequences may benefit democratisation 
(as Chapter 7 demonstrates, this has been the case in Turkey). But a
collective incapacity by parties to offer an adequate response to the chal-
lenges posed by external events could be much more harmful, especially
if society is then tempted to think that an unelected government, a military-
backed technocracy for instance, might perform better.
Transnationalising civil society in the overtaking lane
In the West some leading analysts of party politics see a weakening of
traditional forms of civic engagement, erosion of the networks of trade
unions, churches, farmers groups, business associations and the like. At
minimum the ties with the parties, which used to root the parties in
society, appear to be getting weaker. In a related and well-known claim
there is Putnam’s (2000) thesis on declining social capital in the US. 
An increasing individualisation of society is held responsible. However,
in contrast to these propositions, the literature on globalisation detects
the flourishing of an extremely diverse transnational civil society. Some
of the writers chart the growth of international human rights advocacy
networks in particular; others trumpet the rise of social movements.
‘Nowadays,’ says Ibarra (2003: 2), ‘nobody would question the central
role held by the social movement in the democratic game.’ The great
breadth of actors, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)
as well as non-governmental organisations within countries (NGOs)
stretches from on the one side examples that work closely with global
governance institutions such as the World Bank to those transnational
groups of protesters, campaigners and radical social movements that claim
to offer ‘global resistance’ to globalisation. Scholte cites evidence suggesting
that in the last four decades of the twentieth century the number of active
transborder civil society groups multiplied more than tenfold, to around
17,000; much of this increased mobilisation addressed global issues such
as development, ecology, human rights and peace (Scholte, 2002: 149–50).
The totality of all these different kinds of groupings seems to have taken
very much more advantage of the opportunities to organise and mobilise
across borders in response to pressing issues of urgent, intensely felt
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concern than have political parties. Moreover, civil society sets out to
‘make a difference’ where it matters, such as by influencing the discourse,
the institutional procedures by which policies are made and the policy
content, all of which contribute to the emergence of post-statist govern-
ance. (Scholte, 2002: 152–9). These non-governmental actors are them-
selves challenging national territorial sovereignty as the exclusive basis 
for political community and identity, even when that object is not their
primary goal. So:
Whether in terms of the democratisation of the institutions of global
governance, the spread of human rights across the world, or the emer-
gence of a global citizenry in a world-wide public sphere, global civil
society is understood to provide the agency necessary to these hoped-
for transformations.
(Baker and Chandler, 2005: 1)
For globalisation’s critics the ‘counter-hegemonic’ side of global civic and
social activism has special appeal in this scenario; by comparison parties
do not get a mention in that regard.
Even at the purely domestic and sub-state level NGOs seem to have
benefited from the attentions of international development and democ-
racy assistance organisations. International financial and technical assist-
ance to some countries has been directed away from central government
partly in order to prevent the resources being abused for party patronage
purposes. The most politically able and enterprising figures then gravitate
to civic associations and spurn party politics. They are often more adept
than parties at writing the kind of applications for international support
that chime with the ‘requirements’ of foreign democracy assistance agen-
cies. Indeed, there are democracy aid practitioners who say their concen-
tration of democracy support on civil society has been harmful to party
development, although this picture may not ring so true in Central and
Eastern Europe at the present time, where Ágh (see Chapter 5) sees the
parties as being partly responsible for the current weaknesses of civil
society.
A positive outlook for transnational civil society may be potentially
threatening not only to political parties but to democratisation, too. For
one reason, it is difficult to predict how it can help states to recapture
or retain the initiative against globalisation, even if many of the civil
society organisations continue to succumb to ‘nationalist, statist and terri-
torialist mindsets’ (Scholte, 2004: 230).8 For another, even if transnational
civil society is more ‘wised up’ than most political parties to the increas-
ingly transterritorial nature of major public issues and to the new realities
of global governance, it is far too soon to say they will rescue democratic
objectives and serve democracy’s purposes in this or some other way.
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society’s diverse interests and opinions. They do not submit themselves
to the electorate – an important ritual for bestowing legitimacy and
imposing some veneer of accountability, however thin – in the way polit-
ical parties or even independent (and anti-party) political candidates are
prepared to do. While some NGOs are member-based and hold annual
general meetings (something that can complicate the relations they have
with partners from international democracy assistance) many are in fact
elitist and not well grounded in society. In Scholte’s (2004: 230) words
they operate only ‘very limited and unimaginative accountability mech-
anisms in relation to their own activities’. In many cases transnational
co-operation among the NGOs and INGOs involves only a small cadre
of leading personalities. An increasing number are co-opted by govern-
ance institutions through relying on them for a substantial share of their
income. The consequences for their autonomy may far exceed the effects
that state funding has on political parties.
NGOs and especially the new social movements are prone to wax and
wane. But democracy needs at least some continuity in its political parties
(that is, institutionalisation) if the promises they make to the electorate
are to be taken at all seriously: perhaps paradoxically the likelihood of
that increases where the parties have strong organisational linkages to
society. If it really is the case that many politicians, officials, business
leaders, journalists and academics currently ask why unaccountable civil
society actors should have the right to influence the course of globalisa-
tion (Scholte, 2004: 232), then for parties to concede the field to these
actors hardly bodes well for democratisation. At minimum it places a
large question mark against the ‘civil society first’ approach to democ-
racy assistance and the presumption that that entails, namely that when
the time finally arrives for democracy promotion to prioritise the devel-
opment of parties, democratic values and practices will flow into the
parties from an already well established civil society base.
Threat from transnational uncivil society
The globalisation of organised crime is hostile to democracy. The trans-
territorial linking up of politically motivated actors with a commitment
to pursuing their agendas by illegal and, in some cases, violent means is
even more sinister. Al Qaeda, which sees itself as waging a global struggle,
is only the most obvious example. The growth of such entities no less
than the flourishing of civil society represents a failure by the political
parties to offer adequate channels for expressing grievance and pursuing
dreams. At the same time the apparent success of such organisations in
terms of public profile competes with parties, potentially diverting support
and resources that might have been available to party-building. Of equal
concern is where the response of the parties is to embrace illiberal or anti-
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democratic orientations themselves, which is what can happen where they
feel forced to compete with these organisations on their terms. Of course,
governments that prohibit democratically organised party politics in the
first place, or become more repressive towards parties as they take fright
at the possible consequences of free and fair elections (as happened in
Algeria in 1992), must share some of the responsibility. But situations
like this strengthen the claims for party support to be included as a more
prominent feature of international strategies to support democratisation.
For such strategies now draw added impetus in the West from policy
drivers that hope democratisation worldwide will offer an antidote to
anxieties about international stability, peace and national security.
Global communications networks displace parties
The expansion of global media and new information technology dimin-
ish the parties’ traditional role as sources of political information and 
oracles of guidance on public issues. Citizens can more easily compare
and check the veracity of the messages the parties provide. More and
more people can engage in politics outside the formal channels offered
by political parties, courtesy of cyberspace. Also, parties now have to
compete with the global ‘infotainment’ industry. Not having a captive
audience, political parties now have to work harder to command the
citizens’ attention and influence their views.
In addition, the new communications mediums, most notably the internet
and electronic mail, enable party leaders to reach party members and
supporters directly and to bypass allies or intermediary levels in the organ-
isation. The opportunities increase for power within the party to become
more highly concentrated and for internal debate to be stifled (Katz 
and Mair, 2002; Blyth and Katz, 2005). This operates to the detriment
of intra-party democracy and democratisation more generally. In fact 
the ‘politics of mass society’ (Kornhauser, 1959), a condition whereby
political leaders can exert influence on an increasingly atomised society’s
attitudes and beliefs directly, without even going through party channels,
may be more attainable now than at any time during the totalitarian dicta-
torships in inter-war Europe, for which period the term was originally
designed. And yet the rise of the international entertainment industry made
possible through multichannel satellite broadcasting and the like now
competes not simply with political parties but with (involvement in) politics
per se. Added to this, Webb (2005) and others see in countries such as
the US and Britain a media that purveys unattractive images of politi-
cians as largely self-serving, thereby contributing to a widespread lack 
of trust in politics more generally. The consequences for public cynicism
and indifference, with fewer and fewer citizens relating sympathetically to
party politics, may not yet be apparent in societies that are too poor 
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a democratic transition still prevails. But perhaps the portents for their
future can be read off from what seems to be happening among post-
industrial democracies in the West.
Imported models can do harm
The increase in global media and the ease of international travel expose
societies to influence from contemporary Western models and techniques
such as in the realm of electoral competition that may be inappropriate.
Ottaway and Chung (1999), for instance, refer to an increasing and costly
reliance on professional opinion polling and television advertising at the
expense of deploying voluntary enthusiasm and volunteer labour. The shift
conspires to produce merely electoralist parties rather than organisation-
ally ‘thick’ parties. The new tools encourage politicians to concentrate on
office-seeking for themselves rather than to labour long and hard to develop
deep and lasting organisational roots for the party in society. Both the
chances of party institutionalisation and the likelihood of parties making
a worthwhile contribution to civic education are diminished. Kumar (2005)
singles out for criticism USAID assistance to elections and electioneering.
Even where financial transfers to parties are disallowed, the provision of
material support may still risk creating external links of dependency that
will hamper or distort party development.
Good news
A checklist of reasons why globalisation might be good news for the
spread of party-based democracy can usefully distinguish between before
and after democratic transition. Two points will be made about the former,
followed by five about post-transition.
Globalisation shifts the power imbalance in autocracies
Globalisation that is understood to include cross-border collaboration
among non-state actors and international support for opposition parties,
proto-parties or other pro-democracy activists in authoritarian polities 
can embolden the domestic forces of resistance to oppression. Such 
actors can seek to exploit the ‘boomerang effect’ in the same way that
some human rights advocacy groups have done to good effect (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998). They encourage their friends in those democracies whose
governments have some diplomatic leverage to lobby for international
pressure to be put on their own regime. In consequence undemocratic
regimes that are sensitive to their international legitimacy see the incen-
tive structure changing: they respond not by raising the levels of repression
but by increasing the political space in which pro-democracy activists can
press their case (Yilmaz, 2002). Belonging to one of the political party
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internationals may be a starting point for the domestic opposition to have
access to international channels in this way. For example, support from
the party internationals and from Germany’s Stiftungen was important to
the success of the campaign inside Chile to end General Pinochet’s rule
and secure a return to democracy (Angell, 1996; Pinto-Duschinsky, 1996).
In an example from Europe in the 1990s Pridham (1999b: 1233) observed
that Slovakia’s Democratic Union party benefited from expressions of soli-
darity from the Liberal International when it came under heavy pressure
from an illiberal government.
Globalisation transfers liberal and democratic ideas
By eroding barriers to the free flow of ideas global communications
networks contribute an opening to liberal and democratic values; and as
channels for transferring guidance and advice they assist party formation
in previously closed societies. Here again globalisation appears to threaten
not so much the state but undemocratic governments or authoritarian
regimes, potentially speeding the arrival of free and competitive party
politics. To the extent that transnationalising advocacy networks of NGOs
and INGOs by their words and deeds proselytise or display liberal and
democratic values, their very example should help party politics develop
liberal democratic characteristics. The point is especially pertinent to organ-
isations whose mission quite specifically is to promote civil liberties and
political rights.
Transnationalising civil society and political parties as allies
Even though in terms of addressing certain truly global issues a global-
ising civil society has some advantages vis-à-vis those parties whose 
inertia consigns them to remaining insular, there are many other distinctly
national and sub-national issues for political parties to feed off, show
their relevance and make their mark. In principle there is no reason why
transnationalising civil social actors cannot take a lead in educating parties
to apprehend more clearly the significance of globalisation for new issues,
democratisation and party politics specifically.
In fact, transterritorial social movements and civic action groups could
gain from enlisting the support of political parties on a national (or,
indeed, transnational) basis, injecting energy and ideas along the way.
This is obviously true where the advancement of their own objectives
requires national legislation, and where political parties (those in govern-
ment) provide the means and the formal legitimation. A strong and secure
civil society needs effective, party-based democracy – one that offers guar-
antees against arbitrary state interference in the associations’ internal
affairs. Civil society does not make the state redundant; on the contrary,
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Furthermore, the structure of global civil society almost inevitably reflects
the deep inequalities found in the global political economy. So if the civic
associations in many of the newer democracies are not to have their
national or international agendas dictated by the greater financial, tech-
nical and political clout of their transnational partners in wealthy devel-
oped countries, then co-operation with their country’s own parties could
prove invaluable – by infusing or strengthening perspectives grounded in
distinctively national or local concerns. Parties can add both authority and
authenticity. Similarly, support from democratic parties may usefully
protect the reputation and standing of civil society actors against their
more illiberal or ‘uncivil’ counterparts at home and abroad. Assumptions
that civil society will command respect where parties do not are not always
born out by the evidence.9
Finally, the most radical fringe of collective action groups found in the
broad anti-globalisation movement does not aim to influence public policy
at all. As political parties seek to ‘speak to power’ they may feel no direct
threat from such actors who turn their backs on institutions of govern-
ance. Of course, a dramatic increase in recruitment to anti-politics and,
even more so, in predispositions to political violence by such a ‘fringe’
would pose serious questions not just for political parties but about the
adequacy of the patterns or models of democratisation that are taking
place.
Globalisation and socio-economic change
If, as many economists maintain, integration in the global economy is
generally good for economic growth and development, and if, as most
political scientists believe, development is beneficial to stable liberal democ-
racy, then it seems that economic globalisation must be favourable to
party politics, given the central place that party politics occupies in stable
liberal democracy. But however impeccable the logic of this argument,
more interesting is how the globalisation–development nexus impacts on
parties and party systems. For instance, does the connection revolve mainly
around increases in personal disposable income, or the possibility to divert
increased leisure time into political activity, or perhaps around improved
domestic communications infrastructures, urbanisation or some other inter-
vening variable? Are the main democratising effects of development due
to its role in changing social and political attitudes or through the impact
on the social structure, instead? These are big theoretical issues: they
matter because globalisation understood as greater market openness and
a prospering global political economy produces both winners and losers,
inside as well as between countries.
Growing material inequality within society is generally accepted to be
one of the consequences even in countries whose economies on balance
are benefiting from closer involvement in world trade and corporate
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investment flows. There is strong evidence for this from democracies as
far apart as India and South Africa, Poland and Brazil. As globalisation
exacerbates such divisions there may be opportunities for the political
party system to reproduce something akin to the ideological–class basis
to party competition in the West of old. Something like the ‘golden 
age’ of party politics that possibly existed in Europe’s past might then be
a future possibility. In fact, a trajectory along those lines might be essen-
tial if disillusionment with party politics is not to take hold among 
society’s less privileged groups, for that could lead to declining support
for democracy; even worse, the most disaffected may be mobilised into
anti-system action.
Where the battle lines of inter-party contestation do come to circle
around the politics of redistribution then the prospects for sustaining 
stable democratic politics might actually increase, especially if this prevents
or displaces the most divisive expressions of identity-based politics.
Conflicts over material issues can often be resolved by negotiation; sharp
disagreements over such non-negotiable values as religious credos may
prove more destructive. If the choices that are presented to the electorate
offer competing ideas of market efficiency versus social justice instead 
of just differences between political personalities or a situation where 
political finance and mastery of the techniques of political advertising
determine electoral outcomes, then there is a chance that society’s respect
for politics and thence the levels of democratic participation will increase.
In that case democracy’s value will rise accordingly. (Similar reasoning
might be applied where it is the global and local environmental conse-
quences of globalisation that capture the public imagination and structure
political debate, with voters taking opposing political positions over the
competing merits of the different economic and ecological trade-offs.)
The above reasoning does not sit easily with that strand of social science
that sees globalisation as primarily a force strengthening the hegemony
of transnational and global capital. It appears to suggest that the oppor-
tunity for democracy assistance to work with the emergence of social
democratic (and, perhaps, green) political parties might yet increase, even
as globalisation’s pro-market effects give succour to parties of the right
and centre-right that can draw practical support from business and trade
associations and wealthy entrepreneurs. And where we see the emergence
of parties of a diverse hue of ideological commitments, the scope for the
longer established political parties in the older democracies to engage in
potentially advantageous transnational party co-operation can only be of
benefit, in contrast to situations where ethno-nationalist, neo-patrimonial
and personalist-based parties make up a developing democracy’s party
system. The reality, however, could be much less straightforward.
First, of course, there has to be a belief that organising politically in
this way can actually make a difference – that, for instance, parties with
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policy notwithstanding globalisation and its consequences. Second, there
are those post-communist countries where Communist Party rule still
evokes some bad memories and impedes the sustained resurgence of genu-
inely left-wing parties. Third, everywhere much will depend on whether
any increase in vertical (class-based) inequalities in society cuts across
horizontal (identity-based) cleavages or, instead, coincides with and further
reinforces those cleavages. The second of these alternatives is more likely
to stoke conflict and put democratisation in peril. Chua (2003) goes so
far as to argue that the spread of free market democracies is accentuating
ethno-nationalism and contributing to ethnic violence by pitting poor
indigenous majorities against prosperous market-dominant ethnic minori-
ties. If that were true (and Chua’s claims seem exaggerated), it only
strengthens the case for developing democratic and soundly based party
politics, where political leaders eschew irresponsible strategies of political
mobilisation and stop short of the point where the drive for party institu-
tionalisation prevents the institutionalisation of a democratically compat-
ible party system (Randall and Svåsand, 2002a). Even so, in many less
developed countries it is still not easy for the poor to organise politically
– to go from being what Karl Max called a class ‘in itself’ to a class ‘for
itself’ – compared to what happened during the first industrial revolution
or what is happening now in the most dynamic of the developing
economies. This is partly because levels of unemployment are extremely
high, the poor often labour in seasonal work, and subsistence level activities
in the informal sector are typical. Trade unions and their supraterritorial
allies such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions do
not reach down so far into society. In fact there is a widely held view
that the increasing relative importance of international trade and invest-
ment for national economies must weaken the bargaining power of organ-
ised labour. That in turn weakens parties on the left, perhaps preventing
any one of them from becoming thoroughly consolidated or giving them
greater freedom to pursue vote-maximisation strategies that may offer few
policy gains to the really poor.10 Yet even developments of this nature,
while not encouraging to the left, need not necessarily prevent the consol-
idation of party politics in a new democracy and could make less likely
a reversion to authoritarian rule, through a military coup, for instance.
To repeat a point made earlier, there are different ways of assessing the
contribution that parties and party politics can make to democratisation
depending on timescale and the stage of political change and on which
aspects of democracy or its main purpose are valued most highly.
Finally, the hypothesis that globalisation’s tendency to exacerbate
economic and social inequalities could lead some emerging democracies
to experience a reverse wave of what happened in West, where ‘standard’
or ideologically based parties (‘the golden age’) gave way to ‘catch-all’
parties or even ‘cartel parties’, begs an obvious question. Why do we not
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see such a reverse wave happening now in Central and Eastern Europe
as countries there undergo rapid integration into the global economy or
– even more so – in the countries that are already among the most highly
integrated, namely democracies such as Britain or the US where very size-
able inequalities in incomes or assets continue to increase? The welfare
state arrangements these wealthy democracies have in place undoubtedly
provide part of the answer. It remains to be seen if their explanatory
power obsolesces as the domestic employment protection, social security
and pensions regimes are weakened in response to the intensifying
economic and financial pressures of an increasingly competitive global
economy, as some observers claim is starting to occur.
Bretton Woods bonus
Historically, parties in government in many parts of the world have bene-
fited from the willingness of international financial institutions and other
foreign donors to provide loans and grants to governments for public
purposes. Parties have been able to manipulate expenditure allocations
and disbursements to the end of mobilising partisan political support. In
some countries where neo-patrimonialism and patron–client relationships
are strongly entrenched it has not been unusual for foreign aid to continue
to fuel the ruling party’s deployment of patronage even while trade liber-
alisation is eroding the government’s fiscal base. The use of public resources
to fund one or more political parties through illegal means can, of course,
be considered a form of corruption even where not aimed at the finan-
cial enrichment of specific individuals. The Bretton Woods institutions and
some bilateral donors increasingly try to combat this corruption as part
of their drive for better governance, although the activities of some aid
organisations and, more especially, elements of multinational business 
still seem to be pulling the other way.
As part of the great emphasis now placed on governance and the trans-
fer of ‘global best practice’, the World Bank, the World Bank Institute,
UNDP and INGOs such as Transparency International work towards
applying pressure on the executive branches in debtor countries to become
more transparent, by strengthening the mechanisms of both vertical and
horizontal accountability. Although most of the programmes and projects
to date have concentrated on the judiciary and civil society, there has
been some modest support to capacity-building in parliaments.11 Although
there is no significant evidence that such legislative strengthening has yet
had much impact, more effective programmes would increase the incen-
tives for politicians to invest in building sustainable party organisations.
In theory, whatever enhances the scrutinising and monitoring roles that
parties – opposition parties in particular – can play between elections,
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party systems at the expense of transitory and ephemeral parties, un-
stable party systems and dominant one-party regimes. At the same time,
where the institutional architecture of central government does allow 
all major parties a place in the public policy consultation process – if only
out of recognition that they can influence the chances of successful policy
implementation, or because government comprises a coalition – then 
party actors may be able to exert some influence on policy outcomes even
where negotiations are being conducted with an organisation like the
World Bank. Thus it has been argued that the effectiveness of this self-
styled ‘knowledge bank’ as a ‘norm-broker’ rests in part on its willingness
and ability to construct supportive local alliances in civil and political
society. In a country like Argentina, the Bank’s coercive potential and
ability to change incentive structures through applications of financial
power by themselves do not guarantee the desired results.12 Similarly, the
doubts that are now surfacing about the sustainability of contemporary
strategies for poverty reduction are premised in part on a failure to place
the mass of the people through their elected representatives at the heart
of the process.
Globalisation provokes political interest
Globalisation’s effects in some places demonstrate the capacity to stimu-
late the formation of nationalist parties and have led existing parties to
adopt a nationalist theme, without necessarily creating xenophobia, racism
or other potentially destructive tendencies. Members of society who might
otherwise feel that party politics has nothing to offer are brought into
the politically active citizenry and, over time, may come to take part in
mainstream democratic politics directly. The relatively high levels of partici-
pation in the French and Dutch referenda on the proposed EU constitution
in 2005 provide examples where the infiltration of anti-globalisation senti-
ment and concern about eroding national sovereignty animated voters and
re-energised the political scene. The consequences have not given new
shape to the party system as much as show that people refuse to be spell-
bound by the ruling elites. That is good for democracy.
In Turkey, where pressure from the EU to make concessions in the matter
of northern Cyprus causes much resentment, manipulation of anti-EU sen-
timent to the advantage of right- and left-wing parties is less prejudicial
to the democratic prospect than would be a return to more nationalistic
displays of military rule. But Turkey’s situation also reminds us that parties
who represent sub-state regionalism or historically oppressed segments of
society may have cause to welcome the encroachment of multilevel govern-
ance on central government if that development burnishes human rights
in the communities they represent (most notably, in this case, the Kurds).
And where they (or sub-state levels of government, a regional assembly
for example) are able to gain direct access to supranational institutions of
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governance the recognition that follows can be instrumental to party-
building. It may assist in the struggle to gain more adequate political rep-
resentation vis-à-vis the central authorities in their own national state.13
Again, one effect may be to increase society’s participation in party politics.
Global funding opportunities
More than ever before, the expansion of global financial services and tools
of worldwide communications in principle enable political parties to raise
much needed funds from legitimate sources far and wide. This includes
fundraising both from political elites in neighbouring countries and from
diasporas much further abroad, this last being a phenomenon of growing
significance due to the significant place international migrant labour now
has in the global economy. In some countries, such as Sri Lanka, entire
families have settled abroad and yet continue to take a keen interest in
the country’s politics, and the migrant heads of household want to donate
to party election campaigns. Naturally the question of whether they should
have voting rights, too, is a very delicate one.14 While some countries
prohibit political funding from abroad, many do not, and outright bans
are difficult to enforce.
Conclusion
The three terms ‘party politics’, ‘international promotion of democratisa-
tion’ and ‘globalisation’ are all protean in meaning. The relations between
the phenomena they refer to are variable, complex and mixed. There are
no ‘iron laws’ to sum up the relationships, unless couched in the most
general and least interesting terms. More fine-grained inquiry that takes
the analysis down a level and studies specific cases is sorely needed.
Historically, accounts of what parties (are supposed to) do are much
more clearly defined than the heavily contested discourse that now
surrounds the relations of civil society to market and state. But we should
not presume that the question ‘what are parties for?’ admits the same
answer everywhere and across all time. Recent trends in globalisation –
and not just the way party politics has changed over many years inside
the established democracies – are making a difference. Propositions
claiming the state is losing all relevance as a result of globalisation are
undoubtedly overdrawn; instead, empirically grounded accounts of what
diverse states still do and can realistically aim to achieve (and how) offer
more promising avenues for identifying how the two-way relationship
between globalisation and states really affects party politics. Nevertheless,
just as the question ‘what is democratisation for?’ is bound to elicit a
range of answers none of which addresses the question ‘what does global-
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sharply in terms of what they need most from political parties. There is
far more to investigating the place of party politics in a globalising world
than simply disagreeing about what is happening to policy space. In the
established democracies some of the roles traditionally assigned to parties
may now be shared quite often with other types of organisation. But this
does not necessarily offer an accurate guide to what should – or will –
happen in emerging democracies, where democratisation brings its own
requirements. Furthermore, the available alternatives to political parties
are not everywhere the same. The growing implications of extra-national,
transnational and supranational influences on party politics in emerging
democracies, and the role and performance of party support in inter-
national democracy assistance, in particular, are distinctive features of the
globalisation of democracy in the modern era that merit greater and more
detailed attention.
Notes
1 Although in Mainwaring’s (1998) account of competitive-party-system insti-
tutionalisation at least two of the following four features refer directly to the
parties themselves: regularity in patterns and rules of party competition; parties
well rooted in society; major political actors accord legitimacy to parties; party
organisations matter.
2 The meaning of democratic consolidation is highly contested. Accounts vary
from minimalist models such as a general expectation that elections will remain
‘the only game in town’ to much richer versions that incorporate some notion
of qualitative advance, greater ‘democraticness’ or democratic deepening.
However, most analysts agree that democratisation involves more than just
the routinisation of the electoral process as the method for forming govern-
ments, and must refer to other political institutions such as military–civilian
relations and the status of the judiciary, the development of civil society and
widespread socialisation into a democratic (‘civic’) political culture as well.
Liberal democracy entails acceptance of the rule of law.
3 The survey of established democracies by Webb, Farrell and Holliday (2002)
found that parties are failing most in respect of advancing a civic orientation
among the citizens, owing to declining political participation.
4 Kitschelt (2004) among others notes an increasing differentiation of modes of
collective interest mobilisation and intermediation among parties, interest
groups and social movements, and increasing flexibility in terms of which of
these vehicles citizens in the post-industrial democracies choose to use to
advance the representation of their interests.
5 In Britain it is worth noting that Power to the People, ‘An Independent Inquiry
into Britain’s Democracy’ (Power Commission, 2006: 187), while extremely
critical of the main parties because their members felt unable to influence
policy, and because the parties were perceived to be too similar in their core
policies and lacking in principle, nevertheless added: ‘political parties are, when
they are at their best, effective at presenting alternative ways to the electorate
of aggregating diverse interests within their broad programmes and allocating
resources to those interests. (Single issue) Campaign and interest groups do
not do this – their goal is, of course, to espouse the supremacy of their
particular cause and demand maximum resources to address that cause’.
44 Peter Burnell
6 Mkandawire’s (1999) reasoning, ventured in an African context, finds echoes
in the literature on Europe (see Chapter 5). The EU, by constraining the freedom
of member governments in respect of the policy alternatives they can offer
voters, may be criticised for hollowing out party competition within the states.
Even so, policy convergence can also represent a rational response by the parties
to a movement in the preferences of a majority of voters towards the middle
ground, as the electorate comes to concentrate on a narrow range of ‘bread
and butter’ issues.
7 Mainwaring (1998: 74–6) places personalism in opposition to party rooted-
ness in society; Gunther and Diamond (2001: 28–9) show why personalistic
parties can only weakly perform the usual functions of parties.
8 Scholte (2004: 230) goes on to say the tendency to conceive ‘of the political
arena solely in terms of the territorial national state’ is one of the greatest
challenges facing civil society in obtaining more democratically accountable
global governance.
9 In India, Chandhoke (2005) finds society has only minimal expectations of
both the parties and civil society as agencies that will respond to their needs.
10 For contrasting perspectives on the linkage between trade unions and parties
see Piazza (2001), who observes a weakening of union ties and social demo-
cratic parties, and Riethof (2004), who claims that in Brazil it was the growing
political moderation of the labour movement that enabled the Partido dos
Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) and its leader, Luiz da Silva, to win the 2002
presidential election. We can infer that organised labour’s constructive role in
bringing about Brazil’s (re)democratisation has evolved away from the mili-
tant stance it adopted earlier against the continuation of military rule (which
helped persuade the military to return to barracks) towards the stabilisation
of competitive party politics now.
11 Examples are the UNDP/National Democratic Institute handbooks aimed at
strengthening legislative involvement in the poverty reduction strategy pro-
cess, drawing on collaboration with parliamentarians in Malawi, Niger and 
Nigeria and published in 2004. On line. Available at: www.accessdemocracy.
org (accessed 31 January 2006).
12 Riggirozzi (2005) develops the idea that the Bank is a ‘norm-broker’. In respect
of structural adjustment programmes to liberalise the economy ‘second gener-
ation’ reforms such as reforming labour market practices require a more
consensual approach than technocratic ‘first generation’ reforms (such as
currency devaluation). The merits of a consensual approach may also apply
to governance reforms such as tackling corruption. Parties may be able to
provide support in return for opportunities to influence externally advised
policy in a direction that makes some concessions to their demands and
increases the chances of successful implementation.
13 Thus de Winter and Chachafeiro (2002) say elections to the European
Parliament (EP) have provided a new political space that has helped ethno-
regionalist parties by promoting cross-national networks and stimulating
electoral alliances.
14 Estimates of the annual flow of remittances to developing countries and
emerging economies from around 180 million expatriates range from the World
Bank’s suggestion of US$167 billion to US$300 billion (half of it through
informal or unmonitored channels) according to ‘payments experts’ cited by
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What is the place of political parties and party systems in providing 
democracy for the more global world of the twenty-first century? If contem-
porary globalisation has shifted the contours of governance – that is, the
ways that societal rules are formulated, applied and reviewed – do polit-
ical parties need to reinvent their organisation and practices to fulfil their
democratic role? If so, what kinds of adjustments are required? Or has
globalisation so transformed politics that party formations have become
obsolete in the democratic process, no longer able to deliver adequate
public participation in, and public control over, the decisions that shape
collective destinies?
This chapter argues that the past half-century of intense globalisation
has by no means rendered political parties and party systems irrelevant.
However, political parties – that is, formal organisations that support
candidates for elected public office – have lost substantial democratic
impact by failing to move on with today’s more global times. Official
circles and civil society quarters have generally made considerably more
progress towards recognising, and adjusting their activities to, the shift
from a statist to a polycentric mode of governance that has accompanied
contemporary globalisation. In contrast, political parties have for the 
most part retained a now obsolete statist–territorialist–nationalist modus
operandi. To the extent that political parties currently have only limited
significance for democracy in global affairs, this situation has mainly been
of their own making. Parties could regain considerable stature as demo-
cratic forces if they (belatedly) altered a number of practices in line with
emergent polycentric governance of a more global world.
Along with this heavy critique of failings by political parties to date,
the chapter also advances a number of suggestions to turn the tide in
more positive directions. Such measures could benefit party organisations
and wider democracy alike. Greater attention to global affairs, global rules
and global institutions by parties could contribute significantly to their
revival as democratic players. In turn, more globally oriented political
parties could provide a much-needed boost to the broader democratisa-
tion of globalisation. The current general stagnancy of political parties
and the overall underdevelopment of global democracy would thereby be
addressed at the same time. Reinvigorated party systems are not a panacea
for public participation and public accountability in global politics, but
they could bring major advances.
The chapter elaborates this argument in three broad steps. The first
main section defines key concepts (‘globalisation’, ‘governance’, ‘democ-
racy’ and ‘political parties’) and summarises the consequences of global-
isation for governance and democracy in contemporary history. The second
section analyses the role in this altered situation of traditional political
parties – ‘traditional’ here meaning territorially based organisations that
work at the country level. Country-based political parties have generally
failed to reorient themselves to polycentric governance, although a number
of changes in their practices could enhance democracy in global politics.
The third section of the chapter assesses several ways that political parties
can be reorganised beyond the state: namely, through international net-
works of country-based political parties; through regional party formations;
and through distinctly global political parties. None of these three strat-
egies seems likely to generate major democratising impacts on globalisation
in the short or medium term.
Before proceeding to detail these points it should be stressed that this
discussion is more a conceptual reflection than the result of systematic
empirical research. The writer’s two decades of explorations of global-
isation in a host of contexts across the planet may provide some grounds
for informed speculations on the problems and prospects of political parties
in a more global world. However, the questions and arguments set out
here suggest an agenda for future research more than confirmed theses.
As the limited bibliographical references in this chapter indicate, the ques-
tion of political parties and the democratisation of globalisation has so
far received strikingly – indeed, deplorably – little academic attention. It
is to be hoped that the present chapter and the larger volume of which
it forms a part may stimulate further efforts to fill this gap.
Concepts and context
To assess the actual and potential roles of political parties in the demo-
cratisation of globalisation, it is of course helpful to define terms for the
purpose of the analysis at hand, as well as to describe the general context
that has prompted the research question. The treatment of these complex
and deeply contested conceptual and historical issues must perforce be
truncated here. Readers may refer elsewhere to find further elaboration
and substantiation of the arguments set out in this section (Scholte, 2005:
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Globalisation and the shift to polycentric governance
As the word is understood here, globalisation denotes a trend of becoming
more global: the expansion of a planetary scale of social life. With global-
isation people become more able – technologically, legally, linguistically,
culturally, psychologically – to have direct connections with one another
wherever on the earth they may be located.
Although globality in this sense of transplanetary social connectivity
has sometimes figured importantly in earlier history, global relations have
undergone unprecedented growth since the middle of the twentieth century.
Global links between persons now arise more frequently, take more forms,
transpire faster and impact more deeply than in any previous era. Indeed,
contemporary history has, as never before, seen the emergence of trans-
planetary instantaneity (whereby certain global transmissions such as
intercontinental telephone calls occur in effectively no time) and trans-
planetary simultaneity (whereby certain global phenomena such as satellite
television broadcasts can involve people spread all over the world at the
same time).
In this way globalisation entails a significant respatialisation of social
relations. The global, planetary sphere becomes, in its own right, an
important site of culture, ecology, economics, law, health, history and
politics. Countless phenomena such as the internet, air travel, interconti-
nental production chains, electronic finance, climate change, criminal
networks, the United Nations system, ‘world music’, the AIDS pandemic
and women’s movements cannot be geographically reduced to territorial
logics. They also have a notable ‘supraterritorial’ quality. This is by no
means to say that other (territorial) social spaces such as households,
workplaces, districts, countries and regions have become any less important
in contemporary society. However, these other scales of social relations
are now also supplemented by, and intertwined with, major global
domains. It is not possible to understand the human condition in the
twenty-first century without significant attention to global dimensions.
While altering the geography of social life, globalisation also has 
major consequences for the mode of governance. The term ‘governance’ is
taken here to refer to the complex of rules and regulatory institutions under
which people pursue their societal interactions with each other. The vocab-
ulary of ‘governance’ is here deliberately preferred to that of ‘government’,
inasmuch as the latter word is often assumed to designate the formal,
centralised, public, national, territorial apparatus of the modern state. In
contrast, ‘governance’ encompasses the larger operations of regulation in
society: non-state as well as state; private as well as public; informal as
well as formal; supraterritorial as well as territorial. Thus ‘governance’ is
understood here in the more encompassing sense that others have sug-
gested when invoking the term ‘governmentality’, although the present
analysis does not adopt a Foucauldian approach.
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Talk of ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ is certainly appropriate
with respect to contemporary global affairs. The regulation of transplan-
etary and supraterritorial matters generally involves multiple and diffuse
sites. States retain a key role in the construction, implementation and eval-
uation of the rules that apply to global social relations, but the statist appa-
ratus of societal regulation that prevailed in the middle of the twentieth
century has given way to a more polycentric order.
For one thing, substantial elements of governance have, over recent
decades, become global in scale. As logic might suggest, burgeoning global
activities and issues have prompted a notable increase of rules and regu-
latory institutions with a global span. Some of this transplanetary gov-
ernance has grown through a proliferation and expansion of suprastate
agencies with multi-continental memberships and remits. Well-known
examples include the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the WTO.
Yet global governance also entails more than what have traditionally
been called ‘international organisations’. Other global-scale regulation has
taken a transgovernmental shape, with the development of largely informal
transplanetary networks of state officials. Transgovernmental relations
have addressed matters as disparate as crime, human rights, environmental
regulation and various areas of trade (Slaughter, 2004). Perhaps the most
visible transgovernmental apparatus is the Group of Eight (G8) process
developed since the mid-1970s. Other examples include the Competition
Policy Network and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Still further global governance has expanded in recent times through
non-governmental channels. This privatisation of regulation has been mani-
fested in regimes such as the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB, a market-based organisation created in 1973) the Forestry Steward-
ship Council (FSC, a civil society body formed in 1993) and the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN, a public–private
hybrid established in 1998). Such developments demonstrate that govern-
ance of global (and for that matter any other) affairs need not by definition
occur through the public sector (Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999; Hall
and Biersteker, 2003).
Concurrently with this substantial growth of global regulation, govern-
ance has also taken more regional form during the past half-century of
intense globalisation, with an unprecedented expansion of rules and regu-
latory institutions that apply to a group of contiguous countries. For exam-
ple, 273 regional trade arrangements had been registered with the WTO as
of 2003 (Cosbey et al., 2005: 2). In certain cases inter-regional governance
relationships have emerged, as in the Asia–Europe Meetings (ASEM)
between the EU and the so-called ‘ASEAN+3’ (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations plus China, Japan and South Korea). Many analysts have
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and a policy response to globalisation (Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel, 1999;
Hughes, Cooper and Delombaerde, forthcoming). As elaborated later in this
chapter, this trend in contemporary governance opens important possibili-
ties for political parties to achieve democratisation of globalisation through
regionalisation.
The growth of suprastate (global and regional) governance has by no
means rendered country-based regulation through states irrelevant in a
more global world. Arguments widely heard in the early 1990s that
ongoing globalisation would provoke a decline, retreat or even demise of
the state have been comprehensively refuted. On the contrary, states –
especially the more powerful states – remain central actors in contem-
porary governance and indeed have ranked among the principal architects
of globalisation (Weiss, 1998). In this light, the second section of this
chapter affirms that political parties and party systems focused on the
state retain considerable historical mileage in the early twenty-first century.
That said, states behave differently in today’s more global world than
they did in what could be termed the ‘territorialist’ politics of an earlier
time. One major reorientation of state action has already been mentioned
with regard to the growth and importance of transgovernmental networks.
Another change has arisen with increased attention by states to global
constituencies alongside domestic groups, thereby diluting the previous
concentration of government on so-called ‘national interests’. For example,
a state today may heed pressures from the World Bank, transnational
companies and/or global social movements as well as – and sometimes
even more than – demands from constituents based in its formal terri-
torial jurisdiction. Moreover, under conditions of greater globality states
have acquired a number of different policy instruments, such as computer
networks and (in a few cases) intercontinental missiles. In addition,
although earlier theses that globalisation necessitates a contraction of the
welfare state have been largely refuted, it is clear that states have signifi-
cantly adjusted social policies in response to the growing global economy.
And country-level governance has paralleled global governance with wide-
spread privatisation of various regulatory tasks, as manifested inter alia
in the creation of independent central banks and the spread of non-
governmental financial services authorities.
Finally, intense globalisation of the past half-century has transpired
concurrently with – and in various ways contributed to – significant 
localisation of governance. Across the continents states have under-
taken substantial devolution to sub-state regions and districts. Several
states, including Brazil and Canada, have also revised their constitu-
tions to accord greater autonomy to indigenous peoples residing in the
country. Concurrently, many sub-state governments have ‘gone global’ by
forging direct links with global capital and global governance agencies,
as well as by forming their own global networks such as United Cities
and Local Governments (UCLG), an association with several thousand
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members in over 100 countries. Hence political parties can also have
democratic purpose in a more global world when working in sub-state
government.
In sum, then, unprecedented globalisation of social life in recent history
has been accompanied by substantial globalisation, regionalisation, re-
configured nationalisation and resurgent localisation of governance. To
dissect the regulation of a given global issue (whether it be biodiversity
loss, tourism or whatever), analysts must consider public, private and
public–private mechanisms across global, macro-regional, country, micro-
regional and local scales. Societal regulation has lost the statist character
that prevailed in what has frequently been described as the modern
Westphalian system. Governance is now much more than government.
The term ‘polycentrism’ well designates this situation of multiple inter-
locking nodes of regulation that are diffused across multiple scales and
across public and private sectors. Others have described this situation 
with alternative terms, including ‘cosmocracy’, ‘mobius-web governance’,
‘netocracy’, ‘new medievalism’, ‘new multilateralism’ and ‘plurilateralism’.
Whatever label is used, however, the post-statist mode of governance
requires that political parties shift their practices if they are to remain
relevant and fulfil their democratising potentials in the twenty-first century.
Democratic deficits in contemporary globalisation
These democratic inputs from political parties are sorely needed in contem-
porary governance of global affairs. The shift from statism to poly-
centrism has generated enormous deficits of public participation in and
public control of regulatory processes in society, particularly as they
concern global issues. Shortfalls in democracy have produced some of 
the greatest public unease with contemporary globalisation, as witnessed
most dramatically in large street protests as well as more pervasively in
the casual conversations of everyday life.
As with definitions of globalisation, this chapter is not the place to
undertake a lengthy excursion through the meanings of democracy. For
present purposes governance is regarded as democratic when decision-
taking power lies with the people – a demos, a public, a ‘community of
fate’ – whom the regulations in question affect. Of course, political theor-
ists have suggested highly diverse ways to achieve democracy (deliberative,
participatory, representative models and more). However, there is general
agreement that, whatever its precise form, democracy prevails when the
members of a public determine policies: (a) collectively, together, as a
group; (b) with equivalent opportunities of involvement for all; (c) volun-
tarily, without coercion; (d) transparently, for all to see; and (e) responsibly,
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The many democratic deficits in the governance of contemporary global
affairs can be conveniently summarised under four headings. The first
major problem is public ignorance. Effective democracy presumes com-
petent agents. However, most people today have far from sufficient
information and analytical tools to make sense of globalisation, let alone
to take well-founded decisions about its governance. This ignorance is
hardly surprising, given how poorly the various sources of public education
have fulfilled their task in respect of global affairs. Schools, universities,
mass media, civil society associations, governance agencies and political
parties have all failed to give globalisation the quantity and quality of
attention required to have an adequately informed public. With poor
education, public mobilisations on globalisation – if they occur at all –
easily have little and/or unconstructive impact.
A second leading source of democratic deficits in current governance
of globalisation lies in institutional shortcomings. That is, the processes
of formulating, implementing, enforcing and evaluating policies that 
govern global matters have failed to incorporate adequate mechanisms of
public participation and public control. For example, public referenda on
global policy questions have rarely occurred. Elections to representative
offices have normally left global issues on the sidelines. Most public supra-
state governance agencies and all private regulatory bodies concerned 
with global affairs have lacked a directly elected legislature. Meanwhile,
national parliaments and local councils – as well as the political parties
who field candidates for these offices – have rarely exercised sufficient
scrutiny of government actions in global realms. Courts (on whatever
scale, local to global) have systematically failed to give people adequate
means of obtaining redress when policies concerning global relations cause
harm. Likewise, governance agencies of all kinds have generally provided
insufficient mechanisms for civil society participation in and scrutiny over
their activities. Moreover, civil society associations involved in global
policy processes have themselves often failed to meet adequate democratic
standards in their own behaviour.
Alongside public ignorance and institutional failings, a third key type
of democratic deficit in current governance of global matters relates to
structural inequalities. It was earlier stressed that democracy requires
equivalent opportunities for all affected persons to become involved in
the policy decisions of a given polity. Yet contemporary global politics is
everywhere steeped in social hierarchies. These deeply entrenched rela-
tions of dominance and subordination are manifold: by countries of the
North over those of the South; by wealthy and professional classes over
less skilled and unemployed workers; by modern cultures over non-ratio-
nalist life-worlds; by men over women; by whites over people of colour;
by urban residents over rural inhabitants; by heterosexuals over LGTB
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) orientations; by middle-aged over
younger and older generations; and by able-bodied over disabled persons.
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All of these structural inequalities of opportunity have had the effect
of arbitrarily skewing participation in global politics. Thus, undemocratic-
ally, certain major states have had greater weight in many global govern-
ance institutions. Indigenous peoples, women, subordinated races, sexual
minorities and youth have generally found it difficult to exercise voice in
the governance of global relations. Indeed, the policy directions that have
prevailed in the (weakly democratic) regulation of contemporary global-
isation have often sustained and sometimes even exacerbated arbitrary
social hierarchies (Scholte, 2005: Chapter 10).
The marginalisation of subordinated social groups often overlaps with
a fourth major source of democratic deficits in contemporary global
politics, namely, an insufficient recognition of supraterritorial publics.
Globalisation and the broader respatialisation of social life of which it is
a part have, over the past half-century, significantly reconfigured patterns
of collective identity (Scholte, 2005: Chapter 7). As a result, the nature
of the demos – that is, ‘the people’ whose participation in and control
over governance needs to be assured – has become far more complex. In
territorialist times of old, ‘rule by the people’ simply meant rule by the
national community that inhabited a given country. However, democracy
in a more global world must address a plurality of publics, including
many whose geography does not coincide with traditional territorial spaces.
For one thing, the proliferation and growth of transplanetary diasporas
in contemporary globalisation has brought a significant supraterritorial
element to many national solidarities. Prominent examples of ‘global
nations’ include Armenians, Chilean exiles, Indians, domestic servants 
from the Philippines, Palestinians and Sikhs. In addition, increased glob-
ality has involved an expansion of non-territorial communities, that is,
publics that have no inherent link to a particular homeland. Examples
include global bonds among co-religionists, among people of the same
gender or race, among those of a common class or profession, and among 
those of a similar sexual orientation. Furthermore, recent history has 
seen many persons increasingly identify themselves, at least partly, with
a global humanity. This growing cosmopolitanism has been reflected inter
alia in greater talk of a ‘world community’, ‘human rights’, ‘global public
goods’ and even ‘global citizenship’.
Yet the governance of global affairs has so far generally failed to accom-
modate this growth of supraterritorial publics. Mainstream political theory
and practice still assume that the demos takes the form of a territorial–
national community. An incipient global civil society has given some
political space to plural and hybrid identities, but official policy processes
and political party activities on global issues have tended to marginalise
supraterritorial collectivities. At best, groups such as Kurds, Buddhists,
women, peasants, gays and cosmopolitans have obtained some participa-
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using national–state–territorial channels. However, these supraterritorial
publics have received little recognition in their own right with specific
positions and procedures to ensure their distinctive involvement in global
politics.
Taking, in sum, educational shortcomings, institutional failings, struc-
tural subordinations and under-recognition of supraterritorial publics, the
governance of contemporary globalisation has had very weak democratic
groundings. Emergent polycentric regulation of global affairs can in no
serious way be characterised as ‘rule by the people’. Understandably, as
noted earlier, these democratic deficits have prompted much disquiet.
Indeed, it may be asked whether current directions of globalisation are
politically sustainable in the absence of significant efforts to democratise
the process.
The democratisation of globalisation could be pursued through a num-
ber of channels. These avenues include: programmes of public education;
measures to improve transparency and accountability of regulatory bureau-
cracies; reform of judicial procedures; steps to expand and upgrade civil
society activities; redistribution of resources in favour of structurally dis-
advantaged groups; and revision of constitutions to recognise supra-
territorial publics. However, the rest of this chapter looks more narrowly
at how reoriented practices by political parties might bring greater democ-
racy to global affairs. This focus on political parties reflects the theme of
the present book and does not imply that other approaches to upgrading
democracy in global politics are less worthy. On the contrary, effective
democratisation of globalisation probably requires concurrent initiatives
from multiple complementary angles, including but not limited to changes
in the organisation and activities of political parties.
Political parties
As indicated at the outset of this discussion, a political party is under-
stood here to be a formal organisation that supports candidates (that is,
politicians) for elected public office. Parties may be based on any of several
rationales. For example, in the tradition of many historical party forma-
tions in Western Europe, a party may be rooted in ideology and a particular
vision of the good society. On the other hand, parties may also have
sectoral foundations, in cases where they pursue the political interests of
a given social group, be it an ethnic, regional, religious or other circle.
Alternatively, a political party may find its glue in the charismatic person-
ality of its leader(s). In other instances the raison d’être of the party may
extend no further than to serve the professional ambitions of its career
politicians. Or several of these factors may figure in combination. Whatever
the bonds that unite their members, however, all political parties seek to
take and retain elected public office.
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A specific distinction is therefore maintained in the present analysis
between a political party and a civil society association. Political parties
look to occupy positions of public authority, while civil society bodies
aim to shape societal rules without capturing public regulatory institu-
tions. To be sure, grey areas may arise in the case of fringe political parties
(such as most ultra-nationalist formations) that have little or no prospect
of winning elections. At the same time certain civil society associations
(for example, a number of trade unions) have maintained close affilia-
tions with political parties. Thus, as ever, no definition is crystal clear.
However, the broad distinction between political parties and civil society
is sustainable. The differentiation is also analytically useful in an investi-
gation of democracy, inasmuch as political parties give priority to strategies
of indirect and representative democracy, whereas civil society associa-
tions tend to pursue more deliberative and directly participatory routes
to popular sovereignty.
So now to the specific concern at hand: what can political parties do
to effect more participation and control by the demos in the construc-
tion of rules for the more global world of the twenty-first century? The
rest of this chapter considers what political parties might contribute, both
through traditional territorial-national organisations and through inter-
national, regional and global frameworks.
Country-based parties in a more global world
As noted briefly in the preceding survey of democratic deficits in contem-
porary globalisation, traditional territorial political parties (that is, those
constructed around a country unit in order to pursue office in the national
and local governments of that land) have so far failed to generate much
public participation in and public control over the governance of global
affairs. The following paragraphs identify five main ways that country-
based political parties have fallen short in this regard and suggest corrective
steps under each of these headings that could increase their contribu-
tions to a more global world. The third section of this chapter then goes
on to argue that – however far country-based bodies might raise their
inputs to global democracy – political parties must, in the current circum-
stances of polycentric governance, also organise beyond country–state–
nation units far more than they have done to date.
Educating publics
As mentioned before, traditional territorial parties have – along with other
actors in contemporary politics such as schools, the mass media and civil
society associations – generally failed to make publics sufficiently conscious
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are not governed. Questions of global policy have rarely figured promi-
nently – and often not at all – in party conferences, rallies and workshops.
Likewise, global affairs have usually featured marginally, if at all, in party
research and training programmes, in the selection and promotion of
candidates, in a party’s press conferences and other public communications,
and in campaign manifestos and debates. True, certain parties have raised
public understanding of certain global problems, for example, in the case
of Green parties with respect to planetary ecological challenges. For the
most part, however, political parties have neglected their many oppor-
tunities for public education on global matters.
Indeed, this consistent failure to address global issues has arguably
contributed to a widespread loss of stature for traditional political parties
in the public eye. Concurrently with accelerated globalisation in recent
decades, most established liberal democratic states have experienced signifi-
cant reductions in party memberships and voter turnouts. Many factors
have prompted this decline, of course, but among them are public percep-
tions that established party systems have lost relevance in addressing the
priority issues of the day. In turn, a good part of that apparent loss of
relevance arguably lies in the neglect, especially by the large mainstream
political parties, substantially to engage the global realities of contem-
porary society.
This diagnosis of the problem evokes its own prescription, namely, that
traditional territorial political parties should give greater attention to global
affairs. Parties would thereby contribute more to public awareness of these
vital issues and at the same time reaffirm their relevance for the twenty-
first century. The fact that traditional political parties operate on a
country–state–nation scale does not mean that they must restrict their
policy vision to territorially bounded issues in their land of operation. 
On the contrary, parties arguably have a societal obligation proactively
to reshape the agenda of public debate so that it catches up with the
more global world that has emerged over the past half-century. Indeed,
for parties to perpetuate (inadvertently or otherwise) territorialist and
statist myths is highly damaging given the challenges that globalisation
poses inter alia for material welfare, ecological integrity, the rule of law,
cultural identities and social cohesion.
Country-based parties could take a number of specific measures to
become more effective agents of public education on global affairs. For
example, party meetings, publicity materials and electoral campaigns could
more regularly and prominently discuss global policy issues such as climate
change, governing the internet and global taxes to finance development.
In addition, competence to handle global issues could be made a signifi-
cant consideration when parties select their candidates. Political parties
could also commit more resources to research and training that would
enhance the capacities of politicians and their staffs to address questions
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related to, for instance, global migration flows, global disease control, and
global arms trade. More globally educated candidates and party workers
would in turn, through the wider political process, foster more globally
educated (and thereby more democratically empowered) publics.
Occupying state office
As well as by educating publics, country-based political parties can fulfil
a democratising function in today’s more global world by doing what
they have always done, namely, gaining and holding executive power in
national and local governments. As indicated earlier, globalisation has by
no means sidelined territorial governments. On the contrary, states remain
key actors in the regulation of global relations. Even district councils in
small countries face decisions concerning, for example, contracts with
global companies and implementation of global resolutions on the environ-
ment. Hence control of national and local governments gives political
parties major opportunities to shape globalisation in line with the popular
will.
To date, however, political parties have generally underplayed these
possibilities to democratise global affairs. For one thing, as already stressed,
parties have mostly failed to promote public understanding of and delib-
erations about global policy issues, so that there is little well-formed
popular will upon which a democratic state could act. Lacking awareness
of global relations and their governance, publics rarely press politicians
holding public office to act on the problems.
Nor have elected representatives in national and local government 
shown themselves particularly inclined to rise to global challenges. Indeed,
politicians have all too often depicted globalisation as an omnipotent
external force over which the state can exercise no control. In this vein,
countless ministers have blamed various ills of their country on global
competition, global technologies, global epidemics and global institutions
such as the IMF.
Yet politicians hereby underestimate their potential influence and 
abdicate their democratic responsibility. To be sure, a number of global
circumstances have constrained the range of choices available to states.
Sovereignty in the old Westphalian sense of a state’s claim to total authority
over its realm is unavailable in the more global world of the twenty-
first century. However, it is quite another thing to say that increased
global connectivity has rendered governments prostrate. After all, states
(especially stronger states) have considerable leeway in deciding whether,
when and under what terms to accede to global regulatory regimes.
Likewise, most states – other than the weaker ones – have notable scope
in determining economic, social and environmental policies vis-à-vis global
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today jealously retain their near-monopoly positions in governing migra-
tion and military affairs, yielding only marginal roles to suprastate and
private regulatory mechanisms. Also, globalisation has given states (espe-
cially the major states) various new tools and enhanced opportunities for
influence with, for instance, electronic mass media, global currencies and
even satellite surveillance.
Given this continued importance, the state remains a prize well worth
contesting in a more global world. By winning national and local govern-
ment office, traditional territorial political parties can substantially mould
the formulation and execution of a state’s policies on global issues. If the
victorious parties are genuinely democratic forces, then the governments
that they lead can steer globalisation in popularly preferred directions.
Again, however, to achieve this democratic purpose country-based political
parties need to give global issues due priority and to equip their staffs
and memberships with competence to handle global agendas.
Scrutinising state policies on global affairs
Yet political parties do not have to occupy national and local executive
office in order to democratise state policies on globalisation. In addition,
parties in opposition – as well as critical voices within ruling parties –
can play the role of democratic watchdog, scrutinising whether or not the
government of the day is reflecting the popular will in its handling of
global issues. In this way country-based political parties can contribute
to democratic accountability in globalisation.
Regrettably, few traditional political parties have done much to exploit
these democratising possibilities. As ever, to be sure, certain exceptions
exist. For instance, a number of national politicians and parliaments have
in recent years undertaken closer examination of their government’s
involvement in the Bretton Woods institutions (Halifax Initiative, 2004).
However, this (modest) example stands out as a deviation from the norm
of neglect. For instance, no country-based parties and their representa-
tives in parliaments have performed systematic oversight of the important
transgovernmental networks described earlier. Likewise, state bureaucra-
cies have adopted most of their international commitments regarding 
global matters without reference to legislatures and the political parties
that populate them.
Clearly parties could do much more in this area. Alongside (and some-
times in collaboration with) civil society associations and the mass media,
political parties could be leading agents of public scrutiny over a state’s
involvement in global affairs. For example, party organisations and
politicians could sponsor many more critical studies of a state’s policies
on, say, global environmental matters, global human rights questions or
global debt problems. Party representatives in legislative bodies could use
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committee hearings and plenary debates to push for improved govern-
ment action on given global matters. Likewise, opposition parties could
make the incumbent government’s record on governing global aspects of,
say, trade or health a headline issue in election campaigns.
Engaging governance beyond the state
Important though the measures just discussed may be, traditional polit-
ical parties must not restrict their quest for public participation and public
accountability in global governance to the state alone. Like other polit-
ical actors in the twenty-first century, parties need to abandon outdated
statist assumptions and reorient their practices to the emergent polycentric
mode of governance. That means actively engaging the state, to be sure,
but also other regulatory bodies. To remain effective in a more global
world, country-based political parties must in addition attend to a host
of suprastate and non-state governance mechanisms.
Yet in this area, too, traditional political parties have, to date, gener-
ally failed to deliver. True, as indicated in the next section, certain national
parliamentarians have built connections with certain global regulatory
agencies such as the World Bank and the WTO, but they have generally
done so on their personal initiative. However, country-based political
parties have not, as party organisations, pursued a policy of systematic-
ally engaging with suprastate institutions, let alone private regimes of
global governance. A potentially important channel for conveying demo-
cratic voice to regulatory bodies beyond the state has therefore gone
unutilised. Moreover, the lack of contact with suprastate and private regu-
latory agencies has exacerbated the parties’ ignorance of governance
outside the state. Conversely, too, the absence of links with parties has
contributed to often poor understanding on the part of global bureau-
cracies such as the IMF about political circumstances in the various member
countries. Romania is a good example of repeated IMF failure, which
contrasts with Lithuania where IMF contact with the political opposition
proved helpful when the party in power changed.
The failure of country-based political parties to engage governance insti-
tutions beyond the state becomes all the more striking when compared
with the record of civil society associations in this respect. Countless busi-
ness forums, community groups, faith-based movements, labour unions,
NGOs and think tanks have developed substantive relationships with the
various multilateral development banks, UN organs, the WTO, the OECD,
and even a few private regulatory bodies such as ICANN. In response to
these initiatives, many suprastate governance institutions have set up civil
society liaison bureaus, developed systematic procedures for civil society
consultation, and issued staff guides for relations with civil society asso-
ciations. These official mechanisms remain inadequate in many respects,
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In marked contrast, global regulatory bodies have constructed nothing
of this sort for relations with political parties. This is principally because,
unlike civil society organisations, parties have placed the suprastate agen-
cies under no concerted pressure to engage. It seems telling that, as of
2003, IMF headquarters had devoted half a dozen staff to civil society
matters, while only one junior official had a half-time responsibility for
parliamentary liaison across the entire world.
In short, if country-based political parties are to reaffirm their promise
as major democratic forces in a more global world, they really must catch
up with the realities of polycentric governance. Their traditional statist
orientations and practices are not enough for the twenty-first century and
must be supplemented with systematic efforts to bring public voice and
public accountability to the many suprastate and non-state sites of regu-
lation in contemporary governance of global affairs.
Promoting global equality
Yet however educated the publics and however improved the institutional
processes, greater democracy will not prevail in the more global world of
the twenty-first century unless the previously described structural inequal-
ities are also addressed. If veritable ‘rule by the people’ is to hold sway
in global politics, then all social categories (countries, classes, cultures,
genders, races, urban/rural sectors, sexualities, age groups and so on) must
have equivalent possibilities of involvement in the governance of trans-
planetary affairs. Partly, that requires changes in institutional processes
(such as voting systems and consultation procedures) to ensure that various
structurally subordinated circles obtain due voice in the regulation of
globalisation. Beyond institutional changes, greater political equality also
requires greater economic equality, which in turn necessitates a major
global-scale redistribution of resources.
In this aspect of the democratisation of globalisation, too, traditional
territorial political parties have generally done little. To be sure, a host
of socialist and communist parties have historically championed the cause
of underclasses. In more recent decades many parties have proactively
sought to increase the involvement of women and racial minorities.
However, despite some internationalist rhetoric, such initiatives by political
parties have in practice focused on reducing inequalities within the country
at hand rather than in a larger global polity. As for progressive global
redistribution, political parties in Northern countries have (apart from a
handful of endorsements of the proposed Tobin tax on currency trans-
actions) rarely gone beyond advocacy of modest resource transfers via
international development assistance. Meanwhile political parties in
Southern countries have generally lacked the means to pursue concerted
campaigns for more ambitious global redistribution.
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Once again the diagnosis of failings yields a clear corrective prescrip-
tion: in order to advance democracy in global affairs, political parties
should promote institutional changes and resource redistributions in the
direction of greater global social equality. However, this remedy is easier
identified than implemented. In particular, so long as traditional political
parties maintain a territorial organisation and principally serve country-
based constituencies, it is hard to see how global equality could come to
rank among their priority concerns.
Recognising peoples beyond the territorial nation
Likewise, the territorial orientation of traditional political parties forms
a structural impediment to progress on the fourth type of democratic
deficit mentioned earlier, that is, the need to provide participation and
accountability for a variety of publics, including those that do not take
a territorial–national form. Traditional political parties assume that ‘the
people’ in ‘rule by the people’ is the national community that inhabits
the country at hand. Territorial parties cater to supraterritorial types of
demos (such as those based on world religions, global class solidarities,
or humanity as a whole) only secondarily, if at all.
Certain exceptions to this overall neglect are found in respect of dias-
poras. For instance, a number of country-based political parties in Africa
have received significant funding from co-nationals resident abroad. 
Ghana has even known an ‘Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere Party’
(EGLE) that won one parliamentary seat in the 1993 elections. Many
states now allow those of their citizens based outside the country to vote
in national elections.
However, traditional parties have done little to attend to supraterritorial
publics of a non-national kind. To obtain democratic voice these ‘peoples’
have tended to desert political parties and turn instead to transnational
social movements such as Vía Campesina (for global peasant solidarity),
the International Lesbian and Gay Association and the World March of
Women. Unfortunately these global civil society actors have developed
few links with political parties, connections that could make parties more
sensitive to plural and hybrid identities in contemporary politics. Indeed,
the World Social Forum, a major initiative to create a global public space
for a host of civil society movements, has in its Charter of Principles
(point 9) specifically excluded delegates from political parties.
In sum, while traditional political parties certainly do not stand in
contradiction to democracy in global politics, they have on the whole 
thus far failed to realise their potential as forces for bringing greater 
‘rule by the people’ to transplanetary affairs. As indicated above, country-
based parties offer, in principle, some of the most promising and practicable
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is getting established political parties and party systems to discard old
assumptions about the nature of governance and to address the new
realities of a more global world.
Beyond traditional political parties
Yet no matter how far traditional political parties might pursue the demo-
cratisation of globalisation, their efforts can never be enough by themselves.
However much country-based parties might change their practices, by
definition they have a primarily territorial orientation that inhibits them
from completely adequately handling global issues. Invariably, traditional
parties mainly operate in a country sphere (to the relative neglect of 
other realms); they mainly engage the corresponding state apparatus (to
the relative neglect of other sites of regulation); and they mainly relate to
the corresponding national demos (to the relative neglect of other peoples).
In order to address more fully global spaces, governance beyond the
state and publics beyond the territorial nation, political parties also need
to organise themselves on more than country–state–nation lines. The rest
of this chapter considers three steps towards such a broader orientation,
namely, the development of international, regional and global party organ-
isations. Overall it is concluded that these alternative party forms offer
important possibilities for democratising global politics but limited im-
mediate impacts. For the time being civil society activities beyond the
country–state–nation hold more promise for advancing global democracy
than international, regional and global parties.
International party networks
One readily available path to develop more globally oriented political
parties is to build international links between established country-based
organisations. Such networks allow traditional parties to exchange views,
pool expertise and co-ordinate actions with partners across the planet on
global issues in particular. International collaboration among parties can,
furthermore, have democratising effects if it promotes more public aware-
ness of global affairs, more opportunities for public participation and
accountability in global policy-making, and greater equality and identity
recognition in global politics.
Like many global activities, the origins of international party organ-
isations can be traced to the late nineteenth century. The International
Working Men’s Association (First International) operated across Europe
and North America from 1864 to 1876. The Second International linked
country-based socialist and labour parties from 1889 to 1916, being suc-
ceeded in the 1920s by several rival bodies. The Third or Communist
International (Comintern) institutionalised a world movement of territorial
62 Jan Aart Scholte
communist parties from 1919 to 1943, followed briefly by the Communist
Information Bureau (Cominform) from 1947 to 1956.
Several international associations of country-based political parties are
active today. Following the footsteps of the Second International and its
interwar successors, the London-based Socialist International (SI) currently
involves 148 country-based parties. The Fourth International, founded by
Trotskyists in 1938, persists on a smaller scale and without an official
secretariat. The Liberal International (LI), established in 1947 and also
maintaining headquarters in London, includes full and observer member
organisations from 54 countries. The Oslo-based International Democrat
Union (IDU), launched in 1983, currently groups 47 country-based parties
with conservative and Christian Democrat orientations. The youngest inter-
national party association, the Global Green Network, was formally
created in 2001, although regular intercontinental communications among
country-based ecological parties date from the early 1990s.
The various party internationals have regularly considered matters of
global public policy. For example, the SI has supported committees, cam-
paigns and working groups concerning inter alia poor country debt prob-
lems, migration, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the WTO.
The Fourth International has treated contemporary capitalism and workers’
struggles as distinctly global issues. The LI has repeatedly addressed ‘the
challenges of globalisation’. The Global Greens reveal a transplanetary
orientation in their very name as well as in specific attention accorded to
matters such as climate change and nuclear proliferation.
In addition, other international networking among members of country-
based political parties has occurred through meetings of national legislators.
In this vein the Geneva-based Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has operated
since 1889. The London-based Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
(CPA), dating from 1911, now links some 170 state and sub-state legisla-
tures from 53 countries. Both bodies have handled a number of global
issues, including disarmament, financing for development, HIV/AIDS and
trade. In addition, Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), an associa-
tion involving over 1,300 representatives from 114 national legislatures, has
worked with various UN agencies since the late 1970s.
Several other international networks of country-based parliamentarians
have focused on specific global problems. In this vein the Global Legislators
Organisation for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE), launched in 1989,
now groups representatives from over 100 national parliaments. Since
2000 a Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) has involved
several hundred elected representatives from around 50 countries. Begin-
ning in 2003 the IPU and the EP have jointly convened an annual
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Yet the extent of this international co-operation among country-based
parties must not be exaggerated. After decades of operations these inter-
national associations have made only very modest impacts on global
politics. Relatively few members, politicians and staff of political parties
have devoted substantial time and energy to these networks. All of the
party internationals have remained poorly resourced, with tiny staffs 
and budgets. Even the oldest and largest of these bodies, the SI, currently
survives on an annual budget of only £1 million.
In short, a much bigger scale of international networking among country-
based parties would be required in order to advance a notable demo-
cratisation of globalisation through these channels. The party internationals
would need to do much more than has occurred so far to raise public
awareness of globalisation and its governance, to engage suprastate 
and private regulatory institutions, to combat global inequalities, and 
to provide platforms for supraterritorial as well as territorial publics. In
principle the possibilities of international networking among traditional
political parties are substantial, but in practice the results to date have
been negligible.
Regional parties
One step towards greater global democracy through political parties could
be to move away from country-based organisations. After all, while inter-
national party networks may operate globally, their constituent elements
still derive from – and work primarily within – a country–state–nation
framework. However, political parties could also be organised in relation
to other kinds of geographical units, including regional spaces in particular.
Indeed, several of the party internationals also organise their members in
regional sub-groupings.
As noted earlier in this chapter, regionalisation is a major contemporary
trend alongside globalisation in contemporary history. Considerable regu-
lation of global flows (in terms of communications, finance, investment,
trade and so on) has developed over recent decades through regional gov-
ernance apparatuses such as the EU and the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR). Many advocates of regionalism have argued that such
frameworks offer major – perhaps even the greatest – opportunities to har-
ness global flows in the public interest. From this perspective regionalisation
would be a primary strategy for the democratisation of globalisation.
Thus far two regional governance projects have acquired directly elected
parliamentary bodies. Representatives of the European Parliament of the
EU (now numbering 732 in total) have been directly elected every five
years since 1979. Voters in the six member countries of the Central Amer-
ican Common Market select 132 representatives to the Central American
Parliament, which has convened in Guatemala City since 1991.
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Not surprisingly, the emergence of directly elected regional assemblies
has encouraged the development of regionally organised political parties
to contest the seats. In the EU, for example, a distinctly regional European
People’s Party (EPP) has operated since 1976 and the Party of European
Socialists (PES) was formed in 1992. The European Free Alliance (EFA)
was founded in 2004 to represent stateless nations across the region. Other
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are organised in looser coali-
tions of national parties. So far the Central American Parliament has not
acquired distinctly regional political parties, although the deputies have
formed three main international blocs.
Meanwhile a number of other regional governance frameworks have
gained indirectly elected representative bodies with members who are
appointed from the national legislatures of the member states. Examples
include the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (inaugur-
ated in 1949), the Andean Parliament of the Andean Community (1979),
the Consultative Assembly of the Arab Maghreb Union (1989), the Parlia-
mentary Forum of the Southern African Development Community (1996),
the East African Legislative Assembly of the East African Community
(2001), the Parliament of the Economic Community of West African 
States (2002) and the Pan-African Parliament of the African Union (2004).
In addition, a stand-alone Latin American Parliament has, since 1987,
linked legislatures of that region, but without constituting part of a larger
regional governance apparatus. Thus far these indirectly elected regional
bodies have not called forth distinctly regional party organisations,
although such a development might be anticipated in the course of further
regionalisation in the future.
However, neither the existing regional political parties nor the regional
parliaments have as yet realised significant democratising impacts on
globalisation. At best they have occasionally brought global issues to public
attention. Still more rarely they have scrutinised a regional body’s handling
of globalisation (such as the European Commission’s policies in WTO
talks). Like the secretariats of international party networks, the bureaus
of regional political parties have had very few resources at their disposal.
Moreover, the regional party organisations have generally maintained at
best incidental and loose links with individual members and constituency
branches, thereby generating little democratic participation and account-
ability for the grass roots. Indeed, the vast majority of EU citizens are
probably unaware even of the existence of the EPP, PES and EFA.
In sum, then, the proposition to further a democratisation of global
politics through regional parties and party systems has an appealing under-
lying logic in some respects, but has as yet delivered little substance. Fuller
realisation of this potential would require larger and more influential
regional governance instruments, stronger and directly elected regional
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that maintained close connections with citizens. Such institutions would
seem unlikely to develop very quickly, particularly outside Europe.
Global political parties
If effective regional political parties are at best a project for the medium
term, global political parties as instruments for transplanetary democracy
are today an even more remote prospect. In contrast to international party
networks, which assemble country-based organisations that strive to hold
state power, distinctly global political parties would promote candidates
for elected global governance offices. Although this idea has some support
(cf. Patomäki and Ulvila, 2006), it hardly seems a practicable option for
the time being.
To be sure, contemporary globalisation has created pressing needs for
much more regulation with a transplanetary scope, and the major expan-
sion of global-scale governance witnessed over the past half-century looks
set to continue into the future. Demands for democratic participation 
in and public accountability of global regulatory institutions will carry on
mounting, the more so if – as seems quite possible in the years to come
– global taxes begin to generate resources of their own directly for trans-
planetary governance agencies. The stage would then be set for cries of
‘no taxation without representation’ at the global level.
Yet thus far no global-scale regulatory agency, public or private, has
shown any sign of including a directly elected representative arm. No UN
Legislature, IMF Assembly, OECD Congress, or ICANN Parliament is in
prospect. Hence the raison d’être for distinctly global political parties is
– and looks to remain – decidedly absent. Such parties will not form 
if they have no seats to contest. The democratisation of global-scale govern-
ance mechanisms must therefore be sought through channels other than
a transplanetary party system.
In any case the construction of elected representative bodies attached
to global-scale governance agencies raises highly problematic issues. For
example, how would constituencies within a global arena be drawn? On
country, regional and/or supraterritorial lines? What electoral formula
would be used for global assemblies? One person, one vote, or some kind
of weighting (and if so which one)? How would transplanetary ballots be
conducted and monitored? What regime of campaign financing would
apply to global political parties?
Moreover, beyond these practical difficulties for global representative
democracy through global political parties lie deeper cultural problems.
One such systemic challenge is constructing a sufficiently strong general
ethos of global citizenship, in which a large proportion of humanity 
would frame its sense of political rights and duties substantially in terms
of a transplanetary polity and therefore find it meaningful to engage in
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global party politics. After all, country-based party systems did not become
effective mechanisms of participation and accountability until major
proportions of territorial populations directed significant political commit-
ments to the nation-state. Regional political parties have limited prospects
as engines of global democratisation so long as regional populations have
developed only a shallow, if any, sense of regional citizenship, as evidenced
in relatively and absolutely low voter turnouts to elections of the EP (see
Chapter 5). Although global citizenship is arguably incipient and growing
in contemporary politics, it is at this point in time even further from being
a major force than regional citizenship.
Finally, the construction of global political parties would face huge chal-
lenges of navigating cultural diversity. How could one devise a single
coherent transplanetary regime of parties and elected offices that equit-
ably accommodated the wide variety of political cultures across the planet?
Even on the smaller scale of territorial states, party systems have often
marginalised and excluded specific populations such as many indigenous
peoples for whom this modern model of democracy is culturally alien.
Indeed, in some cases whole countries – as in many parts of Africa and
Asia – have struggled to construct working party systems. Great care
would need to be taken to construct global political parties that delivered
veritable participation and accountability to all and not just to a modernist
elite. However, the necessary tools of intercultural communication and
negotiation are not yet available for effective ‘pluriversal’ politics of this
kind.
In sum, then, contemporary governance of global affairs has major
needs for supraterritorial frameworks of democratic mobilisation, but the
situation is not ripe for global political parties to fill this niche. For the
time being global civil society associations hold the greater promise in
this regard.
Conclusion
This chapter has reflected on the role of political parties in promoting
democratic governance of global affairs. Contemporary rapid growth of
transplanetary and supraterritorial social connectivity has significantly
reshaped the contours of governance and created corresponding needs to
recast democratic practices. Political parties continue to offer important
democratic potential in the more global world of the twenty-first century,
but they must adjust to the changes in order to realise this promise.
Many contributions to a democratisation of globalisation can come
from traditional territorial political parties. Country-based parties can
advance global democracy: by educating publics; by occupying state 
office; by scrutinising state policies; by engaging governance beyond the
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territorial nations. In short, traditional party systems can be relevant to
public participation and public accountability in global politics if they
suitably reorient their conceptions, priorities and practices.
At the same time, as much as possible should be done to promote new
types of party formations beyond country–state–nation units. As stressed
above, the effectiveness of international, regional and global party organ-
isations as agents of democratic globalisation will remain limited so long
as they lack the resources and the popular bases to generate veritable
public participation and public accountability on any significant scale.
Nevertheless, international and regional party constructions in particular
hold potentials that warrant pursuit.
Yet however much might be achieved towards global democracy through
political parties, it is clear that they can fill only part of the picture, particu-
larly so long as suprastate and private regulatory bodies lack elected repre-
sentative offices. Even then democratic global politics would require, among
other things, a fully operative global human rights regime, more globally
oriented public education and mass media, and a vibrant global civil
society. Party systems are no more a panacea for future global democracy
than for past territorial democracy.




International aid aimed at strengthening political parties in countries
attempting democratisation has been growing in size, diversity and geo-
graphical reach during the past decade and a half. This expansion is one
part of the broader growth of aid for democracy during these years.
Political party aid remains a relatively small part of the overall domain
of democracy assistance, but it clearly now has a place as one of the main
areas of attention, alongside assistance to promote free and fair elections,
civil society development, the rule of law and democratic governance.
This recent expansion of political party aid has occurred in two phases.
The first occurred in the 1990s and was primarily fuelled by the open-
ing up of Central and Eastern Europe to political party assistance (and
democracy aid generally). Both American and European parties, party
foundations and party institutes saw in post-1989 Central and Eastern
Europe a compelling opportunity for extending their work. The US party
institutes hurried in the years immediately after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall to set up programmes to support the new pro-democratic parties
emerging in the region, out of concern that without external assistance
these parties might be pushed off the stage by adaptive former commun-
ists building successor parties out of the financial, administrative, and
human resources of the old communist parties. European parties and party
aid organisations also moved into the region, slowly at first, then on a
large scale across the decade, attracted by the sense of rediscovered political
solidarity with a part of Europe long cut off from the West, ideological
similarities of many post-communist parties to Western European parties,
and the relative ease of working in a closely neighbouring region. Many
new European party foundations were established in the 1990s, in France,
Sweden, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, to respond to this opportunity
and to expand European party aid more generally. Both US and European
party organisations also began working in sub-Saharan Africa in these
years, especially in southern Africa, as transitions to multipartyism in
many African countries led to a multiplication of new parties and many














































The second phase of expansion occurred after the 1990s. Party aid has
increased significantly in Latin America (a region where the German
Stiftungen had been active in the 1970s and 1980s but from which they
retreated considerably in terms of party aid in the 1990s) and continued
to spread in Africa. In Latin America, for example, significant party
programmes have been carried out in recent years in Bolivia, Venezuela,
Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and elsewhere. And as part of
the greater Western involvement in democracy promotion in the Middle
East in the past five years, party aid programmes are multiplying there,
too. This phase of expansion has been marked by the entry of another
wave of new party aid actors. These include, for the first time, various
multilateral organisations, such as the United Nations Development
Programme, the Organization of American States, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe and the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Northern European governments
have also become more active in this area, with the establishment of the
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the Norwegian Centre
for Democracy and increased support through the Swedish International
Development Co-operation Agency for party work. The impetus for the
most recent expansion of party aid has primarily been the widespread
perception that many attempted democratic transitions are running into
difficulty and that problematic political parties are one of the main insti-
tutional weaknesses contributing to those troubled transitions. The rapid
increase of party aid in Latin America, for example, is tied to the sharp
sense among regional political leaders and experts that political parties in
the region are in a state of crisis.
Like almost all areas of democracy assistance, political party aid has
expanded more rapidly in scope and level of activity than in the elabo-
ration of well-grounded analysis and evaluation of the basic methods,
value and validity of such work. And the gap is only slowly starting to
be closed. In particular, five key questions about such assistance remain
unsettled in the view of many people within the development community
and the countries on the receiving end of such aid:
1 Is the goal of international political party assistance clear and coherent?
2 Are the methods of such assistance well designed and effective?
3 How is party aid evolving?
4 Is party aid a form of partisan political interference in other coun-
tries’ affairs?
5 Does it have significant positive impact?
Although definitive answers to these questions are not yet available, recent
research that this writer has carried out looking at party aid on a cross-
regional basis provides some preliminary insights.1
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A mythic model?
Organisations that engage in political party assistance often describe the
goal of their work in very general terms, saying they seek to help build
stronger or more capable parties in the places where they work. Observing
their programmes on the ground, however, one can see that in fact the
general concept of stronger or more capable parties has a fairly specific,
clear meaning in practice. Stated briefly, Western party aid seeks to help
build parties that are internally democratic, rationally and competent
managed in a non-personalistic manner, effective at campaigning, rooted
in society, law-abiding, financially transparent, ideologically defined,
strongly inclusive of women and youth, good at media relations, and
focused on grass-roots membership development and citizen outreach in
between elections.
These priorities for party development grow out of a generalised model
of parties in established democracies. In fact this model could be described
as mythic or idealised. All areas of democracy aid suffer to some degree
from a gap between idealised models that aid providers hold out to aid
recipients – whether it is of efficient, non-corrupt legislatures, swift, highly
competent and politically disinterested judiciaries, vigorous, diverse and
independent media, non-partisan, self-sustaining, powerful NGO sectors,
or engaged, well-informed citizenries – and the realities of most such insti-
tutions or sectors in established democracies. Yet this problem is
particularly acute when it comes to political party work. Perhaps a few
parties in the established democracies have the main characteristics that
party aid seeks to produce in parties in new or struggling democracies.
That is to say, perhaps a few parties are internally democratic, managed
in a rational, non-personalistic fashion, highly inclusive of women, ideo-
logically coherent, committed to issue-based, grass-roots campaigning and
so forth. Many, or most, however, fall well short of this ideal.
The problem of a gap between prescriptions dispensed abroad and real-
ities at home hits US political party aid especially hard. The US Republican
and Democratic parties – being organisations with no formal membership
rolls, weak central structures and a dominant focus on their role as organ-
isers of candidate primaries – substantially do not resemble what most
Western political scientists consider as the ‘normal’ model of a political
party, which is largely based on a European, or perhaps even more specific-
ally Northern European model (with the post-war German parties
archetypes of strong parties). Thus it is striking to see the US political
party institutes (the IRI and the NDI) going to other countries to push
for the development of political parties of a type that actually does not
exist in the United States, and doing so as though such parties are natural
and necessary for the consolidation of democracy.
Western party aid appears to be based on a model of parties that is
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that is also somewhat dislocated in time. Many of the organisational
features that party aid programmes emphasise hark back to an earlier
age, sometimes in the first half of the twentieth century, before the rise
in established democracies of television-driven, image-oriented campaign-
ing, the diminution of direct links between parties and voters, the blurring
and fading of traditional ideological orientations, the widespread public
cynicism about politics and the rise of heightened individualism, with its
negative consequences for the tendency of people to want to invest time
in or feel attached to broad-based socio-political organisations. Some party
aid practitioners seem to believe that fledgling parties in new or strug-
gling democracies can first develop as parties did in the days of traditional
politics in the established democracies (though fully inclusive of women
in accordance with the most contemporary Western values) and then at
some later stage deal with the all pressures and exigencies of socio-political
post-modernism. In fact, however, new or struggling democracies do not
have the luxury of passing through the various slow, evolutionary stages
of nineteenth and twentieth century European political development. They
are pushed both by their own citizens and the Western donors to move
quickly ahead on all elements of democratisation at the same time,
especially elections. For many parties this means plunging directly into
the age of media-saturated, hyper-individualistic politics without a century
or so of gradual, grass-roots-oriented development in which elite parties
grow into or give way to mass-based parties that over time then evolve
into catch-all parties or beyond.
A problematic standard approach
Party aid organisations not only tend to operate from a notably uniform
idea of what constitutes a good political party, they pursue this goal with
a fairly consistent set of methods. These methods are rooted in the
dominant ‘institutional modelling’ approach of democracy aid that Western
democracy promoters employ in most domains of their work: party aid
providers start with a conception of what a good party is and then try
to provide training and other forms of technical assistance to help recip-
ient parties become like the good party model. Training is by far the most
common method – party aid is a sea of workshops, seminars and round
tables sponsored by party aid organisations, at which representatives of
‘target’ or recipient parties receive exposure to a wide range of methods
and techniques of party-building and election campaigning. The arche-
typical party aid event is a two- or three-day training workshop on party
building led by a few experts from a Western capital who fly in to instruct
several dozen party cadres then fly out again once the workshop is over.
In addition to training, party aid providers also often offer exchange
visits and study tours. The study tours usually involve a group of repre-
sentatives of one or several parties spending a week or two in the
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aid-providing country to meet people in counterpart parties and govern-
ment agencies to learn at first hand about the workings of parties and
democracy. Exchanges also go in the other direction, with party delega-
tions travelling from aid-providing countries to visit counterparts in
aid-receiving countries.
Party aid also frequently includes extensive advice and counsel provided
by representatives of Western party foundations or institutes to party
leaders or activists in recipient countries. This advice and counsel may
cover all sorts of issues relating to the recipient party’s operations –
Western party aid representatives might cajole a party leader to delegate
power to his subordinates or form a coalition with another party, urge
a party’s executive committee to adopt a new method of candidate selec-
tion, give advice to a senior party official about how to structure a new
executive committee in the party, or tell a local party branch leader how
to strengthen his branch.
Different party organisations combine these various methods into
different approaches. Some, particularly the German Stiftungen, which
usually have a long-term field presence in the countries where they work,
conceive of their party aid role as that of a resource centre for the party
or parties they seek to support. The head of their local office offers a
flexible mix of assistance – occasional training or discussion workshops
and seminars, study tours and exchange visits, books and others mater-
ials, and frequent advice. Others, especially the US party institutes,
emphasise training, defining their role and their goals primarily as helping
parties achieve certain capabilities and organisational characteristics via a
set of training activities, combined with some strategic advice and guid-
ance. And still others, including most of the European party foundations
(or international outreach offices of parties) that operate without field
offices in other countries, primarily utilise exchange visits. Through a series
of visits or study tours in both directions between the aid-provider’s and
the aid-recipient’s capitals, a network of personal relationships and oppor-
tunities for information transfer is established between the party offering
aid and the counterpart party in a newly democratising country. The rela-
tionship advances as the exchanges proceed with a wider range of people
on the parties on both sides taking part, friendships being established and
trust developing.
The basic approach of party aid – institutional modelling using a
common ‘toolbox’ of familiar methods of knowledge transfer – has a clear
advantage. It allows aid providers to go to almost any other country, no
matter how unfamiliar the political life and how complex the underlying
socio-political structures, and settle quickly on a party-strengthening
programme that at least has a clear sense of both purpose and method.
And its consistency across highly varied contexts allows for a certain ease
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has some serious weaknesses. When interviewed, participants in party aid
highlight certain problematic features of much party aid. Above all, they
dislike what they view as the frequent use of pre-set, standardised designs
not well adapted to their particular context and mechanistic methods of
implementation.
Training programmes come in for steady criticism. Indeed the high level
of ‘workshop fatigue’ among persons on the receiving end of political
party training programmes is very striking. The criticisms about training
include the following:
1 Training workshops are often short, one-off events with no real follow-
up.
2 Aid providers allow party leaders to choose the wrong kind of partici-
pants for training events, that is, either personal cronies of the party
leader, who have little interest in the training, or marginal persons
who will not be able to effect change in the party.
3 The trainers are often ‘fly-in’ experts who lack substantial knowledge
of the local scene and teach from a set script based on political prac-
tices in their own country.
4 The topics covered in the workshops are often chosen by the aid
providers.
Shortcomings of using exchange relations as a method of party aid are
also quite manifest. Study tours and exchange visits are good for building
goodwill and personal ties between parties, but they are generally a poor
method for supporting party reform. If a study tour is carefully designed,
the participants rigorously chosen and the tour closely integrated with
follow-up training activities that will provide reinforcement, it can be
useful. Most study tours, however, do not have these characteristics 
and serve little purpose beyond relationship-building. Visits in the other
direction by a delegation of party officials or parliamentarians from 
the aid-providing country to a counterpart party on the receiving end 
also contribute to some friendship building and solidarity but rarely have
much more substance. And with respect to the advice and counsel that
party aid representatives provide to counterparts, research interviews with
both sides reveal a substantial gap between the providers and the recipi-
ents of such advice and counsel regarding the weight and value of such
interventions.
The chronic weaknesses of the standard method are, generally speak-
ing, recognisable symptoms of technical assistance that is supply driven,
externally designed and externally implemented (in the sense of being
implemented by persons not from the recipient society). As has been
experienced in many other domains where technical assistance follows this
model, such efforts usually fail to penetrate the socio-political fabric of
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the recipient society, to identify and nurture local processes of change 
and to adapt and evolve over time in response to rigorous processes of
evaluation.
Despite these weaknesses in the basic approach, it is still much used.
Given its fairly obvious shortcomings (it is enough, for example, to observe
a political party study tour from a reasonably close distance to see that
this is a method fraught with problems) and the consistency of critiques
that emerge from recipient parties, why does it show such persistence?
First, as noted above, it is a simple, straightforward approach that can
be put into place anywhere with little prior study or design. Second, the
standard approach reflects the non-developmental mindset common in
party aid circles. Most people who staff party aid organisations are experts
in politics and parties, not in developmental issues or methods. They are
not versed in methods such as nurturing local sources of change and
ensuring that external approaches are fully tailored to fit the local reali-
ties. Their instinctive inclination instead is straight institutional modelling.
Baldly stated, the outlook behind the assistance is: ‘We Westerners know
how parties are supposed to work and we will teach you, the represen-
tatives of parties that are not working as we think parties should, to learn
to make your parties work correctly.’ Third, most party aid organisations
rarely engage in or are required to take part in rigorous, independent
evaluations of their work. Thus they are rarely confronted with any chal-
lenging, in-depth assessments of what they do that might push them to
question their existing methods and try something different.
New approaches
Although the standard approach persists, some party aid organisations are
making efforts to correct some of its deficiencies and to broaden it. With
regard to training, for example, some recent or ongoing party aid pro-
grammes eschew the usual one-off workshops or seminars in favour of
more sustained learning opportunities with structured follow-up in which
participants carry out small reform initiatives in their parties to build con-
cretely on what they learned in the trainings. Some programmes avoid the
‘fly-in’ trainer syndrome and use more experienced outside trainers who
stay in the country for enough time to get to know the scene. They provide
some sustained contact with participants or ‘third-country’ trainers, that
is, experts from another developing democracy with relevant personal
experience in party-building. And at least a few groups are utilising trainer-
of-trainer methods to spread learning more widely in parties.
Some of the aid organisations that have recently entered the party assist-
ance realm, such as the Netherlands IMD and the IDEA, are taking a
somewhat different approach overall. Rather than working directly with
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efforts to reform the legal and regulatory framework that governs parties
in that country, in work that can be considered party system aid in that
it aims to affect the whole system of parties rather than just individual
parties. Some of this work is directed at the political party law of the
country. Aid providers look for ways to bolster initiatives that call for
reform of a problematic political party law (such as one that creates
cumbersome obstacles to the establishment of new parties), including not
only the rationalisation of basic administrative elements but also the addi-
tion of provisions with requirements regarding internal democracy in
parties or other ‘good party governance’ measures.
Another major area of this growing field of party system work focuses
on the reform of party financing. Corrupt party financing is a widespread,
serious problem throughout the developing and post-communist worlds
(and hardly unknown to Western established democracies either), with
manifold deleterious effects on the position and development of parties
all over. Assistance efforts to stimulate and advance reforms in party
finance systems are mushrooming. These include support for changes in
the legal frameworks and governmental enforcement bodies that regulate
party financing as well as bottom-up initiatives to create a civil society
capacity to monitor party finance and push from the bottom up for
reforms.
A few aid groups are trying to find ways to get to know a local party
scene more deeply before establishing assistance initiatives and to involve
the potential recipient parties more thoroughly in the process of designing
the assistance. Such efforts include self-evaluation exercises that parties
take part in to analyse and articulate their own strengths and weaknesses
and in-depth political economy studies of the party landscape to identify
the deeper structural causes of party problems. The Dutch IMD has over-
seen a self-evaluation exercise by parties in Georgia, for example, and the
US NDI, with the support of Britain’s Department for International
Development (DFID), has undertaken political economic studies of the
party landscapes in Bolivia and Peru. It is not yet clear whether and how
a deeper prior understanding of the party scene in a particular country
will translate into aid programmes that differ from conventional ones, but
the intention is innovative and worth developing.
Another new emphasis in party aid is the problematic relationship that
many parties in emergent democracies have with civil society. Some party
aid groups have launched activities to try to help build closer, more mutu-
ally productive ties between civil society sectors traditionally suspicious of
parties and parties bereft of meaningful contacts with civil society groups.
Such programmes typically consist of round table meetings and workshops
in which representatives of political parties and civil society organisations
meet, with the idea of helping the two sides get to know each other better
and perhaps learn to work with each other more effectively.
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These efforts, while based on an important idea – that the lack of
societal rootedness of parties in new or struggling democracies is a core
problem, not a symptom of weak party organisations or a natural char-
acteristic of parties operating in an early phase of democratisation – have
not yet gained much traction where they have been tried. Civil society
representatives who attend such meetings often come out of them
complaining that the political parties just want to use them for their own
purposes and have no interest in real partnership. The political party
people, in turn, complain that the civil society activists are only interested
in their own issues and look down on political parties.
Some of the problem with the attempts so far to help forge stronger
ties between political parties and civil society comes from the narrow
definition of civil society that democracy promoters tend to use. They are
in the habit of essentially equating civil society with NGOs, especially the
rather specialised circle of public interest advocacy and service NGOs that
are close to the donor world. These NGOs are only one part of civil
society and they are one of the parts that are least likely to want to work
closely with parties. They are usually led and peopled by activists who
entered the NGO sector as an alternative to a political sector they view
as corrupt and unproductive. Their interests in policy advocacy and service
delivery lead them to be deeply wary of close association with any party
or group of parties. Such an association can stand in the way of obtaining
their needed access or co-operation with the government if the ‘wrong’
party comes to power. These NGOs, very much at the donors’ urging,
have cultivated the ideal of non-partisanship and a certain technocratic
distance from the political melee. They are thus surprised, and rather
confused, when they hear now from some Western democracy promoters
that they should in fact get involved in building ties to political parties.
For assistance work on this issue to advance, aid providers will have to
broaden their scope to take on board a much wider conception of civil
society. It is precisely the types of civil society groups that are often not
part of donor-funded civil society development programmes – groups
oriented toward mobilisation and wide membership, such as teacher’s
organisations, indigenous persons’ groups, informal ethnic associations,
professional associations and trade unions – that are more likely to have
the sort of political interests and orientation that would lead them to want
to work closely with political parties. And party aid groups will need to
abandon the idea of party–civil society relationships as a kind of policy-
oriented partnership and instead figure out how to support the kinds of
deeply strategic (and opportunistic) party–civil society relationships that
actually exist in established democracies, such as in the intertwining of
trade unions and the Labour Party in Britain or the active role that many
citizens’ interest groups in the United States play in endorsing and raising
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Another new approach also addresses the problem of party rootedness,
though it focuses on citizens generally rather than NGOs. The idea is to
use targeted civic education activities to encourage citizens to get inter-
ested in engaging with parties for the sake of protecting or pursuing some
set of interests, while simultaneously working with parties to help them
better meet citizen’s needs. One example from 2005 is a programme in
Peru that aims to get parties more focused on poverty reduction policy
measures so that parties will learn to try to meet the core needs of citizens.
The programme offers civic education to some citizens to raise their aware-
ness about how parties and politicians can (and should) address the issue
of poverty reduction while at the same time training parties on how to
formulate effective poverty reduction platforms and policies.
As with the work on party–civil society relations, this is an interesting
new line of work, yet one that also has yet to show that it can effect
substantial changes in how parties relate (or do not relate) to their societies.
It is difficult to change the incentive structures that shape parties’ behav-
iour just by changing some of the attitudes of citizens about parties (to
the extent civic education can really do that). Parties’ problematic relation-
ships to citizens have many entrenched causes, from patronage patterns
to social hierarchies, which cannot be easily outweighed by some mild
attitudinal shifts. And establishing clear, rational linkages between the
policy performance of parties and the preferences and choices of voters
is something that takes place only very imperfectly, even in established
democracies. In the United States, for example, many voters make notably
irrational (viewed strictly in terms of economic causality) judgments about
the economic results that presidents are responsible for. And their voting
choices often rest on much more specific personalistic or even quixotic
factors than a clear-eyed assessment of their economic self-interest and
the policy platforms or policy records of competing candidates or parties.
Partisanship
All types of democracy aid raise questions about political interventionism
and the appropriate limits on the roles of outside organisations in trying
to affect the political life of other countries. Party aid is especially sensi-
tive because it directly touches the key political actors vying for power
and has the clear potential to directly affect the recipient societies’ basic
political choices. The core issue here is partisanship: do party aid providers
adopt and promote favourites, helping certain parties over others for the
sake of influencing the outcomes of elections?
Party aid providers usually downplay the idea that their work might
be partisan and deny that they might be seeking to influence electoral
outcomes. European parties and party foundations say that although they
do work with individual parties on the basis of ideological partnership 
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(a Western European social democratic party, for example, will work with
social democratic parties in other countries), their work in any one recip-
ient country is politically balanced because all the different major parties
in their country will be pursuing similar party-to-party relationships and
thus an overall ideological balance will prevail. The US party institutes
defend against charges of partisanship by arguing that almost all of their
party work follows a multiparty approach in which the assistance is offered
to all the major parties in any one country.
In fact, however, the picture is not so clear; neat lines and simple conclu-
sions about partisanship in party aid are hard to draw. Concerning Euro-
pean party aid it is true that aid coming from one aid-providing country,
such as Germany, Sweden or Britain, may go to several different parties
in a recipient country. Yet the idea that an ideological balance in the aid
will necessarily be achieved is flawed, for several reasons. First, the parties
or party foundations in the aid-providing country may not receive equal
amounts of aid themselves and thus their assistance activities will vary in
size and scope. In Sweden, for example, the Social Democratic Party’s
long domination of the electoral scene means that the party foundation
tied to that party has long received a much greater amount of funds for
international work than the other Swedish party foundations. Thus, on
the whole, Swedish party aid abroad is distinctly weighted toward centre-
left parties.
Second, even if an aid-providing country’s party foundations are rela-
tively balanced in size, their assistance in any single country will not
necessarily reflect this balance. The country’s right-of-centre foundation
may decide to work actively in a country while the country’s left-of-centre
foundation may decide, for whatever reason, not to work there. Thus in
that setting, the aid from that particular aid-providing country will be
ideologically weighted in one direction. Third, some of the parties in a
recipient country may not match up with European party foundations
working there in terms of shared ideology and thus will not be chosen
as partners for party aid. In the Middle East, for example, Islamist parties,
which are quite active in some countries, are not likely to be chosen by
European parties or party foundations operating on the basis of the
fraternal party method. Thus European party aid in that region will not
be ideologically balanced in terms of the local ideological spectrum.
It is true that most US party aid is multipartisan, yet not all of it is.
In the first half of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe, the US party
institutes often supported centrist and centre-right parties against post-
communist successor parties, reflecting the view that the success of the
centrist and centre-right parties was crucial to transitions away from the
old communist order, and that these parties faced serious structural dis-
advantages compared to the post-communist parties. The US institutes
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sense but rather pro-democratic – it did not aim to produce a particular
electoral outcome but rather simply to level an un-level electoral playing
field.
Since the 1990s the US party institutes have been helping coalitions of
opposition parties prepare for electoral campaigns against entrenched
strongmen regimes in a small but important set of countries, such as
Serbia, Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. These pro-oppositional party aid
programmes are often one part of a larger set of US and other Western
support for civic and political forces in the country trying to oblige the
regime in power to hold a relatively free and fair election. The US party
institutes justify what is a clearly partisan line in such situations in a
similar fashion as they did in Central and Eastern Europe in the early
1990s – these programmes are not, they argue, attempts to favour one
political party over another but rather they are providing aid to a broad
democratic bloc standing up to a non-democratic regime.
In short, the issue of partisanship cannot be lightly brushed aside. 
Some party aid is partisan and the practices of Western party providers
in this regard are not always clear and well explained. Inevitably there 
is much suspicion in many countries on the receiving end of Western
political aid about the intentions and interests behind such activities.
Partisan party aid easily plays into internal debates over outside inter-
vention and can muddy local political waters by leading some parties to
be accused of being Western lackeys or giving citizens the exaggerated
impression that their country’s electoral outcomes are influenced by
powerful outside actors. A growing number of governments around the
world, especially in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union
but also in China, southern Africa, and South America, are actively 
taking measures to block or curtail Western democracy aid inside their
borders. These measures sometimes take the form of tighter legal restric-
tions on contacts between foreign organisations and political parties, such
as a 2003 presidential edict in Belarus prohibiting foreign funding for any
politically related activities in the country. At other times there is public
criticism or threats by senior government officials directed against parties
or civic organisations that receive support from foreign organisations, such
as the vituperative comments along these lines by Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. In such a climate,
an open discussion across aid-provider and aid-recipient lines about the
appropriate types of party aid would be valuable, as well as greater trans-
parency by party aid providers about some of their specific activities in
sensitive contexts.
Impact
Persons who work on party aid, like most persons involved in democracy
assistance generally, often project a strong sense of optimism about their
80 Thomas Carothers
work. They see tangible problems before them, they feel they have
genuinely useful knowledge that could help overcome these problems, and
they are determined to have an impact. Party aid programmes often seem
to promise transformative effects on the parties in question as aid providers
talk of introducing internal democracy, financial transparency, manage-
ment rationality, ideological coherence and other fundamental changes
into deeply troubled parties lacking these and most other elements of what
aid providers believe constitutes a good political party. Yet although party
aid programmes are redolent with optimism, they are also usually rather
vague about what actual impact they promise to have in what time frame.
And when disappointments occur, as they often do, there is a call for
more time and patience, with little sense of what was a realistic expec-
tation in the first place and what are the genuine prospects for improvement
in the near term.
Broadly speaking, there is little evidence for the transformative effects
of international party aid. This is clear from the sobering fact that almost
everywhere where party aid providers have worked or are working in the
developing and post-communist worlds, often for many years, the polit-
ical parties today embody most or all of the essential deficiencies that
motivated party aid providers to get involved in the first place. Bluntly
stated, if party aid were having transformative effects, parties would not
be in such a profoundly troubled state all over the world. Underlining
this basic conclusion is the fact that the largest, most concentrated under-
takings in this domain have failed to produce dramatic positive effects.
These include the efforts by the main German Stiftungen to strengthen
both Christian Democratic and centre-left parties in Latin America during
the 1970s and 1980s and the extensive European and US support for
centre-right parties in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
The effects of party aid in various specific countries where Western
groups have made a special push in the past 10 to 15 years also high-
lights the absence of transformative effects. In Russia, more than ten 
years of US, German and British support for the main two pro-reform
parties (Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces) failed to help those
parties grow into successful parties. In Romania, the main recipient of
the considerable amount of US and European party aid that went to the
country in the 1990s, the Peasant Party, ended up collapsing as a result
of poor management and a failure of leadership renewal, so disappearing
from the political scene. In Mozambique, international aid to help consol-
idate the party system as the country came out of civil war was helpful
in strengthening the main party, FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation
Front), and enabling the principal opposition party, RENAMO (National
Resistance of Mozambique), to make the transition from guerrilla move-
ment to political party. But the assistance has not been able to make much
headway in leading either of those parties to become more internally
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The problems with the standard approach of party aid described above
inevitably weaken the impact of many party assistance programmes. But
even if those shortcomings were fully resolved, a combination of other
factors having to do with the nature of political parties and the contexts
in which they operate in new or struggling democracies would still make
it very hard for party aid to have more than very modest positive effects,
at best.
First, the leaders of parties in these countries tend to resist the reforms
that outside aid providers advocate. Such leaders are usually very strong
personalities who have a strong sense of their place in their own society
and are not very open to ideas and suggestions coming from outsiders.
Even more importantly, these leaders often end up resisting reforms pushed
from the outside because the organisational and operational reforms that
Western party aid providers advocate threaten to weaken party leaders’
hold on power. For example, internal party democracy (probably the most
commonly recommended reform by Western party aid representatives)
sounds to Western ears as a sensible and necessary step to advance democ-
racy. To most party leaders in these countries, however, it appears as a
dangerous step that may undermine the leader’s ability to control internal
developments in the party, to reward his or her closest associates and
cronies and to block potential rivals for the party leadership. Similarly,
incorporating women more fully into the party sounds almost self-evidently
valuable to Western aid providers but is heard by party leaders as a
measure that may break up the hold of their inner circle of loyalists at
the top of the party and disrupt traditional patterns of promotion in the
party that allow the leader to keep control.
Furthermore, some party leaders in new or struggling democracies have
a very different vision than Western party aid groups have about what
their party is or aims to be. Thus although they may formally welcome
co-operation with outside party aid groups, they do not share their assumed
agenda of trying to become a good party in the conventional sense of the
term. Obviously, for example, many party leaders view their parties as
vehicles for the pursuit of their own personal political ambitions. As a
result they may well not be interested in building a long-term party
constituency, learning how to represent citizen’s interests effectively or
effecting any of the other pro-democratic reforms urged upon them by
well-intentioned outsiders.
Political parties in new or struggling democracies are also hard to change
through external assistance not only because of frequent resistance to
reforms on the part of party leaders but because of the chronic institutional
weaknesses of these parties (the same weaknesses that draw in outside
aid providers looking to help). The weak institutionalisation common to
many parties in these countries – the shortage of permanent staff, the
incoherent, disorganised management structures, the lack of financial
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resources – makes it hard for them to articulate what kinds of assistance
they most need, to take advantage of what aid they are offered and to
build over time on whatever short-term progress they make. As with other
types of institution-building assistance, party aid providers face the
dilemma that those institutions that most need basic organisational
strengthening are least well positioned to take advantage of aid dedicated
to that end.
Party aid tends to have only rather limited effects not only because
parties are hard organisations to try to help but also because parties are
shaped by a whole set of underlying conditions and structures that party
aid usually has no bearing on. This is a problem with most types of
external aid that seek to change a particular institution or set of institu-
tions. The aid almost inevitably focuses on the institution itself, not on
all the surrounding forces and factors that play a major role in deter-
mining its shape and function. Because parties in many countries are part
of the central nervous system of a country’s political corpus, the range
of such underlying conditions and structures relevant to their develop-
ment is unusually wide.
Basic features of the overall political system will have significant effects
on party development. If, for example, the political space in the country
is highly restricted, political parties (other than the governing party) will
usually be crippled. And no matter what their level of determination or
skills, or what aid, training and advice they receive, they will have diffi-
culty building up their organisational capacity significantly. Moreover, any
number of underlying social, economic and other structural features also
greatly influence the course and direction of political party development
in a society. Widespread poverty and socio-economic marginalisation 
create fertile ground for clientelism and patronage politics. Weak rule of
law encourages corruption, weak accountability and other deformations
of party politics. Enduring authoritarian legacies, both psychological and
institutional, make it hard for parties to build real ties to citizens. 
A constricted range of economic policy choices due to pressures of global-
isation undercuts ideological differentiation of parties, at least on the
standard right–left axis.
At least as it is presently conceived and carried out in most cases, party
aid does not address these sorts of broader conditions and structural
factors that weigh so heavily on party development. This fact reflects a
basic reality of party aid, given the relatively modest amounts of money
that aid donors are willing to devote to the issue: party foundations and
institutes naturally tend to focus on the more manageable-sized target of
the parties themselves rather than on the many larger issues bearing on
party development, such as poverty and weak rule of law. At the same
time, the tendency of party aid groups usually to focus on working directly
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occurs in some other areas of democracy-related institution-building aid
(such as with programmes to reform judiciaries or strengthen parliaments).
This is the non-developmental tendency of specialists in a particular kind
of institution (whether it is judiciaries, legislatures, parties or something
else) to try to strengthen counterpart institutions in other countries using
a standard set of institutional-strengthening tools (usually training about
how the institution is ‘supposed’ to work) with little regard for the context
in which the institution is embedded.
Although transformative effects of party aid are scarce, modest posi-
tive impact is often apparent. If one examines parties that have participated
in some party aid programmes, small signs of change can frequently be
identified, changes that can be fairly clearly linked with the aid activities.
One frequently can observe, for example, an increasing sophistication over
time in the campaign methods that parties use. In countries where author-
itarianism has just in the past decade or two given way to competitive
elections, parties have been scrambling to learn up about electioneering,
sharpen their messages, develop better publicity materials, incorporate
information gained from polling, be more strategic in the deployment of
resources, become more effective at recruiting and using campaign volun-
teers, and so forth. Although some of this is self-learning (and the
Darwinian effect of parties that fail to improve their campaigning losing
elections and sometimes disappearing), some of it is also the result of
externally sponsored assistance.
The fact that party aid often has fairly definite effects in this domain
is not surprising. Many of the elements of effective campaigning are
discrete, widely transferable techniques that are not very difficult to teach,
and which parties can adopt without having to make major changes in
the underlying structures of the party. And most parties perceive a tangible
interest in learning these things. Yet though positive effects of campaign-
related assistance are relatively common, drawing a larger judgment about
the value of this type of party aid is complicated by a hard question: does
helping a party or set of parties in a new or struggling democracy to
professionalise its campaign methods advance democracy in that country?
One can argue for the affirmative by asserting that through better-organised
and better-executed campaigns, parties engage more citizens more effec-
tively in the democratic process and perhaps build the representative
function of the party or parties.
Yet a contrary argument is also possible. The professionalisation of
election campaigning in established democracies is often blamed as a
contributing factor in the loss of citizens’ interest in party politics and
the hollowing out of modern democracies. Citizens become politically
alienated as parties learn to ‘focus group’ messages and candidates until
the messages and candidates seem to say only what the research indicates
is most effective for hitting key ‘hot buttons’, not what the parties or
84 Thomas Carothers
candidates actually believe. Many elements of mounting an effective
campaign have little to do with creating genuine bonds between parties
and constituents but rather treating voters as opportunistic targets for the
most superficial and temporary loyalty. It often seems in established democ-
racies that the more artfully parties learn to persuade people to vote for
them, the less citizens feel represented by their parties.
One can also observe some parties in new or struggling democracies
taking positive steps on organisational development. And in some cases
it appears (from analysing the timing of the changes and interviewing key
persons within the parties about the process of internal party change) that
these steps were prompted by externally funded assistance activities. Many
parties around the developing world, for example, have experimented 
with greater efforts to carry out door-to-door campaigning as a result of
training efforts by outside aid providers. Similarly, many parties have
taken steps to give women a great role in internal party structures as a
consequence of party aid providers pushing on that issue. Changes of this
sort are almost always small, incremental steps. In most cases they are
piecemeal, sometimes they are part of a larger, though still gradualistic,
set of internal reforms. The hard question is whether the small positive
steps will deepen over time and cumulate in major organisational changes.
Party aid providers tend to take the optimistic view. They often describe
what they are doing as ‘planting seeds of change’ and argue that over
time these seeds will take root and grow into large reforms. Their confi-
dence often seems grounded in a rather vague sense of naturalness about
political party development, as though once parties get exposed to the
right ideas and have more time to try out new practices they will natu-
rally evolve in the direction of ‘good parties’. In many cases, this vague
sense is remarkably untouched by an awareness of the deeply rooted
reasons internal to the parties themselves and related to the underlying
structural conditions why the parties have the organisational characteris-
tics that they do. Since most party aid representatives work in any one
country only for several years at a time (at most) before moving on to
another assignment, they rarely actually see whether these seeds of change
really do take root and grow.
Conclusions
International aid for political parties is at an important juncture. It is
expanding in response to the widespread perception both among 
democracy specialists and ordinary citizens in many developing and post-
communist countries that political parties are one of the weakest, or even
often the weakest, institutional link in the chain of attempted democrat-
isation. Yet it is expanding without a clear sense within the donor
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let alone answered, despite decades of work in this domain. This chapter
has examined some of these questions with a view to giving at least prelim-
inary answers.
The goals of party aid are, in fact, clear, but what is not clear is whether
they are coherent. It is puzzling and perhaps problematic to expect parties
in new or struggling democracies to develop along pre-defined (by Western
party experts) organisational and operational lines that many parties in
established democracies do not follow. At a minimum the goals of party
aid often seem unrealistic; more seriously, in some cases they may simply
be a bad fit relative to local circumstances.
The standard approach of party aid, which is based on the same insti-
tutional modelling approach that democracy promoters employ in most
areas of their work, is often criticised by persons on the receiving end of
such efforts. The most common criticism portrays party aid as a supply-
driven domain marked by mechanistic training and other activities that
are poorly adapted to local realities and not designed to foster long-term,
widely disseminated learning within parties. Some aid providers are
attempting to improve the standard approach but a lack of challenging
evaluations of party aid allow some aid providers to keep doing the same
thing over and over, despite limited effectiveness.
Although party aid providers almost always insist that party aid is non-
partisan and does not seek to influence the outcome of elections, in practice
significant elements of partisanship can be found in both European and
US party aid. Such partisanship is not necessarily illegitimate, but given
the current global context of heightened controversy about Western democ-
racy promotion generally, it can create suspicion that party aid is being
used for the pursuit of narrow regime change goals rather than broader
pro-democratic ones.
Party aid rarely has transformative effects and the troubled state of
parties in most new or struggling democracies is likely to continue for
some time, despite the best efforts of well-intentioned aid actors and their
local counterparts. The absence of transformative effects reflects the fact
that party leaders often resist the reforms aid providers urge on them and
that most parties in the aid-receiving countries are difficult organisations
to assist due to their core institutional weaknesses. It is also due to fact
that party aid does not get at the underlying socio-political and socio-
economic structures and conditions that shape parties. Party aid does 
have modest positive effects in some cases, both in the electoral campaign
capacities of parties, and their basic organisational development.
As party aid expands and evolves, some new approaches are surfacing.
These include work on party systems rather than directly on parties them-
selves, improved training methods, more in-depth analysis of a political
party landscape prior to designing an aid intervention, efforts to connect
parties with civil society, and activities aimed at fostering citizen demand
for better parties. Some of the new actors entering the party aid field,
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such as regional multilateral organisations, are emphasising these new
methods. The traditional party foundations and institutes that have long
worked in this area are also broadening their traditional approaches as
the search continues for the best ways to meet the daunting challenge for
democratisation presented by troubled political parties all around the
world.
Note
1 Between 2003 and 2005 the author carried out field research on Western polit-
ical party aid programmes in Russia, Romania, Morocco, Mozambique,
Guatemala and Indonesia as well as numerous interviews with representatives
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5 East-Central Europe
Parties in crisis and the external 
and internal Europeanisation of 
the party systems
Attila Ágh
Introduction: the dual pressure of Europeanisation and 
social consolidation
The party systems in East-Central Europe (ECE) have emerged under a
series of dual pressures from inside and outside. The general framework
of the external adaptation pressure has been the globalisation cum Euro-
peanisation challenge, since globalisation has mostly impacted upon the
ECE countries through the Europeanisation process. This challenge, how-
ever, has been so strong, so overwhelming that this external adaptation
pressure has dominated the domestic processes. In the early 1990s the
global financial institutions, notably the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund appeared as institutional tutors in ECE. But their direct
influence soon vanished and the main external pressures for democratic
transition and consolidation since then have been exerted upon the ECE
states by the EU’s accession ‘conditionalities’ (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon,
2004; Pridham, 2005). The EU pressure began with the Association Treaty
process and even after completion of entry by the new member states it
still impacts heavily on their domestic transformations. A previous distinc-
tion made by the author to assess these processes has been between
anticipative and adaptive Europeanisation, as stages before and after the
accession negotiations (1998–2002); but it is the next stage of post-
accession Europeanisation that merits close attention now. Given the very
asymmetrical dependency relationship in this particular Europeanisation
process, it is indeed the case that the strikingly successful examples of
democratisation in ECE probably have very limited application elsewhere.
So this chapter explores how Europeanisation – as both promotion of
democracy and requirement of multilevel governance – has influenced in
this specific regional framework the process of party-building in ECE. 
It analyses the three stages – anticipative, adaptive and post-accession –
and characterises both ECE parties and party systems in this historical
sequence.1
The central thesis of this chapter is that the process of emergence of
the ECE party systems has now come to an end, and a new period 
has begun with a general crisis of the ECE parties and party systems. The
ECE governments and party systems have been shaken by a dual pres-
sure, having to face the European Union’s convergence criteria from outside
and high expectation from the ECE populations for a ‘normal’ standard
of living and public services from inside. This turning point can also be
described as a tension between adaptation to the EU by completing the
membership process (institutional reforms, euro-zone and Schengen acquis)
and social consolidation in the new member states (reaching the ‘normal’
level of standard of living and public services). Thus, the historical turning
point with the entry to the EU has provoked a general crisis of the ECE
party systems that can be characterised as the socio-political senilisation
of parties and party leaderships after just 15 years and that has been
aggravated by the unsettling effects of the EU membership. The ECE
parties have been programmed for transition and accession, and both goals
have now been attained. These parties, however, have no new programmes
and no new messages to offer in the current period. The party elites in
general have become, at least socio-politically, ‘old’, tired and extremely
unpopular. Even many young politicians are, in fact, very ‘old’ since they
have been over-socialised by the former generations of politicians, and
they have developed the same kind of familiar outdated or old-fashioned
patterns in political culture (examples are Viktor Orbán in Hungary and
Stanislav Gross in the Czech Republic).
Altogether, this party crisis has also contributed to a crisis in theory,
which Ágh (2005a) terms ‘the glorious failure of transitology and humble
success of Europeanization’. It means that theories of democratisation
based around the sequence of transition and consolidation have proven
inadequate to conceptualising the actual processes in ECE, since they have
been imported from Latin America and southern Europe, and not adapted
to Central Europe. In addition, they have been so over-generalised in a
‘post-communist’ frame of reference that these theories have been unable
to grasp the essence of the specific ECE regional transformations. Although
previous attempts have tried to construct a notion of ‘early consolida-
tion’ to reflect the special character of the ECE developments, in reality
no such fine-tuning of the established democratisation theory can suffice
to describe the ECE specificity. In fact, the main reason for the failure of
transitology-consolidology is that the European integration has taken place
under very different conditions in Central Europe than in southern Europe
two decades ago: in ECE the external adaptation pressure has been much
bigger and more asymmetrical. Consequently, Europeanisation is the 
key term to explain the ECE transformations, although ‘Europeanisation-
cum-democratisation’ may be as relevant for indicating that the major
advances of democratisation have basically been under the direct pressure
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The external adaptation pressures also include the emergence and func-
tioning of the ECE party systems, since Europeanisation has appeared more
strongly in ‘particisation’, including the ‘transnational elite socialization’
(Pridham, 2005: 16), than in any other fields of political transformation.
Finding EU partners has been the only route to legitimacy and guarantee
for survival of the ECE parties.
Emergence of the ECE party systems: the blurred identities
External and internal Europeanisation of the ECE parties
The evolution of the party landscape in the EU can be summarised as a
long process of change from the party systems of industrial society based
on materialist values and class cleavages to those of post-industrial service
society based on post-materialist values and culturally oriented social
cleavages. This also gives a clue to the language of ‘new left’ and ‘new
right’ parties as basic transformations in party politics. The new left has
differed from the old left because of its rejection of class-based politics
and embrace of participatory and decentralised forms of party member-
ship. The main issues on the agenda of the new right has been taxation,
immigration and radical regionalism, in addition to anti-political and anti-
elitist forms of protest that have been clear crisis phenomena of the
declining industrial society and its social strata leading to social and
national populism (Cole, 2005). These Western conditions of radical trans-
formations on both the left and right have had major consequences for
the emergence of the ECE parties and party systems, the main actors in
new democracies. Domestic conditions and the internal logic of party-
building have also been important, but adaptation to the Western
requirements has been the dominant feature.
From the side of Europeanisation the real process of emergence and/or
adaptation of the ECE party systems began in the late 1990s. In fact,
some ‘anticipative’ Europeanisation of the ECE parties can be observed
already in the early 1990s. But it was so embedded in the more general
requirements of democratisation then that the real specificity of European-
isation as a special accommodation to the EU parties and party systems
was not yet felt, and was not demanded either. Thus the period between
1990 and 2004 was a period of premature party systems, consisting of
mainly two major sub-periods: first, general democratisation and/or antici-
patory Europeanisation, up until 1998; and second, a special EU kind of
democratisation and adaptive Europeanisation until 2004. These two sub-
periods should be kept clearly distinct, since after the start of accession
negotiations specific EU issues increasingly began to dominate in the lives
of the ECE citizens, and direct Europeanisation was high on the party
agenda as well.
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EU entry has brought a clear turning point for the ECE parties, because
it has meant a direct participation for them in the EU’s activities. The
specific Europeanisation pressure upon them increased greatly with the
preparation for the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004.
It resulted in a radical adaptation by ECE MEPs to the party groups in
the EP. Party performance in ECE and the present ‘performance crisis’ of
the parties and their national parliaments on entering the EU have brought
new challenges for the parties’ political, administrative and absorption
capacities, facing the demands for effective membership with all the
features of multilevel governance, sub-national democracy, regional devel-
opment and decentralisation. Thus, the main adaptation pressure has only
begun for the parties inside the EU with its long and painful learning
process for the party elites. The following discusses the premature, tran-
sitory party systems up to entry, then the crisis and near collapse of 
these transitory party systems from the side of a ‘participation paradox’
before, finally, outlining the EU requirements placed on ECE parties in
the present, post-accession period, which we can call an emerging ‘post-
Lisbon democracy’.2
So far, little attention has been paid to the participation of ECE parties
in the European party system, although the relationships between the
national parties and party formations at the EU level have been discussed
since the early days (Gaffney, 1996; Hix, 1996; Hix, Kreppel and Noury,
2003). The dominant view about the influence of the EU upon the national
party systems has been one of ‘limited impact’. But this is defective because
it ignores the distinction between the external and internal Europeanisation
of the ECE parties, since the Europeanisation has been very ‘direct’ or
hard on one side while very ‘indirect’ or soft on the other. External
Europeanisation is an elite-based process through which contacts with
and/or membership in the international party organisations appear and
the ECE parties’ programmes, values and public discourses change accord-
ingly. By comparison internal Europeanisation is a process reaching and
transforming the membership, the constituency of the ECE parties and
their relationship to the civil society through which the internal party
organisations and popular beliefs change accordingly. In fact, external
Europeanisation has proceeded in the above mentioned two – anticipatory
and adaptive – stages, and in ways that produced a ‘limited’ but never-
theless growing impact on the side of internal Europeanisation. The first
stage may be called, again, general democratisation, and the second was
the stage of partial integration. In fact, these initial stages of European
integration produced a split between the external and the internal
Europeanisation of the ECE parties, with a growing contrast between their
international and domestic activities. In the present post-accession stage,
this tension has sharpened, since the activities of the ECE parties in the
EP have provoked an acute conflict between the MEPs and the ‘domestic
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future, certainly by the end of this parliamentary cycle in 2009, European-
isation will penetrate much more into the domestic structures of the ECE
parties as well, so creating an opportunity to shape their alternatives for
national strategy, too.3
Fundamentally, external Europeanisation is a process through which
contacts have been established with Western parties and party inter-
nationals, including membership of the international party organisations.
As a result, the parties have shaped a Western type of image or out-
look for themselves (international party). Internal Europeanisation as a
mass-based process is the transformation of such basic party features as
membership and organisation to approximate more closely to the Western-
type parties in their internal structures, including the relationship to 
the party constituency and to civil society as a whole (domestic party). 
So far, external Europeanisation has only scratched the surface of the 
ECE parties. Europeanisation has appeared only through the established
official contacts and the informal meetings of a very few party leaders
with their Western European counterparts. The bulk of the party member-
ship and the population at large have not been informed very much about
the discussions of the EU left and right, international social democracy
or Christian democracy, and so on. The reason is simple: namely, the
problems and concerns are so different that most of the population are
unable to decode recent Western discourse about the ‘third way’ and 
the like, since ECE societies remain preoccupied with their domestic diffi-
culties and cannot escape from the trap of materialist needs. It is true,
however, that EU membership has also brought some changes in this
respect. Issues that are specifically EU problems have been brought to the
attention of a large part of the ECE populations and these may provoke
in the coming years a complex and controversial process of internal
Europeanisation of the ECE parties.
All these arguments point in the same direction: the ECE parties have
not yet been completely prepared for assuming the rights and duties of
membership in the EU-level parties. Given both the low degree of their
external Europeanisation and the internal weaknesses, the ECE parties
have been lagging behind in both policy co-operation and strategy-making.
This is only ‘thin’ – rather than ‘thick’ – Europeanisation. A similar situ-
ation has obtained in the case of other member states when they were
new, for example, Ireland and also Greece, Portugal and Spain. But there
are two big differences. First, when the Mediterranean states entered, the
EU worked at a lower level of complexity than now. For instance there
was no globalisation-oriented Lisbon Strategy to cope with. Nowadays
the main political actors face greatly increased demands both for policy
co-ordination and for more strategic thinking. Second, the Western
European sister parties offered very active assistance to the Spanish and
Portuguese parties, and, notwithstanding significant assistance from West-
ern political foundations such as Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation
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and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, nothing of comparable size happened
in the case of the ECE parties.
Left–right and nation–Europe co-ordinates in the ECE 
party systems
The external–internal Europeanisation duality leads to the issue of ECE
party identities as a result of their relation to the EU. First, the party cleav-
ages at the EU level will be described, in order to situate the ECE parties.
There are two basic if as yet underdeveloped cleavages in the Euro-polity:
the federalist–intergovernmental and the left–right cleavages. They give four
possible combinations, but they are not equally strong and influential, since
only the EU right has divided into sizeable anti-European and pro-European
wings, as two different cultural camps. Conservatives in general stress cul-
tural identity, family values, and law and order, but among them even the
moderate Euro-sceptic parties favour an intergovernmental approach in
order to preserve national capacities to shape policies. Moderate Euro-
sceptic parties may be considered as ‘liberals’ from an economics point of
view, since they support only the integration of markets and not that of
institutions. On the other hand, the leftist parties have become more pro-
European, and only some of the smaller extreme-left parties tend to be
anti-European. Social democrats insist on the EU’s engagement in social
affairs and added goals such as full employment and social inclusion to
the list of EU tasks. (Dauderstädt, 2004: 12–13).
Turning to the domestic idiosyncrasies of the new member states, there
is a big and increasing divide between the pro-European and anti-European
forces. The ECE parties can be situated according to the left–right and
nation–Europe coordinates. Thus, the ECE parties can be described accord-
ing to the two axes of left/right and Europeanisation/nation-centrism (or
traditionalism). This typology generates four basic types of ECE parties:
Europeanised left and Europeanised right, and nation-centric left and
nation-centric right. This dual divide has distorted both types: the centre-
left suffers from the trap of materialist needs and crisis management, the
centre-right from the contradictions of Europeanisation. Accordingly, the
ECE right is much more populist and Euro-sceptic than the right-wing
parties in the older member states of the EU. It favours the idea of an
EU of nation states much more than its sister parties in the West, unlike
the ECE left, which is more supportive of closer EU integration but has
been frustrated by the failure to come closer to the model of ‘Social
Europe’, which in turn has led to its leftist credentials being questioned
by friends and foes alike. What we see, then, are blurred and uncertain
identities on both left and right. It is difficult to find a really pro-European
centre-right party in ECE, and impossible to identify a centre-left party
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The clear cases of both hard and soft party-based Euro-scepticism on the
right could be observed as early as the late 1990s in all the accession can-
didate states. The real turning point came in the second half of the decade
when the soft party-based Euro-scepticism appeared in its explicit form
among the governing right-wing parties in Poland and Hungary especially.
In Hungary, soft Euro-scepticism is taken up by two parties in the govern-
ing coalition, FIDESZ as the major party and the Small-holders Party as
the junior partner. FIDESZ’s leader, premier Victor Orbán, increasingly
adopted ‘national interest Euroscepticism’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001:
18). In this spirit, even the more consolidated conservative parties made a
populist turn at that time, or courted some Euro-sceptic ideas.
By the late 1990s, however, the lack of real debate, and the perception
that these countries were kowtowing to an exploitative EU, began to
create the opportunities for more populist leaders to arise and succeed,
even where populism had earlier been discredited. Thus, in its right-
ward shift, Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ in Hungary exploited popular dis-
content and blamed the EU. Similarly, former Czech prime minister
Vaclav Klaus, once ousted from power, turned to Euro-scepticism as a
way to regain popularity, speaking out about the EU’s ‘creeping silent
unification of the continent’. In Poland, finally, a fourth of the seats in
the fall 2001 elections have been claimed by anti-Union parties. 
(Grzymala-Busse and Innes, 2003: 69)
The demobilisation of the masses was, in some ways, a conscious process
in the early 1990s by parties and politicians eager to avoid populism. But
it was much more an unintended result of economic and social margin-
alisation. This has led – by the late 1990s – to an ‘unstructured political
market’ with a low membership density for the parties (von Beyme, 2001:
139, 153), together with a strong national–social populism. The main
reason for the general crisis of the ECE party systems is the absence of
a new message and the lack of new programmes as a result of the dual
pressure and blurred party identities in ECE. It has also appeared in the
form of a lack of new party elites (or the senilisation of the old party
elite) and a shortage of relevant political capacities and skills in the new
period of the EU membership.4
General crisis of party systems as participation deficit
From general mobilisation to party-induced demobilisation
In the description of the general crisis of the ECE party systems the term
‘crisis’ is justifiable on two counts. First, at an empirical level there has
been a protracted accession-related government crisis in Poland and the
Czech Republic, with crises in Slovenia and Hungary as well; the Baltic
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states have been affected, too. As usual, the government situation as well
as the party crisis has been the most dramatic in Poland. Both there and
in the Czech Republic the governing parties almost completely lost their
popular support, provoking a collapse of the party system as a whole in
Poland. Parties and party systems, however, have been basically trans-
formed in all ECE states. For instance, in Hungary in August 2004 there
was a ‘popular uprising’ against the party leadership, and its official candi-
date for the post of prime minister was voted down. An ‘opposition
candidate’ emerged with wide popular support, who received more than
two-thirds of the vote in an extraordinary party congress that led to the
dismissal of the party leadership in October 2004. Second, through this
ECE party crisis, the vital issue of political mobilisation–demobilisation
has come to the fore, and this has unleashed a basic transformation in
the parties and party systems.
The ECE participation paradox is that the ECE parties initiated the
change from mass mobilisation to political demobilisation in the early
1990s. The ensuing economic transformations – as transition costs earlier
and accession costs later – have also resulted in mass ‘economic’ demobil-
isation, and widespread social exclusion has followed from that. In the
initial period of economic transformation millions of jobs were lost across
all the ECE countries. The effects have been accelerated and deepened by
the parties’ conscious efforts at political demobilisation, intended to turn
them into the only or main political actors in society. At the same time
parties have been fighting for the electoral remobilisation of population,
rather unsuccessfully. Both the actions for political demobilisation in
general and the political remobilisation for elections in particular have
their origins in the basic weakness of parties as ‘small size mass parties’.
The memberships of the ECE parliamentary parties lie within the range
10,000–40,000, except for the Czech Communist Party, which is greater.
This means party membership is tiny compared to the number of voters
for that given party, possibly 100:1 as an ECE average. The social base
of the ECE parties has been very weak, and further erosion of the party
memberships has taken place since 1999 (Kostelecky, 2002; Ka-Lok Chan,
2003; Sikk, 2005).5
Since the early 1990s the populations of the ECE countries have divided
more and more into passive and active sectors. Democracy, however, needs
participation as ‘organisational underpinnings’ and a large variety of insti-
tutions acting as connections between culture, social structure and political
institutions. These provide a system of social and political integration
through the structure and density of social participation. Political inte-
gration or involvement means providing channels of representation for all
organised groups. Truly consolidated democracy goes beyond a multiparty
system to a multi-actor democracy, but that has not yet emerged in the
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their monopolising efforts. Democratic consolidation cannot be successful
without ‘inviting back’ a large part of the passive sector, perhaps as much
as half of the entire population, to participate in national and municipal
politics. Political inclusion also means articulating their anti-EU views in
a coherent form, to replace the outbursts of emotion that form a polit-
ical undercurrent. There is a danger that there will seem to be no alternative
for a rather large segment of the population but to join ‘anomical’ move-
ments, with support for extreme right-wing populist or anti-political parties
being entertained as a likely option.
The ‘infantile disease’ and social deficit in ECE
The paradox is still there: popular participation is very unequal in elections
and referendums and yet everybody would consider the institutional-
isation (let alone the legalisation) of unequal voting and other participa-
tion patterns (for instance special voting rights for wealthier and better 
educated people) to be highly undemocratic. There is a clear contrast
between the ECE young democracies and their counterparts in Western
Europe, given the drastic decline in social and political participation 
the ECE states have witnessed soon after the early mobilisation phase of
systemic change and before the participatory revolution has yet to be
completed. This contrast between Eastern and Western Europe created by
the rise and decline of participation in such a short time offers the key
to understanding the weaknesses of political representation in ECE,
including the ECE parties.
As the very low economic activity rate and very low electoral turnout
– both slightly above 50 per cent – demonstrate, systemic change following
EU accession has resulted in the social and political exclusion of up to
half of the population. The ECE countries have turned their economic
deficits into social deficits by imposing drastic reductions in public services
such as health care, education and social security, and they have turned
these into political deficit by social exclusion and marginalisation. And
these have been turned into a democratic deficit by the mass dissatis-
faction with the way democracy works, including the way the process of
EU accession has been managed by the governments, with no attempt to
integrate the population at large into the larger community. Altogether,
the ECE countries have cumulated a huge social and political deficit that
will mark Central European history for some generations to come. It is
more than the typical kind of historically inherited ‘infantile disease’ of
new democracies, usually conceptualised as a weakness of civil society.
For what we see in ECE is a complex exclusion of losers. That means
the social capital for the effective and efficient workings of representa-
tive democracy is still largely missing. After completing legal–formal
‘constitutional consolidation’, the ECE countries have yet to reached
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‘representative consolidation’, through the completion of intermediary
organisations, and social ‘integrative consolidation’, through eliminating
anti-systemic movements. Finally, they have not yet reached the ‘attitu-
dinal consolidation’ that is required if citizens are to take part in political
life with firm democratic values.
Before entry to the EU the ECE governments were, in fact, under the
double pressure to make a full adjustment to the EU’s requirements and
to meet their own society’s expectations to represent their countries effec-
tively in the accession process. Here the representation and participation
paradoxes meet. The governments could not represent their countries
properly, since they did not allow their populations as a pluralised and
organised civil society to participate in Europeanisation in general and in
the accession negotiations in particular. In contrast in the Nordic exten-
sion of the EU, the countries concerned invited their social actors to the
accession process, including the negotiations, very intensively. The ECE
states denied their organised civil society this opportunity and offered
them only meaningless ‘consultations’; even their parliaments participated
in the accession process only very marginally. The ECE governments have
often been accused of a lack of social sensitivity and political respon-
siveness. So far the governments have been ‘flying blind’; their populations
have seen changing the government through elections as the only means
to influence government. Indeed, in ECE there have been very few cases
where governments have been re-elected. The democratic deficit with the
representation and participation paradoxes has been very marked in the
ECE region, inflated by low levels of trust in public institutions such that
people and organised interests do not easily accept the opinions and
guidance of their governments and parties. The political parties so far
have been both unable and unwilling to mobilise the ECE populations to
take part in the Europeanisation process. They have acted as a party
‘cartel’ in favour of Europeanisation as an elite-driven process, and in the
spirit of over-particisation. They have been reluctant to give up their
monopolistic approach to politics and allow a greater role for policy chan-
nels, organised interests, territorial actors and civil society associations in
the Europeanisation process. At the same time they have been unable to
thematise and concretise Europeanisation for their constituencies, so deep-
ening the accession democratic deficit in ECE. This elitist approach by
the parties has been one of the major reasons for turning the ‘Euro-phoria’
to ‘Euro-fatigue’ in ECE.
So, ECE has a new challenge: to remove the representation and partici-
pation deficit, and even more so to solve the representation crisis through
involvement of the whole population in politics, including the European-
isation process. A better-informed and more organised participation of
the ECE countries’ populations is urgently needed if there is to be a large
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The future of the ECE party systems
Following accession to the EU the ECE parties on the right have empha-
sised even more the dangers that EU integration holds for their countries,
and in order to exploit the increasingly Euro-pessimistic mood they have
become more Euro-sceptic than before. The ECE parties on the left have
remained faithful to the ideals of ‘Social Europe’ but have been facing
even more the contrast between their EU-related promises and the high
expectations of the population for a ‘normal’ standard of living and
improved public services. However, very few ECE parties oppose EU
membership or are openly anti-European; only a few extreme right parties
espouse a hard Euro-sceptic position, and this is mainly in Poland. At the
same time, even some well-established parties such as FIDESZ in Hungary
have tried to combine national populism with social populism, as have
all the Slovak parties on the right. Thus the danger of an increase in
populism is very real. Renewed restrictions in social policy could provoke
quite angry populist reactions, ‘hunger riots’ even, like those seen in eastern
Slovakia in March 2004. But although the populist demagoguery contains
some references to unilateral dependence on ‘Brussels’ in the way that
‘Moscow’ used to be referred to, so far the ECE populations are not as
sensitive to the fact that decision-making processes have become concen-
trated in the EU institutions, that is to say ‘above them’, as are the citizens
in some of the longer established member states such as Britain. ‘Eastern’
populism has formulated its basic slogans more in the terms of social
demands than in those of ‘national sovereignty’, whereas combinations of
social and national populisms have been rather widespread. Again, the
populations of the ECE countries do not formulate their Euro-sceptic
feeling in a similar way to their Western European counterparts, that is,
in terms of the EU ‘democratic deficit’, for they perceive a greater demo-
cratic deficit at home, in their own national political systems.
EU membership also unleashes party competition for elaborating the
national strategy, based around the contrasting social preferences and
value systems of the different ECE parties. In general, party competition
seems to be sharpening in the EP and this could lead to an increase in
polarisation of the parties inside the ECE countries as well. At the same
time the workings of the EP as a policy-making body will produce more
convergence among the ECE parties, as they are pushed away from the
ideological battles and towards more practical, policy-oriented issues
(Bonoli and Powell, 2004). Yet a profound cleavage can also be seen
between the old and the new member states concerning the evaluation of
domestic democracy versus EU-level democracy. EU-level democracy is
appreciated more keenly in the newer members from ECE – a feature that
is shared with, for instance, Portugal, where respect for EU democracy
still seems much greater than for the nation’s own democracy. ‘While
Italians, Portuguese and Greeks are extremely dissatisfied with the working
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of their national democracy, at the other end of the scale Danish, Dutch
and Irish citizens seem relatively satisfied’ (Krouwel, 2004: 10).
The degree of satisfaction with the EU institutional order in the ECE
democracies differs from the established old democracies, and it has been
an important pulling factor towards membership. The populations of the
new member states have been open in many ways to a transfer of democ-
racy from EU institutions and have been much less sensitive to the EU
democracy deficit because of their own national dual – democracy and
performance – deficit. Although anti-European and/or Euro-sceptic parties
have ‘imported’ or fabricated home-made anti-Brussels slogans, this is 
still less important than the dissatisfaction with the workings of democ-
racy at home. This feeling of a democracy deficit at home in the ECE
states has mainly been caused by the parties. It is a product of the general
crisis of the party systems, which has deepened subsequent to European
entry. The claims made here are confirmed by Johnson’s findings from
the Eurobarometer:
The new member states are more favourably disposed to European
political institutions than to national ones. In large part, this is prob-
ably driven more by negative feelings about domestic political systems
and politicians than about European institutions, about which they
have insufficient knowledge and experience to make a judgement. As
yet, there are few signs of developing concerns about democratic
deficits in the EU.
(Johnson, 2005: 128)
Indeed, people even look forward to a further transfer of democracy from
the EU, converting their countries from formal to more fully effective
membership.
In contrast, the ECE parties themselves seem happy to continue with
the general demobilisation of the population, even after the remobil-
isation failure of the first EP elections and the emergence of widening
participation and political inclusion as central themes in the discourse of
democratisation worldwide. In the ECE it is the uneven levels of political
participation in society and limited access to political representatives 
that stand in need of radical correction, in this post-Lisbon multilevel 
and multi-actor democracy. Demobilisation of the people is now the 
biggest obstacle to further democratisation in ECE because the organisa-
tions of civil society that flourished in the late 1980s/early 1990s have
been turned into, or are now subjected to, mere party politics. At their
present stage of party development the parties in ECE must work harder
to establish connections in the spirit of partnership with the actors in the















































East-Central Europe: parties in crisis 99
Satisfaction with representative democracy has two aspects: satisfaction
with the democratic character of institutions (formal–procedural side) and
satisfaction with the performance of democracy or democratic govern-
ance (policy–efficiency side). These two sides can also be separated in the
West, since the formal criteria have lost and the efficiency criteria have
gained some significance for the general public. The general concept of
‘the people’s interest in politics’ relates more and more to the dimensions
of the performance of democracy. In an overview of the discussions on
democratic deficit and satisfaction with democracy Linde and Ekman
(2003: 393) have constructed a five-fold model of popular support, further
developing David Easton’s earlier model of a three-fold distinction: (1)
diffuse support for the political or national community, which indicates
a basic attachment to a political system; the distinction between (2) regime
principles and (3) regime performance in order to account for the differ-
ence between support for the democracy as an ideal and attitudes towards
the way democracy works in practice; (4) support for political institutions
in general or for specific institutions in particular; and finally (5) support
for political actors, which has to do with support for a particular person
and/or a political party.
This sophisticated approach to political support enables Linde and
Ekman to offer a detailed and nuanced analysis of satisfaction with democ-
racy based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) data. Their
most important finding is that support for democracy in principle has
been divorced from satisfaction with democracy as it works: the over-
whelming majority of the population still supports democracy as a political
system in general but has become deeply disappointed with the practice
of democratic regimes. Linde and Ekman say ‘a respondent can be a
convinced democrat, rejecting all forms of non-democratic alternatives,
but nonetheless be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in his or
her country at a specific point of time’ (2003: 396). Indeed, according to
the CEEB data, immediately before EU accession only 28, 32 and 35 per
cent of citizens were satisfied with the way democracy was working in
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary respectively (Linde and Ekman,
2003: 401–5). In time this could come to have implications for how these
countries participate in the EU. Thus as Slomczynski and Shabad concluded
in regard to Poland:
As scholars, and, somewhat more belatedly, European and domestic
elites of the EU Member States have come to realize, public opinion
plays a significant role in shaping the scope and pace of integration.
(. . .) As these countries gain entry, public support will continue to
be crucial for the political and economic outcomes of EU enlarge-
ment.
(Slomczynski and Shabad, 2003: 504, 527)
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Conclusion: Europeanisation as a proxy for globalisation
This chapter has argued that the direct impact of globalisation on the
ECE parties and party systems has been relatively minor, except for some
years in the early 1990s when these parties were only just taking shape.
But if the direct economic impact of globalisation has been slight, this is
because the parties and party systems have been facing much stronger
pressure from both the EU conditionalities in general and the EU parties
and party internationals in particular. The challenges connected with
meeting the convergence criteria for entering the eurozone, the acceptance
and introduction of the Schengen acquis (on the free movement of people
within the EU) and joining the Lisbon strategy have been dominant, which
makes the emergence of the ECE party systems rather unique. This
extremely outward-oriented political development has been indeed a ‘return
to Europe’, where copying the EU institutions has been the only way to
get an entry ticket. The ‘forced course development’, as it has been called,
has been very positive; although it has aggravated some contradictions,
it has still been a privileged or ‘king’s way’ to EU membership.
In the first decade of Europeanisation a ‘party cartel’ was formed in
support of joining the EU. Most ECE parties supported EU membership
and the voices of dissent were marginalised; anti-European or Euro-sceptic
opinions were forced underground or minimised. The situation changed
radically after closing the accession negotiations in December 2002 at the
Copenhagen Summit since there was a turning away from ideologically
based political issues to the very pragmatic, even financially based, policy
issues. Both left and right began a nested game: the parties on the right
introduced a double talk for the domestic and international audience,
playing with the ‘national card’, while parties on the left continued to
blame ‘Europe’ for the austerity measures and for the divergence from
the model of Social Europe. Under these circumstances it has become
increasingly difficult to reach a national consensus between and among
the ECE parties. This has unleashed a vicious circle in the process of
structural adaptation to the EU, although this has been counterbalanced
to a great extent by the constraints coming from the European Parliament
and from the common pressures applying to all MEPs.
Certainly the ECE political systems, including the party systems, have
radically changed with membership of the EU. However, the political
system of the EU as a whole has also changed beyond recognition with
the Eastern enlargement and the emergence of the enlarged EU25. It has
changed much more than in the case of former enlargements, not just
because this most recent enlargement has been larger but also because of
the specific problems of the new entrants. In the writer’s view, the politi-
cians and analysts of the former member states have not yet realised this
fact, since they have been accustomed to the asymmetries of the Eastern
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incumbents. But now the old member states have to face the fact that
there is also an adaptation process for them, not because of the political
will or political capacity of the new members (whose ability to gain signifi-
cant concessions from the EU remains very low) but because Eastern
enlargement has brought a new political landscape and new socio-economic
situation. There is now enlargement fatigue, as a new form of Euro-fatigue
(on how this might be significant for party politics in Turkey, see Chapter
7). The populations of the new member states have not been enthusiastic
about the further enlargements either, although they see more the advan-
tages of including Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania as new members in the
near future. They do share the view of many people in Western Europe
that the borders of the EU should be stabilised for a long time to come,
once accession has been achieved by the western Balkans. Following the
most recent round of accession, then, the EU political system as a whole
has radically changed.
As to the party systems, there has been a very strong convergence due
to the external Europeanisation process, but not at the expense of losing
the idiosyncrasies that ECE party systems share. The main specifics of the
ECE parties are, first, that they have been ‘small size mass parties’. The
ECE populations have not joined parties in great numbers, in contrast to
earlier experience in the West, and so the ECE parties have a ‘head’ but
they do not have a ‘body’. Second, they can be classified, therefore, as
an ‘office-seeking’ cadre party, since the small membership is just enough
to provide the political elite. Third, their structuring principle has been
based much more on cultural than social cleavages, since cultural tradi-
tions and ‘camps’ matter. Fourth, they have still been much more oriented
to ideology than policy, so the policy turn that is required in order to
deal with the EU policy universe has caused major problems for the parties.
Finally, there has been a bigger divide between left and right than in the
West, and this has almost completely excluded compromises, coalition-
making and the reaching of a national consensus between them. All in
all, the ECE parties are not yet ready for the post-Lisbon multi-actor
democracy, where social and territorial actors are expected to play a larger
role due to decentralisation to the regional level. However, it is quite
possible that the parties will be remodelled, once again, under completely
different circumstances in the EU ‘inside’, compared to the 1990s when
they were ‘outside’. The external adaptation pressure works for the ECE
parties in the EU much more now than before.
In sum, the ECE democratisation has been a party-based development
but with the emergence of much weaker parties than in the West. The
impact of the international organisations and/or the parties in the West
has been mostly positive but much less intensive than in the case of the
southern European countries in the 1980s. The party-based democracy in
ECE has been affected by Europeanisation-cum-globalisation in an asym-
metrical way. The political actions have been much more beneficial than
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the social effects of the EU membership, which explains the lack of social
consolidation, which has provoked national-social populist tendencies.
Finally, regionalisation has taken the form of Europeanisation, initiating
a growing homogenisation in the ECE countries. All in all, the party-
based democracy in ECE has been stable and weak at the same time. It
is now facing further drastic transformations within the EU in the direction
of the internal Europeanisation of the ECE parties.
Notes
1 The ECE region covers Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia
and Croatia. The parties and party systems of Slovakia and Croatia – engaged
in the early nation-building process – have shown some particular features.
Slovak political scientists have elaborated the terminology of standard or non-
standard parties according to the criteria of fitting to the European party
systems or not (see Henderson, 2004). This chapter refers mostly to the Polish,
Czech and Hungarian cases, drawing on Pridham and Ágh, 2001.
2 At the Lisbon summit in 2000 EU heads agreed a Lisbon Strategy for Growth
and Jobs, setting targets of 3 per cent average annual economic growth and
20 million new jobs by 2010.
3 Krouwel (2004: 5) summarises two tendencies in political parties literature:
Peter Mair sees little evidence of the emergence of a genuine European party
system; but Simon Hix finds that party cohesion at the EU level is increasing.
4 See Ágh, 2005b and 2006. It has often been mentioned that the organisa-
tional linkages with society are weak. The ECE parties are elitist and top-down
organisations, live on state subsidies and have a high degree of centralisation.
They also have a high number of party employees in their headquarters
compared to the size of membership (van Biezen, 2005: 156, 159, 165).
5 The parties have experimented with new ways of making contact with members
or society at large. For instance, the Hungarian Socialist Party has organised
seven party congresses in the current parliamentary cycle: May 2002, March
2003, March 2004, August 2004, October 2004, April 2005 and the latest
one in mid-June 2005. Some other parties, such as FIDESZ, have organised
pseudo-mobilisation (for example, ‘national referendums’ by the party, or ‘civic
circles’ and street demonstrations) to give the impression that they are compen-
sating for the lack of intra-party democracy and the considerable powers the
party statutes have vested in the party leaders.
6 There was a very low turnout in ECE at the June 2004 elections to the EP.
The average electoral participation was 28 per cent in the recently joined
members compared to 47 per cent in the older established members. The
percentages were 27.9, 21.2, 38.5, 28.2 and 20.0 in the Czech Republic,
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6 External assistance for political
contenders in transition states
Cautionary tales from the Balkans
Tom Gallagher
After 1989, Eastern Europe was the scene of particularly intensive external
efforts to promote democracy. It might even be possible to refer to a
fourth democratic wave in which the stimulus for change was mainly
external, unlike Huntington’s pre-1989 third wave of democratisation,
which was mainly triggered by internal developments (Huntington, 1991).
The United States were to the fore in the external sponsorship of pluralist
politics – eventually to be followed by the European Union as well as
party political foundations in Germany and independent bodies such as
the Open Society Foundation (OSF, or Soros Foundation).
The Soviet takeover of a belt of states from the Baltic to the Black Sea
was crucial to the launch of the cold war in the second half of the 1940s.
A lot of American energy, and, indeed, emotional commitment, was subse-
quently invested in ending Soviet control of its satellites. Eventually the
apparent victory of the West seemed to pave the way for the region’s
political and economic institutions to be fundamentally refashioned.
Broadly liberal values were promoted in a bid to replace authoritarian
and collective systems of rule with ones based on open and competitive
political and economic arrangements.
The nature and intensity of communist rule were far from uniform in
the Soviet bloc. But in the Balkans the replacement of the traditional social
system with one based on rigid one-party rule and forced industrialisa-
tion had usually been pursued with greater militancy and zeal than in 
the Central European ‘People’s Democracies’, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary (Gallagher, 2005b: 186). This meant Bulgaria, Romania and
Albania lacked the internal resources necessary to move speedily in an
unambiguously democratic direction. Yugoslavia was in a stronger posi-
tion because of the pragmatic economic policies pursued under Marshall
Tito until his death in 1980, but this advantage was erased by the disas-
trous wave of internal conflict that tore apart this federal state in the
1990s. By the close of the 1990s external support for democracy appeared
to be the only firm asset these states possessed as they attempted, in their
economic and security arrangements, to become part of the community
of Euro-Atlantic states. This chapter argues, mainly with reference to party
assistance, but taking account of complementary support for civil society
initiatives, that external intervention in these areas has not decisively
strengthened the democratic process in the Balkans. Structural factors such
as the uninhibited nature of power struggles in different localities and the
limited social categories involved in emerging party activism make it diffi-
cult for new parties to work effectively with donors. Transparency, internal
democracy, access for citizens and even respect for basic democratic rules
have all too often been honoured in the breach, not the observance. More-
over, broadly contextual issues have hampered the rise of parties with a
solid democratising ethos. The globalisation process has led to new patterns
of dependence and subordination, leaving the Balkans at the margins of
the European political economy, which is reflected in domestic political
arrangements. The regionalisation process that the EU is championing has
also contributed to a low-intensity democracy, with the oligarchic features
of parties being strengthened by the way that EU assistance is formulated
and delivered. There is evidence that the political conditionality attached
to the release of funds by external donors is far less onerous than economic
conditionality: inevitably the quality of party-led democracy suffers. The
need to reform the state so that it is able to resist predatory attempts to
colonise it or divert its resources has also been overlooked by the multi-
lateral institutions (with the exception of post-2000 Bosnia), leading to
harmful political effects.
The chapter will therefore argue that the approach of external donors
to democracy promotion in the Balkans usually falls rather far short of
what is needed in order to be able to contribute to the consolidation of
democracy in the region.
The Balkans enters the sights of democracy promoters
Promoting democracy moved towards being a core element in US foreign
policy from the early years of the Reagan presidency in the 1980s. The
institutionalisation of the US democratisation drive was marked in 1984
by the founding of the NED, which by the end of the 1980s was over-
taken by the USAID in size and significance as a democracy promotion
actor. A series of programmes in Central America and parts of South
America were designed to reinforce a strategy of containing radical leftist
movements. The stress on repulsing communism, or at least its remnants,
was carried over to the Balkans.
Across the region, the communist party, or more often its successor,
remained the best-organised political force. It was usually prepared to
modify or abandon its Marxist–Leninist doctrine while attempting to retain
a near-monopoly of power. The party institutes attached to the two main
US political parties became heavily involved in assisting new parties in
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forces. The IRI modified its partisan backing for anti-communist parties
in developing countries that had been in the front line in the cold war,
but applied it to parts of the disintegrating Soviet bloc where networks
of power and influence, some with a clear-cut anti-Western outlook,
appeared determined to hang on to power (Carothers, 1999: 144). Albania,
Bulgaria and Romania witnessed intensive efforts to strengthen fledgling
parties from both the IRI and the NDI. Technical assistance and training 
on campaign methods and institutional development of parties were priori-
tised. Considerable emphasis was placed on the electoral arena in order
to guarantee free and fair elections that could result in a peaceful transfer
of power. These forms of external assistance were extended to govern-
ment institutions and civil society. Whereas there was wariness about
promoting the concept of civil society in other countries, where ‘people’s
power’ was often seen as a preserve of the radical left, in Eastern Europe
this was not a preoccupation of American donors. Civil society was viewed
in Washington as a force that in some countries had played a key role
in displacing communism and thwarting a neo-communist alternative
(Carothers, 1999: 208). Civil society mobilisation in Bulgaria and Albania
at different stages in their protracted transition processes was sometimes
seen as having more potential to strengthen fragile democratic processes
compared to orthodox political party developments. Accordingly, more
funding was channelled into the civil society sector, especially during the
Clinton presidency from 1992 to 2000 (Carothers, 1999: 204).
Fifteen years have now elapsed since the disappearance of single-party
rule along Marxist–Leninist lines in the Balkan states of south-east Europe:
Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. In that period of time, it has
become increasingly apparent that international assistance to enable new
parties to cope with the challenges of democratisation has not been very
successful. What has happened in those fifteen years? Fukuyama’s (1992)
proclamation of a New World Order based on the triumph of liberal
principles was shown to have a very shallow basis even in the heart of
Europe. The emergence of a more just and democratic global order was
foiled in the very neighbourhood that supposedly had witnessed a decisive
victory for the forces ranged against the totalitarianism of the left.
Yugoslavia, the largest state in the Balkans, was cold-bloodedly dismantled
by a section of the ruling elite that sought to radically rebuild it around
an ethno-nationalist core (Conversi, 2000). The Greater Serbia project of
Slobodan Milošević, which was partially emulated by the Greater Croatia
project of Franjo Tudjman, led to the deliberate unleashing of long-
buried rivalries or manufacturing of entirely new ones, in order to radic-
ally alter the human geography of what had been Yugoslavia (Gallagher,
2003, Chapters 3 and 4). The worldwide interconnectedness at the 
heart of the globalisation process was rendered mute. Finally, in 1995,
the Atlantic democracies with the US to the fore intervened to impose a
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ceasefire in the Bosnian conflict (raging since 1992). The messy peace
process that followed, and a more resolute, but poorly executed attempt
a few years later to prevent a conflict in Kosovo reaching a similar bloody
climax, showed how little enthusiasm there was for upholding a global-
ised approach to security even in Europe’s heartland (Wheeler and Bellamy,
2005: 575).
Competitive parties in the Balkans, among whom the commitment to
pluralist practices is genuine and not insincere, have a stupendously diffi-
cult task. The collapse of single-party states and the command economy
has produced millions of social casualties. In certain war-affected parts
of the former Yugoslavia, criminal groups have tasted power and been
very difficult to displace. The plunder of the state and the wholesale theft
of private goods in parts of Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo resulted in a
radical realignment of the social structure. Urban elites whose status and
prosperity derived from their professional skills lost ground to individuals
from a small town or rural background, who possessed little formal educa-
tion but who did exceedingly well out of the war (Kaldor, 1998). With
much of the existing middle class becoming trapped in poverty as state
salaries failed to keep up with inflation and waves of sackings occurred,
based on political or ethnic criteria, well-qualified and often liberal-minded
people fled abroad to remake their lives.
The collapse of manufacturing industry across much of the region, either
because of the effects of war and international sanctions against Serbia
or because of its uncompetitive character, has had a destructive impact
on the working class. A social group that was influential in West European
(party) politics at least up to the 1980s faces marginalisation in the Balkans
only a few years after the ending of political systems that were supposed
to govern in its name.
The wars in the former Yugoslavia led to the erosion or collapse of
central authority. Even Slobodan Milošević, the chief architect of Yugo-
slavia’s destruction, soon lost control of forces that he had whipped up
and armed in order to dismantle federal Yugoslavia and then reunite it
around a Serbian core (following massive enforced population movements).
The fragmentation of political power enabled warlords, criminals and
corrupt businessmen to emerge as power-brokers across large parts of the
fractured state.
To a lesser extent, and in different ways, the criminalisation of power
was noticeable in those Balkan states that had formally remained at peace:
Bulgaria, Albania and Romania (to which could be added Macedonia, 
the southernmost republic of the old Yugoslav federation). Programmes
designed to overcome the defects of institutions such as the judiciary, vital
for the functioning of a law-based society, had ‘an artificial technical
quality’(Carothers, 1997: 123). For a long time they would be devised
without overmuch concern about the context in which these institutions
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customs service, judiciary or prosecutor’s office? How could the capacity
of different state agencies to sabotage reform efforts be reduced? There
indeed appeared to be few active reform constituencies in these countries
and few political parties that appeared capable of being the nucleus of
an effort at sustained democratisation.
Western assumptions tested against Balkan realities
Belated US intervention in the Bosnian conflict in 1995, when it appeared
that Western geo-strategic interests were being threatened by its prolon-
gation, provided another massive impetus towards the fragmentation of
political power and its capture by new social formations. The 1995 Dayton
Peace Agreement (DPA) provided for a weak central state overlaying
ethnically based layers of authority, which was where real power resided
(Gallagher, 2005b: chapter 6). There were two ethnically based entities.
The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina represented an enforced union of
the Bosniaks (or Muslims) and the Croats who, for the rest of 1990, oper-
ated a para-state known as Herceg-Bosna. The federation was further
weakened by the creation of ten cantons. They soon became centres of
economic power as massive amounts of humanitarian aid flowed into
Bosnia to begin post-war reconstruction. The second declared entity was
the Republic of Srpska (RS). The breakaway Serbian statelet, which had
waged a savage war against its ethnic Muslim rivals, was allowed to
remain in existence and indeed retain its own separate army.
An international administration was to govern in partnership with local
political forces. This hastily conceived experiment in political engineering
was based on the assumption that the more complicated and multilayered
the elected institutions were, the likelier it was that previously implacable
rivals would discover the need to cooperate with one another. Dayton’s
architects thought that early elections and the devolution of power to the
entities, and further down still to the cantons and the municipalities, might
provide the basis for trans-ethnic co-operation to get under way. Instead,
all the incentives were for the leaders of the three national groups to build
three different polities and to ignore or weaken the central state (Knaus
and Whyte, 2004).
However, the belated US intervention in Bosnia was the Clinton admin-
istration’s most ambitious international undertaking, and the credibility
of externally led efforts to reconstitute a state and its society after unremit-
ting internal conflict depended on the venture enjoying success. But this
undertaking contained serious flaws often noticeable in more routine 
efforts to sponsor political progress in places that had avoided the melt-
down seen in Bosnia. There was a fixation with achieving short-term
targets and, indeed, concluding the task of political reconstruction within
an incredibly brief timescale, US forces being originally due to withdraw
by the end of 1997. The need to take account of underlying ‘power factors’
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was overlooked. So was the importance of building state institutions able
to enforce their authority on recalcitrant groups opposed to the normal-
isation of politics and inter-societal relations. Breaking up the leviathan
former communist state was seen as an overriding priority in most former
communist countries, but donors gave little thought to how to restore its
competence and legitimacy, especially in the face of criminal groups, some-
times benefiting from ill-thought-out neo-liberal policies that were ready
to challenge its remaining authority.
David Harland, a top United Nations official in Bosnia during the mid-
1990s (later responsible for drawing up the UN’s report on the Srebrenica
massacre of 1995), wrote ‘Bosnia has taught much to all of us about how
not to implement a peace agreement’ (International Herald Tribune, 27
January 2004). The Dayton experiment threw into sharp relief some of
the doubtful core assumptions held by those involved in exporting liberal
political forms to unpropitious settings: (1) that overcoming strong internal
barriers to progress and the entrenched interests behind them need not
be factored into the democratisation agenda; (2) that elections are the
vital rite of passage in the transition from conflict, tyranny or both towards
political stability; they comprise a series of end points: participation of
citizens in political decision-making; the establishment of rules for assessing
political change; peaceful competition between previously entrenched
rivals; and the formal move towards a stable constitutional order. The
September 1996 Bosnian elections resulted in the triumph of the forces
of ethno-nationalism in each of the three main ethnic groups, arguably
giving them far more legitimacy than they had previously exercised during
the years of outright warfare.
The NATO-led UN mission in Bosnia after 1995 aimed to prepare
Bosnia for international statehood by building trust and a willingness to
co-operate among the different ethnic groups. Instead, ultra-nationalist
forces were given incredible incentives to refine their separatist agendas,
thanks to unwise pseudo-reforms. The most glaring one was a deeply
inappropriate form of privatisation imposed from 1998 onwards, admitted
as such by Haris Silajdžić, the wartime Prime Minister of Bosnia. Privatisa-
tion legislation was hastily drawn up by USAID with US Department of
the Treasury influence. Under a firmly neo-liberal economic agenda, it was
assumed that privatisation would stimulate the economy and create accel-
erating social benefits. The approach of US advisers with little direct
knowledge of Bosnia made this a virtual impossibility irrespective of what-
ever merits a neo-liberal agenda might have had. The USAID plan allowed
for 12 privatisation agencies, one for the RS, one for the Federation and
another for each of its cantons. Besides the opportunities for corruption,
this unwieldy approach offered politicians the chance to confirm the effects
of ethnic cleansing by means of ethnically exclusive privatisations.
Local economies remained under mono-ethnic control as privatisation














































Cautionary tales from the Balkans 109
an almost religious belief that deregulation would promote economic and
political ‘normalisation’. Instead, local nationalist elites quickly gained
control of socially owned assets. Jobs and other economic goods were dis-
tributed by powerful magnates to favoured supporters, enhancing patron–
client relations. The informal economy started to thrive as the socially
owned one declined in the face of accelerating de-industrialisation. This
enabled ethno-political leaders to strengthen their political hold over 
many Bosnians even as inter-ethnic tensions slowly began to recede (Pugh,
2004: 55).
Launching hasty and often ill-thought-out neo-liberal measures while
the strengthening of the state was neglected hardly served to stabilise a
territory such as Bosnia, which was still reeling from conflict. It seemed
to confirm the assertion of those critics of democracy promotion who see
lying behind it a goal of aggressively spreading free market economics in
post-communist settings. One scholar, Vasile Fouskas, was even moved
to claim that in 1999, the US insistence on the introduction of free market
principles in Serbia lay behind its confrontation with Milošević at that
time (Fouskas, 2003: 46). But few US or other foreign private investors
would be drawn in even as the timescale of Western involvement in state-
building extended beyond 2000.
Misconceived policies emanating from the international administration
and the chief national players shaping the peace-building strategy in Bosnia
blighted attempts to strengthen the capacity and credibility of Western-
leaning parties in Bosnia. They were pursued by democracy assistance
experts attached to the OSCE and the foundations linked to German and
US parties. For Britain’s WFD, too, the Balkans were a primary area of
concern, from the late 1990s. The assumption that a strengthening of
democratic processes could prevent or reduce the likelihood of a return
to conflict guided its programmes. Assistance was given to multi-ethnic
parties in Bosnia in order to strengthen their capacity to successfully take
part in elections. (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2005: 6) In
an effort to promote a non-national political community, attempts were
made to bring parties and NGOs with similar objectives closer together,
but there was resistance on the part of Bosnia’s Social Democratic Party,
the principal reformist contender, towards working on joint projects with
the NGO sector (River Path Associates, 2005: Vol. 1: 58). Whatever the
quality of the WFD’s programmes, their impact was likely to be limited
as long as the international administration and the chief national players
attempting to strengthen Bosnia’s opposition appeared to lack a coherent
peace-building strategy. From the late 1990s there was a belated aware-
ness of the need to strengthen the authority of the central state and take
back powers from the entities and cantons and municipalities.
In contrast to Bosnia, external assistance for political parties has been
less noticeable in Kosovo, which became a de facto UN protectorate in
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June 1999; perhaps the strongly nationalist characteristics of the main
political forces proved too much of a disincentive. But the WFD was pre-
pared to work with the most nationalistic of Kosovo’s Albanian parties,
the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Association for the Future
of Kosovo (AAK). It claimed most of the credit for having ‘successfully
brought’ them into the mainstream democratic process’ (Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, 2005: 6).
Turning to Romania and Bulgaria, Carothers (1999: 311) remarked that
both countries may be cases in which Western democratic aid has had
‘real weight’, but in fact the results appeared meagre for much of the
1990s. In Romania, substantial US sponsorship of groups on the centre-
right opposed to the still influential post-communists failed to stimulate
the emergence of modern professional parties able to bear the responsi-
bilities of government, as shown when they were in government from
1996 to 2000. Bulgaria received the greatest share of democracy aid for
the whole of Eastern Europe from the US under the 1991 Support for
East European Democracy Act (SEED) but, after several years of political
stalemate, the Bulgarian Socialists (ex-communists) were returned with an
overall majority in 1995. A period of chronic misrule that led to the
systematic looting of state resources culminated in mass demonstrations
in 1996–7, leading to the collapse of this government. In Albania, an
unpopular government increasingly intolerant of opposition was swept
from office by a popular revolt following hotly disputed elections and the
collapse of a pyramid savings bank that absorbed most of society’s private
savings. This led to the collapse of state institutions in 1997 and wide-
spread anarchy. The IRI had given high-profile backing to Prime Minister
Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party as indeed had several ruling parties on
the right in Western Europe.
Western disarray had first surfaced after the parliamentary elections 
of 26 May 1996. Appalled at the extent of vote-rigging and intimidation,
a number of observers from the OSCE delegation, monitoring the conduct
of elections, denounced them as fundamentally flawed. The OSCE went
on to produce a heavily critical report while that of the Council of Europe’s
monitors was much milder. As a result, opposition parties used the OSCE
findings to justify their parliamentary boycott while Berisha’s Democrats
quoted the report of the Council of Europe to uphold their landslide
victory. The Italian and German ambassadors were reported to have exer-
cised pressure on the Swiss-led OSCE team not to invalidate the 1996
elections ‘and to bury their reports in the drawers of realpolitik’ (The
Guardian, 14 March 1997).
The example of Berisha’s Albania, and also Croatia (under President
Tudjman’s tight control from 1991 to 1999), revealed centre-right parties
with an approach to monopolising power and public goods not dissimilar
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its resources to a narrow retinue of supporters and business allies some-
times appeared to transcend the political spectrum. Western parties and
others seeking to strengthen the parties’ democratic capacity often failed
to make much impact in such circumstances. Assumptions and expecta-
tions were often greatly at variance with the reality of inner party life and
behaviour in the Balkans when encountered on the ground.
Unintended consequences flow from the EU’s deepening 
engagement
From 2000, the US under a Republican administration preoccupied with
international terrorism and the Middle East has grown increasingly
detached from the Balkans. The EU has replaced the US as the main inter-
national actor across the whole region, acquiring a new Common Foreign
and Security Policy as it seeks to supplant the conventional authority of
the nation states belonging to it, in important respects. The promotion of
peace, security and democratic institutions in adjacent zones are corner-
stones of this foreign policy. It is widely recognised that the success or
failure of this ambitious transnational development will, in no small way,
depend on how effectively it can promote reform in the Balkans when
drawing the region closer to European institutions.
By 2005 the EU had assumed control over both civil and military aspects
of the international mission to create a Bosnian state fit for both EU and
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership. It has been
involved for a rather longer period with trying to prepare those Balkan
states that remained at peace, particularly Bulgaria and Romania, to face
the rigours of EU membership, the main gateway for their integration
with the global economy. But some of the changes promoted by the EU
have also contributed to the fragmentation of political authority noticed
elsewhere in the region, impeding the emergence of strong central parties
with a clear sense of direction.
Romania, the largest country in the region following Yugoslavia’s
demise, has proven to be one of the biggest challenges for the EU. In a
move designed to strengthen its bid for EU membership, the centrist coali-
tion ruling Romania from 1996 to 2000 transferred power and resources
to the localities, a move unprecedented in Romanian history. A law on
local public finance introduced in January 1999 enabled 50 per cent of
income tax revenue to go to local government as well as a large share of
the revenues earned by the local branches of the national privatisation
agency (Gallagher, 2005a: 239). The EU regards decentralisation as a vital
prerequisite particularly in previously heavily centralised states if they are
to benefit effectively from membership. But not all the consequences appear
to have been anticipated by EU officials. Capturing power at the local
level has become a major priority for competing parties because of the
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resources now located there. Enjoying most success in this regard has been
the successor to the communist party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD),
in office from 1990 to 2004 and for all but four years in the late 1990s.
Until it narrowly failed to be re-elected in 2004, its monopolistic approach
and harassment of the local media and local business forces not subservient
to it caused numerous anxieties for the EU (Gallagher, 2005a: Chapters
10 and 11).
Another source of concern has been the fate of pre-accession funds
meant to modernise the state and enable it to compete effectively with
existing EU members. A large component has been channelled through
regional bodies especially created to quicken the pace of support for the
Romania infrastructure, bypassing unwieldy and often partisan central
ministries. But the regionalisation process has created new power centres
greatly altering the character of the PSD. Authority has swung towards
regional barons who have grown powerful through their ability to siphon
off regional funds for their own private use (Gallagher, 2005a: 313–14).
The extent to which the centre of gravity has moved towards local and
regional chieftains was shown in April 2005 when their votes displaced
the party’s founder Ion Iliescu – hitherto seen as enjoying an unassailable
hold over the party. The regional barons in their turn have caused concern
at the EU because of their contempt for conduct necessary for a modicum
of good governance. But it was the EU’s own strategy that contributed
to this shift, altering the balance of power inside Romania’s main party
and, in some ways, making it more difficult for the PSD to benefit from
outside advice and assistance designed to strengthen pluralist tendencies
within the party.
Thus a key part of the regionalisation process that Romania has been
subjected to since entry talks began in 1999 has had unintended conse-
quences. Injections of economic and technical assistance, instead of
spreading liberal values, enabled the dominant party to tighten its control
over different layers of state authority and weaken competitors. Even with
the election of a variegated coalition of the PSD’s opponents in 2004, the
party retains control of its local fiefdoms, not least because of the EU
money that flows into the regional authorities that it mainly dominates.
The Romanian case suggests that unless regional assistance is rethought
in Brussels, then a strengthening of democratic processes in the Balkans
will not necessarily be one of the outcomes of growing interconnected-
ness between Western Europe and its Balkan neighbours.
The unhealthy state of donor parties
The condition of donor parties and their standing in their home coun-
tries has often raised legitimate concerns about their ability to be effective
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rule, chronic underdevelopment and misuse of resources by a privileged
few. Parties from consolidated democracies in Western Europe, and to a
lesser extent in North America, have experienced mounting difficulties and
have changed in character during this period. Their membership has often
shrunk, contacts with key social groups have frayed, and they have often
fallen under the sway of special interests, particularly in the business
world. Their overall credibility at home has often declined. The charac-
teristics in terms of separate programmes, distinctive ideological positions
and mobilising techniques that might once have distinguished parties 
have been greatly eroded in the post-cold war era. In Britain there is no
better illustration of this than Power to the People, which found that the
level of alienation felt towards politicians and the main parties was
extremely high and widespread: ‘Few aspects of the political system inves-
tigated by Power received more hostile comment than the main political
parties’ (Power Commission, 2006: 181). At best the main parties were
judged to be ‘failing in the basic function of connecting governed and the
governors, and, at worst, are serious obstacles to democratic engagement’.
So it is probably not unfair to say that West European parties from
the Socialist/Social Democratic, Liberal, Conservative and Christian Demo-
cratic families find it difficult to offer meaningful support to democratising
forces in a region with an enormous range of problems that defy easy
solutions. Their own families are increasingly dysfunctional, some major
parties have disappeared (Italian Christian Democrats) or faced serious
electoral reverses (British Conservatives, French Socialists, German Social
Democrats), or have had to radically redefine themselves in order to remain
viable (British Labour and Conservative Parties). Struggling to retain
respect in their own increasingly disgruntled societies, it is perhaps border-
ing on the utopian to expect tired parties to have the means to reinforce
Balkan parties and point them in a direction that results in sustained
attempts to make an experiment in democratisation work.
The temptation of regime change
It is hardly surprising that a huge gulf often exits between the parties and
the Balkan societies in which they operate given their oligarchic features.
Support by the IRI for Romania’s historic parties trying to supplant the
post-communist PSD in the early 1990s failed to transform the ‘club’ atmos-
phere of political parties based around several prominent individuals 
and their retinues. They were ‘unwilling to learn from outsiders’, but nor
were their sponsors engaged in an effort designed to change the nature of
these parties through, for instance, the strengthening of their representative
function. The US Republicans wished to dislodge the post-communist 
Ion Iliescu from office. Their concern was with making the opposition
appear electable by strengthening their professionalism in elections, media
114 Tom Gallagher
appearances and party organisation. Nothing more ambitious than streng-
thening the technical efficiency of the Romanian centre-right opposition
appeared to be required (Carothers, 1996: 39–42).
Achieving regime change was also the impetus behind the concentrated
assistance given to Serbia’s coalition of 18 opposition parties known as
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). After the confrontation
between NATO and Milošević in 1999, US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright had told her officials that she fervently wished Milošević gone
from power by the time her term of office ended in 2002.1 Some US$30
million from US sources went to the opposition in the pre-election period.
It was used to purchase cell-phones and computers for DOS’s leadership
and recruit and train an army of 20,000 election monitors. External
backing also enabled Otpor, a pro-democracy youth movement, to launch
a sophisticated marketing campaign with posters, badges and T-shirts. By
the eve of the September 2000 elections, it consisted of 20,000 activists
organised into ‘action teams’ in 120 towns across Serbia (Collin, 2001:
208). Otpor’s rallying-cry was, ‘He’s finished!’ This investment paid off:
Milošević was ousted by popular unrest, after a failed attempt at election
fraud. Heavy Western backing for the hitherto weak and fragmented
Serbian opposition forces in 2000 was the most visible and spectacularly
effective example of international assistance for parties in states struggling
to democratise. It was seen as a dry run for an even more sophisticated
and extensive assistance operation for the Ukrainian opposition, which
prevailed against a post-communist oligarchy following the disputed elec-
tions there in November 2004. But international assistance did not appear
to have a lasting impact on the Serbian parties. They remained in the
main coterie parties keen to benefit from their access to state power and
neglectful of developing any representative function that would narrow
the chasm between state and society. The need for the governing parties
to finance election campaigns gave some of the power-brokers from the
Milošević era (still active in the underground economy) significant scope
to prolong their influence. Following the assassination of the Prime
Minister of Serbia Zorin Djindjić in 2003, the assumption that a clear
dividing line existed between the ‘reformers’ of DOS and the nationalists,
racketeers and communist-orientated figures who had dominated Serbia
since the late 1980s became increasingly untenable. In fact the battle lines
have become extremely blurred. Much of Serbian politics today revolves
around securing the spoils of office rather than championing specific
political values or projects (Gallagher, 2005b: Chapter 5).
The Romanian and Serbian parties that received Western training and
financial support in the end were the victims of their own shortcomings
and the punishing political environments in which they had to operate.
But they faced severe international pressure that lessened their chances 
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forces deeply hostile to genuine political pluralism. In Romania, struggling
reformers saw their popularity vanish in the late 1990s partly owing to
the need to bow to IMF demands for higher taxes and rapid privatisa-
tion, changes fully endorsed by the EU (Gallagher, 2005a: 217–18, 
222). In Serbia after 2000, strong Western pressure to deliver top sus-
pects to the United Nations Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The
Hague greatly reduced the room to manoeuvre of the embattled Zorin
Djindjić. Thus, neo-liberal policies or adherence to international human
rights norms – among the most contested aspects of globalisation –
adversely affected the ability of reformers to consolidate their authority.
They were caught between the competing pressures of delivering goods
and services for their citizens and slimming down their states in order to
compete in a global marketplace.
A loveless duo: civil society and political parties
The very limited successes enjoyed by external donors in attempting to
groom Balkan parties that could play a central role in the democrat-
isation process have encouraged them to redouble their efforts in the civil
society field. Civil society organisations with a strongly pro-democratic
orientation have continued to receive much external assistance. The policy-
orientated and service-delivery NGOs with a reformist agenda often appear
to exhibit a greater level of professionalism and transparency than polit-
ical parties. Donors often found it easier to wield influence over them,
especially because they were not answerable to public opinion or other
important national constituencies. But policy-orientated NGOs adept at
securing international funding were not always successful in embodying
democratic values such as transparent governance and accountable leader-
ship (Quigley, 2000: 206). While usually responsive to the bureaucratic
needs and world view of donors, they could easily lose touch with
important sections of society (Ottoway, 2000: 13; Quigley, 2000: 210).
Many successful NGO participants in the Balkans were drawn to inter-
national careers and seemed inclined to detach themselves from the public
arenas of their home countries. They may intuitively realise that the civil
society model pushed by US donors, and also the EU – professional organ-
isations sustained by a large middle-class and a corporate world with a
tradition of philanthropy – is unlikely rapidly to take root at home
(Carothers, 1999: 221). The lure of a career in international civil assist-
ance or development is greater than the attraction of moving over to
regular politics. Relations between parties and civil society groups are
often notoriously poor. Democracy promoters have started to give more
thought to trying to bridge the gulf (Gershman, 2004: 28–32), but the
Balkans shows it is far from easy. Parties react with undisguised fury
towards the claims of unelected individuals who possess a lofty moral
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purpose ‘and whose closest allies are often sections of the media who are
the main critics of the parties’ (Furedi, 2005: 111, 116).
It is thus extremely hard for civil society bodies to carve out perma-
nent political influence. Sometimes it is felt that this can only be done by
entering the electoral arena as a direct competitor for office. In Serbia
Otpor tried and failed to do this and obtained a derisory result in 2003,
even when the reputation of parties once known for their reformist goals
was at its nadir. The same had happened in Romania a decade earlier
when a large segment of its then best-known NGO, the Civic Alliance,
formed its own party before suffering dissension and eventually being
absorbed by another party. However, in Bulgaria the Centre for Liberal
Strategies has exercised the same watchdog role over an unconsolidated
democratic system as the Romanian Academic Society (SAR) and Pro-
Democratia have performed in Romania. These particular NGOs have
displayed greater staying-power and coherence about their aims and objec-
tives than perhaps any of the pro-reform political parties. For Romania,
2003–04 was an anxious period when the country at times appeared to
be on the verge of becoming ‘a choiceless democracy’: the opposition was
completely submerged by a dominant party fully in control of all of the
levers of state power. But the PSD unexpectedly lost office at the end of
2004. In October 2004, 12 of the leading advocacy NGOs in the country
joined forces to form a Coalition for a Clean Parliament (CCP). It docu-
mented the cases of 222 parliamentary candidates from the ranks of the
major parties who were judged to be unsuitable to hold high elected office.
Politicians were faulted if they had been enmeshed with the communist
system and the Securitate (police and intelligence), if they had acquired
fortunes incommensurate with their declared private assets, if they had
profited from controversial privatisations or if they were involved with
private firms that had secured lucrative contracts with public utilities or
state-owned firms (Stan, 2005). So-called ‘corruption’ bulletins were drawn
up for each constituency especially where, in the absence of an inde-
pendent local media, it was difficult for voters to obtain information on
the candidates’ background. The Democratic Party (PD) largely complied
with the request to stand down tainted candidates. But members of the
ruling PSD took out law suits against the CCP. Local activists fabricated
its bulletins in order to indict opponents of the PSD. Traian Bǎsescu, PD’s
leader, became President after a narrow victory and appointed a non-PSD
government, one of whose best-known figures was the head of the main
human rights NGO in Romania, Monica Macovei. As minister of justice
her challenge is to overhaul a justice system that has become a byword
for corruption, threatening Romania’s chances of joining the EU on
schedule in 2007.
West European parties remained on the sidelines even in the face 
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28 November 2004. The Socialist International endorsed the ruling PSD,
its head António Guterres (appointed head of the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees in 2005) actually visiting the country during
the election campaign to publicly support the ruling party. The rival EPP
of centre-right parties in the European Parliament sent a delegation to
Romania in May 2005 to determine which parties could join the grouping
once Romania started to send elected representatives to the EP. This started
an unseemly dash among Romanian parties to change their names and
programmes in order to gain coveted membership in this parliamentary
club. But once inside the EPP it was not expected that they would change
to any meaningful extent nor did it appear that the EPP expected them
to improve their act (other than disavow extremist positions). In their
attitude to aspirant parties, the main leftist, centrist and conservative blocs
in the EP all too often have behaved like Balkan parties themselves at the
start of their lives seeking to quickly acquire activists without enquiring
too closely about their fitness to represent the party. If these club arrange-
ments amount to the regionalisation of party politics as the Balkans draws 
closer to eventual EU membership, it seems unlikely that the Western
mentors have the aptitude or inclination to establish new norms of behav-
iour among their Balkan associates.
By contrast, parties in kin states such as Croatia and Serbia have pro-
vided more concentrated assistance to parties dominated by their co-ethnics
in neighbouring territories such as Bosnia and Kosovo (although keeping
alive territorial ambitions may be the main impulse for such solidar-
ity). Also, parties have sometimes enjoyed more effective patronage from 
émigré groups. This certainly applies to right-wing nationalist ones 
that have been in office in Croatia for most of the time since 1991 and
less often in Macedonia. The possibility of transnational criminal groups
showing more expertise and flair than conventional purveyors of assist-
ance in influencing parties they hope will defend their illicit interests cannot
be ruled out.
Conclusion
It is often difficult for international assistance for party development
channelled through foundations and institutes (with or without a link to
Western parties) to have a positive impact in the Balkans. The region is
experiencing major difficulties in establishing the basis for smoothly
functioning democracies. This stems from a variety of factors: the damaging
legacy of hard-line forms of communism associated with major policy
failures, especially in the economic realm; the collapse of Yugoslavia,
previously the largest state in the region, into dissolution and warfare;
and the effects of globalisation on the political economy of the region. 
It is far from clear if the absorption of Bulgaria, Romania and perhaps
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eventually several states in the Western Balkans into the EU will provide
the impetus for economic recovery and political stability. This may be
because the integration process was designed for states that had a different
social and economic profile from those found in the region: a large service
sector, a growing middle-class and significant levels of urbanisation and
public administrations able to absorb aid and redesign their laws to fit
in with EU norms.
The regionalisation process that Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and several
other Balkan states are now part of appears likely to initiate a new pattern
of dependence and subordination, with the EU replacing the pre-1989
Soviet Union as the chief regional hegemon. By 2005, EU-based firms had
bought up nearly all of the strategic sectors of the Romanian economy.
The vested interests of West European economic groups in seeing their
investments protected by Romania becoming a full member by 2008 was
the chief guarantee that its accession would not be frozen because of
persistent failures to reform. The chronic weakness of the state is emerging
as a drawback hampering the consolidation of democracy in the region.
Foreign donors were all too ready to promote the dismantling of the
Marxist–Leninist state without seeing the need to replace it with a state
able to regulate the private sector and shield citizens from unscrupulous
forces benefiting from the onset of untrammelled capitalism. The mistake
was noticed in Bosnia five years into a dysfunctional peace process, 
and steps were taken to strengthen central institutions. Where thought
has been given to the matter, it appears that both the US and the EU
prefer a state model that is suitable for rapid economic liberalisation 
but that is unable to promote democratisation allied to a strong sense of
citizenship. None of the Western nations promoting radical economic
liberalisation along with competitive democracy ever subjected themselves
to the experiment that they have urged upon post-communist and a range
of developing countries (Chua, 2003: 13). Strong internal backing for
democracy only emerged gradually in today’s mature democracies. The
international impetus is likely to remain weak in the Balkans as long 
as competitive politics is indelibly associated with economic suffering by
millions of voters. External leverage is ineffective without strong domestic
parties that display a capacity to rule along with a vested interest in
consolidating a robust democracy. Ruling parties such as the Romanian
PSD from 2000 to 2004 have noticed that political conditionality imposed
by the EU and the US is usually less rigorous than economic condition-
ality or the commitment to the global war on terrorism (Gallagher, 2004:
12–13). Sanctions from the West for blocking reform of the judiciary,
harassing the independent media and impeding effective anti-corruption
measures were very light indeed in 2003–04 when Romania joined NATO
and made significant progressive with its EU bid. This suggests that Western
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syndrome of form fara fond (literally form without content), which has
been widely seen for over a century as a metaphor for the country’s failure
to successfully modernise.
Perhaps party-based organisations (and associated institutes and foun-
dations) in the Atlantic democracies that see a role for themselves in 
the Balkans can be most useful if they try to exert leverage in their own
capitals to prevent the imposition of policies that undermine the reformists
and prevent the transition process reaching successful completion, with a
real likelihood of periodic reversal to authoritarian practices. They might
ask if the fragmentation of power which has been the direct outcome of
the West’s engagement in the region, as shown by the 1995 Dayton
Agreement in Bosnia, the promotion of a slimmed down state through
privatisation, and the EU’s accession process, leaves any point in backing
parties that wish to be strong national players. With a weakened central
state in the Balkans, it is often hard to see such parties emerging.
But if they are involved, there are elementary rules to be followed in
order not to discredit international assistance. Assistance should not confer
legitimacy on parties without proof of commitment to democratic practices
and goals. It should not base programmes on the success of a particular
individual, nor get involved in internecine party conflicts. Nor should
anyone relax vigilance over the democratic process just because local ruling
parties are prepared to grant large infrastructure projects to firms that are
among their own principal donors. The fact that well-known parties in
Western Europe have found themselves in such a situation raises real
doubts as to whether they still have the commitment as well as the skills
and expertise to be of service to parties in the Balkans attempting to make
democratic politics work.
Given the fact that so many parties are in difficulties in their home
environments, it is perhaps worth asking whether they should review 
the nature of their democracy promotion work abroad and search for
alternatives. This is not to question the validity of the undertaking but
rather to suggest that there are moments when parties might delegate the
task of democracy assistance to non-partisan cross-party formations in
their home countries. They would be more likely to employ a long-term
focus and be less swayed by political expediency. The case for saying that
actively encouraging the implantation of democracy in adjacent regions
in fact strengthens the security of democratic strongholds such as West–
Central Europe remains strong. But the way that democracy promotion
has often been linked with drastic economic measures that erode popular
respect for pluralism has often opened up a dangerous gulf between elec-
torates and fledgling party elites. Criminal groups have sometimes profited
immensely from disenchantment with democracy. Their rise has obvious
implications for the security of West European societies not to mention
their own domestic ones. The Atlantic democracies should not abandon
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attempts to strengthen democracy in their immediate neighbourhoods, 
but much greater self-awareness is needed about what can be done and
how best it can be carried out. Certainly, there is a great need for parties
and other bodies involved in democracy promotion to ponder the lessons
of the past 15 years in order to see how they can do better in the future.
Note
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7 Globalisation and party 
transformation




There is no doubt that Turkey’s political system has undergone trans-
formation in recent years partly as a result of the increasingly strong
signals provided by the European Union (EU) and a more credible set of
incentives relating to eventual full membership of the EU. However, it is
not simply external actors alone but a complex interplay of domestic and
external influences that have shaped this process of transformation, which
in many ways remains an ongoing and incomplete process. This chapter
has two interrelated objectives. The first goal is to highlight the para-
doxical role of the Justice and Development Party (the AKP), a party with
Islamist roots, in Turkey’s recent transformation and Europeanisation. The
second is to use recent Turkish experience to illuminate a broader question
concerning the possibilities of transforming an Islamist political movement
into a party that embraces the norms of liberal democracy. A central claim
in this context is that although such a transformation is clearly possible
and the norms of liberal democracy can be firmly entrenched in a predomin-
antly Muslim society, this outcome in Turkey is context-specific, and is
conditional upon the co-existence and the interplay over time of several
favourable internal and external processes.
What is interesting from a comparative perspective is that unlike some
of the countries included in this book, direct international assistance 
or promotion aimed at transforming key political parties has not been a
major aspect of Turkish experience. International democracy promotion
efforts have by and large been directed towards civil society organisa-
tions instead. The links between Turkey’s main political parties and their 
foreign counterparts have also been relatively weak. Nevertheless, the
process of globalisation has had a dramatic impact in terms of trans-
forming one major party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In
retrospect, the process of globalisation has contributed to this through
three distinct sets of influences. First, it created a group of winners in
economic terms, and this provided an opportunity for the party leadership
to construct a broad inter-class coalition of both winners and losers,
offering widespread electoral appeal. Second, the major crises of financial
globalisation that Turkey experienced in 2000–01, which resulted in a
massive collapse of output (with negative economic growth of −7.4 per
cent in 2001) and which was accompanied by even more rigorous IMF
conditions in terms of fiscal disciplines and regulatory reforms, helped to
discredit the established parties on both the left and right of the political
spectrum. This created political space for the AKP to capitalise upon.
Third, the regional context of globalisation, namely the prospect of EU
membership, has also played a particularly favourable role both in terms
of transforming the party and boosting its electoral fortunes. Turkey’s
attempts to engage with globalisation through deeper integration with the
EU have opened up an opportunity space for moderate Islamist politics,
providing a source of protection against the secularist ideology of the state
elites. At the same time, it has created a clear boundary for the range of
permissible politics in the Turkish context, given the strong consensus in
the EU on a secular constitutional order and, hence, the antipathy towards
any signs of religious fundamentalism or fundamentalist politics in general.
From moderate Islamists to ‘Muslim democrats’: the 
historical roots of the recent transformation
The question of whether Political Islam is compatible with liberal democ-
racy has considerable practical relevance not only for societies with Muslim
populations but also for the future of the international economic and
political order, particularly in the post 9/11 global context. The fact that
most of the countries in the Middle East and Islamic world more gener-
ally are ruled by authoritarian regimes and have been rather impervious
to the kind of democratic currents affecting much of Latin America, Eastern
Europe and East Asia following the end of the cold war also appeared
to raise fundamental questions about the compatibility of Political Islam
and liberal democracy. Turkey as a secular and democratic state with a
predominantly Muslim population appeared to be a unique case in the
Islamic world. Nevertheless, in the past Turkey’s own democratic deficits
limited its ability to offer a role model of change that would inspire polit-
ical reform in Arab or other Muslim societies. More recently, however,
Turkey’s own political and economic transformation has helped raise the
credibility and the international appeal of the Turkish experience.
Given the increasing international relevance of the Turkish experience,
then, what are some of the key lessons that can be derived from this
particular national and historical context? Certainly, one of them is that
a secular political order is a precondition for liberal democracy. Liberal
democracy cannot take root in a Muslim society without a strong commit-
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order and firm constitutional safeguards to prevent a violation of the
secular character of the state. In spite of its limitations, one of the achieve-
ments of the Kemalist state founded by Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s has
been to prevent the alternative of an ‘Islamic state’ (based on the Islamic
Law) right from the beginning. The process of top-down implementation
of the secularist ideology has also triggered a process of long-term social
and political change. As a consequence, even the most authoritarian-
looking versions of Political Islam in Turkey, such as the Welfare Party
(the RP) in the 1990s were politically moderate by the standards of other
Muslim societies. The goal of establishing an Islamic state has enjoyed
only very marginal political support among the society at large.1
Yet another striking lesson is the long-term impact of the democratisa-
tion process on the behaviour of key political actors. Democratisation over
time necessarily involves a learning process, and Islamists in Turkey have
not been immune to this process.2 Indeed, scholars of Christian democ-
racy in Western Europe have identified a similar learning process, whereby
a largely authoritarian political movement has become transformed and
has progressively embraced liberal democratic norms in the process of
trying to construct broad electoral coalitions within the boundaries of par-
liamentary democracy (Kalyvas, 1996). Islamist political actors have also
experienced a similar and often painful learning experience, which increas-
ingly altered their basic perception of what was permissible in a demo-
cratic environment given the domestic and external constraints. What is
interesting is that this learning process helped to instigate a virtuous circle
whereby the Islamists learned not simply how to respond to democratisa-
tion in a reactive fashion but how to become a proactive force contributing
to the process of further democratic deepening.
A third major lesson of the Turkish experience is the importance of 
an economic transformation that helps to produce a substantial middle
class of entrepreneurs and educated professionals. If Political Islam is
primarily a movement oriented towards mobilising the interests of the
underclass of urban marginals and rural poor – the so-called losers of
globalisation – then it is more likely to adopt a radical posture. If, in
contrast, Political Islam is a movement based on a cross-class electoral
coalition that includes a significant proportion of winners of globalisa-
tion, then it is more likely to take a more moderate direction. Clearly,
the Turkish experience of economic development and more specifically
the process of neo-liberal economic restructuring over the past two decades
have helped develop a kind of conservative middle class or bourgeoisie
that represents a significant moderating influence. Moving in a moderate
direction and accommodating the precepts of a secular regime do not
necessarily mean, however, that the norms of liberal democracy will be
embraced. Certainly, Malaysia’s flourishing bourgeoisie, for example, has
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been making a major contribution to economic development there without
undermining the authoritarian political foundations of the existing regime.
So the rise of an economically successful and influential middle class could
be considered as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the entrench-
ment of liberal democracy.
Another important lesson concerns the role of the intellectuals and 
civil society organisations. There is no doubt that civil society started to
flourish in Turkey during the 1990s, and a wide variety of groups are
now beginning to voice claims against the limitations of the current political
order. Similarly, intellectuals from both the ‘secularist’ and ‘Islamist’
components of society have emerged as notable sources of criticism for
the existing democratic order. Hence, democratisation in Turkey in the
1990s, especially, is strongly rooted in the domestic sphere; and pressures
have been building from below for the transformation of the Turkish state
towards a more democratic regime.3
There is no doubt also that the EU anchor has been extremely important
in terms of helping to soften the underlying secular versus Islam divide
in Turkish society. In this context, one should emphasise both the long-
term impact of Europeanisation and Westernisation on Turkish democracy
and the more recent impact of stronger signals in the direction of full
membership, which have dramatically altered the incentive structure for
key political actors and have helped to reshape the Islamists more than
anybody else in the process. However, the very significance of this point
raises a question mark concerning the broader applicability of the Turkish
experience to the Arab Middle East, for the EU is unlikely ever to offer
the possibility of full membership to the states in that region.
Finally, one should emphasise the role of leadership in helping to
transform the nature of Islamist politics in Turkey. Structural incentives
generated through globalisation and potential EU membership consti-
tute important channels for political change. Nevertheless, the ability of
key political actors to respond and capitalise on these incentives is also
critical. In this regard Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah
Gül, the Foreign Minister, have been very instrumental. As well as cur-
rently occupying leadership positions in the AKP, they had previously been
important figures in the Welfare Party (RP), and the FP establishments.
They have played a central role in the transformation process by insti-
gating the intra-party debate within the FP, which succeeded the RP in
1997, that culminated in the splitting up of that party and the creation of
the AKP. The role of leadership in the transformation process becomes all
the more striking when compared with the position of the main opposi-
tion party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which through its own
leadership failures was unable to capitalise on the opportunities provided














































Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 125
Accounting for the transformation: the interplay of 
domestic and external dynamics
The Islamist movement in Turkey has been radically transformed over the
course of the past decade. Table 7.1 clearly illustrates this by highlighting
the profound differences that characterised the approach of the AKP
compared with its two predecessors, the RP and the FP. By 1995, the RP
had emerged as a major political force following electoral victories in the
main metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Ankara during the municipal
elections of 1994. The party’s rise continued in the general elections of
December 1995. It emerged as the leading party capturing 21.4 per cent
of the vote and was able to form a coalition government as the major
coalition partner (Öniş; 1997; Yavuz, 2003; Toprak, 2005). While the RP
was moderate by the standards of most Islamist political movements and
was a coalition of a diverse set of interest and tendencies, it had some
authoritarian leanings, raising doubts in the public mind about how far
it would respect a pluralistic political order. It appeared that the party
conceived of democracy in rather instrumental terms in their quest to
change the Turkish state and Turkish society in a more Islamist direc-
tion. In the economic sphere, their underlying model was one of
hyper-populism based on heavy state interventionism, in line with their
popular conception of the ‘just order’ (adil düzen). In the foreign policy
sphere, their approach involved a strong anti-European dimension in addi-
tion to being strongly opposed to the state of Israel. The main thrust of
the foreign policy appeared to be the development of strong relations with
other Muslim countries, with a clear focus on the Arab Middle East and
North Africa.
What is interesting is that this kind of vision encountered serious setbacks
and reversals during the course of the 1990s onwards. Certainly, devel-
opments in domestic politics played a key role here. RP’s authoritarian
leanings encountered resistance from both the secular establishment and
the society at large. The ‘postmodern’ military intervention of 28 February
1997 was not a typical military coup and did not involve the replace-
ment of a civilian government by a military government. Nevertheless,
the military – through indirect pressure and the warning of a possible
coup in the future – effectively facilitated the collapse of the RP-led coali-
tion government in June, and this culminated in the legal closure of the
party by 1998. In spite of their authoritarian nature, these events signalled
what was broadly permissible within a secular political environment,
reflecting the preferences of large segments of the Turkish state and society
and their reactions against what appeared to be rising Islamic funda-
mentalist tendencies.
The Islamists undoubtedly experienced a significant learning process
during this episode. The RP’s successor, the Virtue Party (the FP), was a
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Table 7.1 Islamists’ changing political agenda in Turkey: stylised comparison of
Welfare Party (RP) (1995), Virtue Party (FP) (1999) and Freedom and
Justice Party (AKP)
RP FP AKP
Economic role of the State
Extremely significant. Some reference to the Strong emphasis on liberal 
Strong redistributive role distributional role of the economy and foreign direct 
for the state. An active role state. Much more emphasis investment. Favours 
for the state in subsidising on competition, the need to privatisation and properly 
industrial development. rely on market forces and regulated market economy. 
Privatisation de-emphasised. privatisation. Some reference to social 
justice. Provision of social 
services within the budgetary 
limits of the IMF programme.
Democratisation
No reference to individual Major emphasis on Major emphasis on 
or human rights. Major individual and human rights. democratic consolidation 
emphasis on social rights Extension of democratic through continuing reforms in 
and freedom to practise rights especially in the the realm of civil and human 
religion. sphere of freedom to rights. Emphasis on the 
practise religion. involvement of civil society. 
Only occasional references to 
religious freedoms.
Nationalism
Very strong nationalistic Emphasis on nationalism Highly cosmopolitan in 
flavour. Conceives Turkey less pronounced. outlook; nationalistic element 
as the leader of the Muslim somewhat subdued.
world.
Religion and moral values
Very strong. Outlines Moral values and principles Takes the secular order as its 
specific recommendations emphasised. However, no basic reference point. Moral 
with special reference to explicit reference to Islam values and principles are 
Islamic values and practices. or Islamic values. Emphasis considered as broad social 
A major distinguishing on religious freedoms as norms of Turkish society 
characteristic of the party part of a broader agenda rather than specific emphasis 
programme. of individual rights and on Islamic values. Religious 
democratisation. freedom as part of a broader 
programme of 
democratisation.
Centralisation versus local government
Active role for the central Strong emphasis on Strong emphasis on 
government. Minor reference decentralisation and decentralisation and the 
to local government. delegation of authority to policy-making capacities of 
local government. local governments.
Foreign policy orientation
Strong anti-Western and Favours an active but Strong Western orientation 
anti-EU bias. Strong balanced approach to with full commitment to EU 
opposition to Israel. foreign policy. Anti-Western membership. Open to 
Favours close relations with and anti-EU attitudes compromise solutions on 
the Muslim world. rejected. No explicit refer- key foreign policy issues 
ence to Muslim countries. such as Cyprus. Follows a 
balanced approach towards 
Middle East.
Style of politics
Aggressive, assertive and Defensive and subdued tone. Emphasis on dialogue and 
confident tone. Frequent use consensus-building. Tends to 
of populist rhetoric. characterise itself as 
‘Conservative Democrats’ and 
defines itself increasingly as a 
party of the ‘centre’.
Source: Author’s compilation.
the emphasis shifted to the extension of religious freedoms within the
boundaries of the existing secular order. The FP was much more market-
friendly in its approach to economic policy and much more supportive of
developing close relations with the European Union. Even the FP, however,
could not escape from legal closure, which, in part, reflected the author-
itarian bias of the Turkish state (see Table 7.2). The outcome of this
decision was to generate a massive internal debate within the party between
the ‘modernisers’ and the ‘traditionalists’, leading to fragmentation. The
result was the emergence of two separate political parties, with the
modernisers constituting the backbone of the newly founded the AKP.
Looking back, it is noteworthy that the degree of intra-party debate was
much stronger in the late 1990s in the FP than in the older, more leader-
dominated parties of the centre-right and the centre-left.
State policies and disciplines were not alone in triggering a process of
fragmentation and transformation. Certainly, a discursive change among
Islamist intellectuals and civil society organisations was also in evidence,
which helped the ‘modernisers’. Important civil society organisations such
as major business association, the Independent Industrialists and Business-
men’s Association (MÜSÏAD), which had provided the backbone of the
RP and represented a moderating force within the movement, underwent
a significant change in outlook by the end of the decade. MÜSÏAD began
to place much more emphasis on the theme of democratisation, the exten-
sion of civil and human rights and integration with Europe. Similarly, the
discourse of Islamist intellectuals in Turkey has been undergoing a parallel
transformation leading to their increasing embrace of the liberal democratic
norms and values.4
Naturally this brings us to the increasingly important role the EU plays
in shaping the preferences of leading political actors, including the
Islamists, long before the crucial Helsinki decision of December 1999 at
which the European Union’s Council of Ministers granted Turkey candi-
date country status. Even the RP when it came to office agreed to operate
within the boundaries of the newly signed Customs Union agreement with
the EU. Certainly, the RP’s successors were much more positive in their
attitudes towards the EU, increasingly seeing the EU as a necessary safe-
guard against the long-established state elites and as a vehicle to consolidate
their position in society.5 The fact that the EU did not particularly object
to the closure of the RP, but was more critical when it came to the 
closure of the FP, provided important signals both to the state elites and
to Islamist politicians themselves. Notable decisions taken in Europe such
as the decision by the European Court of Human Rights to endorse the
closure of the RP and, more recently, the banning in France by the French
government of wearing headscarves in public places, have had further
conditioning and boundary-setting effects on the range of permissible
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Table 7.2 Major turning points in defining the space for, and boundaries of,
political action for Islamist political parties in Turkey
Internal External
9 October 1996
Reactions of US and Europe to the
foreign policy of the coalition
government of the RP and the DYP,
which appeared to take a strong anti-
Western stance.
23 June 2001
Increased concerns by the European
media over the closure of the more
moderate FP because of the
implications for democratisation in
Turkey and the future of Turkey–EU
relations.
31 June 2001
Approval of RP’s Closure by European
Court of Human Rights.
10 February 2004
French government prohibits the
headscarf, conceived of as a symbol of
Political Islam, in French schools.
10 December 2004
Closure of Belgian Radical Party,
Vlaams Blook.
30 June 2004
Application of AKP to the EPP for
membership.
28 January 2005
EPP gives observer status to AKP.
10 November 2005
The Decision of European Court of
Human Rights endorsing the official
position of the Turkish State involving
the ban on the wearing of headscarf in
public places, resulting in the rejection
of the application by Leyla Şahin, a
student from Istanbul University who
wanted to attend the university with a
headscarf.
27 March 1994
Significant increase in the votes of 
RP in local elections (19 per cent 
of the vote) recording victories in 
major metropolitan centres such as 
Ankara and Istanbul.
24 December 1995
Victory of RP in general elections. RP
emerged as the leading party, but was
unable to form a majority government.
28 June 1995
RP-DYP (True Path Party) coalition
government established under the
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.
28 February 1997
‘Postmodern coup’ and the forced




Merve Kavakçı’s attempt to attend the
opening ceremony of the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey wearing
a headscarf, thereby violating a basic
constitutional principle.
May 2000
FP Congress and emergence of division
within party over the candidacy of




Foundation of the new party, AKP.
3 November 2002
Victory of AKP in the general elections
by acquiring 34.8 per cent of the vote,
which enabled it to form a single party
government with a comfortable
majority.
Source: Author’s compilation.
to restrict the use of religious symbols in public spaces and tougher action
taken against radical right-wing parties will inevitably influence the domain
of action of Islamist politics in Turkey.
The principal bases of the AKP’s electoral success
The extraordinary electoral success of the AKP in the November 2002
general elections (winning 34.28 per cent of the votes and 363 seats in
the Parliament) following a decade of political instability featuring succes-
sive coalition governments, represented a major turning point in Turkey’s
political and economic trajectory. The explanation takes several forms.
First, the party has been extremely successful in constructing a cross-
class electoral alliance incorporating into its orbit both winners and losers
from the neo-liberal globalisation process. Business support, notably from 
small and medium-sized business units falling under the umbrella of a
major nationwide business association, constitutes a crucial element of the
AKP’s electoral support. Second, there is the strong track record of the
AKP’s predecessors at the municipal government level. Third, the failures
of the established conventional parties of centre-right and centre-left in
achieving sustained and equitable economic growth, avoiding damaging
financial crises and tackling pervasive corruption also paved the way for
the AKP’s unprecedented electoral success. In spite of its Islamist roots
and a natural association in terms of its leadership and core bases of
political support with the Welfare and the Virtue Parties, the AKP has
nevertheless managed to present itself as a new face with a claim to the
very centre of Turkish politics. Hence it was able to form a broad electoral
coalition.
Explaining the rise of the AKP is not difficult, but will the party be able
to consolidate its power and establish itself as a major force in Turkish
politics for several years to come? Clearly, an adequate answer to this ques-
tion requires a systematic and critical analysis of the AKP government’s
performance, notably in the economic realm. Up to now, our assessment
in this context is quite favourable, though with certain reservations; and
no major setbacks are expected until the next general elections, at least,
which are likely to be held in November 2007.
There is no doubt that the financial and economic crisis of 2001, which
has been the deepest crisis that Turkey has experienced in its recent 
history and which produced negative repercussions on all segments of
Turkish society – rich and poor, educated and non-educated, urban and
rural – had a devastating impact on the electoral fortunes of established
political parties in Turkey.6 An indication of the magnitude of the crisis
is provided by the fact the growth rate was −7.4 per cent, while per capita
GNP declined from US$3,095 to US$2,261 during the course of 2001
and unemployment increased by one million.7 Clearly, the three parties
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that saw a collapse in their electoral support were the parties that made
up the coalition government that had come into office after the April 1999
elections and, ironically, can be credited with unintentionally paving 
the way for some of Turkey’s recent economic and political reforms. The
leading party in the coalition government, the Democratic Left Party 
(the DSP) led by Bülent Ecevit experienced a total collapse. Similarly, the
Nationalist Action Party (the MHP) and the Motherland Party (the ANAP)
also experienced dramatic declines in their electoral base. Indeed, by the
time of the next general election in November 2002 none of the three
members of the coalition government was able to reach the 10-per-cent
threshold of the vote, and after 1999 they were effectively excluded from
participation in parliamentary politics. The True Path party (DYP), which
was yet another party that was not in government in the years 1999 to
2002 but nevertheless had been a significant political force in the 1990s,
also found itself relegated to the sidelines. Centre-left parties were penalised
for failing to protect the interests of the poor and the underprivileged,
and centre-right parties suffered, in addition, from their association with
widespread corruption.
The AKP, as a new force, capitalised on the situation and presented
itself to the electorate as a progressive force that could bring benefits from
the positive aspects of economic globalisation, based on active participa-
tion and competition in the global market. At the same time, the AKP’s
approach indicated a genuine concern with issues in social justice to do
with the distribution of material benefits and extension of individual 
rights and freedoms. Compared to its rivals, in particular the CHP, the
AKP appeared to be forward-looking and reformist, rather like a European-
style social democratic party of the ‘third way’. With its emphasis on 
the benefits of the market, the need to reform the state in the direction
of a post-developmental regulatory model, commitments to multicultur-
alism and social justice and the extension of religious freedoms, and
disposition in favour of EU membership, the AKP made the CHP look
inward-oriented and conservative, judged by European standards.8 The
CHP did have the advantage of not being in government or, even in parlia-
ment in 1999–2002, and so it, too, could try to present itself as a new
face. But it could not get rid of a heavily nationalistic and statist orien-
tation, and its attachment to a rigid version of secularism alienated it
from significant segments of Turkish society that favoured an extension
of religious rights and freedoms within the boundaries of a secular state.
All things considered, the AKP benefited from the absence of a power-
ful rival. The continuing absence of a genuine alternative from either the
right or the left with the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and
the new parameters within which Turkish politics operates may help to
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The Turkish counterpart to Christian democracy?
The emergence of the AKP as the dominant force in Turkish politics in
the elections of November 2002 also represented a turning point in
Turkey–EU relations.10 Here was a new party with strong Islamist roots
but nevertheless far more moderate and centrist in terms of outlook than
its predecessors. Even more interesting, the party presented itself as an
active and vocal supporter of EU membership. Indeed, once in office it
pursued the EU-related reform agenda with a far greater degree of consist-
ency and commitment than had the previous coalition government. The
AKP has now established itself as the dominant component of the pro-
EU coalition. This has contributed towards the development of a sizeable
pro-Turkey coalition within the European Union itself.
The AKP is a broad-based political movement with a pragmatic ideology.
The fact that leading figures in the party as well as its core electoral support
have previously been associated with the Islamist parties at first generated
considerable scepticism among secular elements of the Turkish state and
society, as well as the international community. But it soon became clear
that the party was more moderate than its predecessors (see Table 7.1).
Certainly it has a strong conservative streak, with a major emphasis on
religion, morals and the need to preserve traditional values. This is mani-
fest in relation to issues concerning women’s rights and gender equality.
Indeed, the party’s own self-description is that of ‘conservative democrats’
identifying a close affinity in the process with their Christian democratic
counterparts in Western Europe.11 And the party’s electoral base is a cross-
class coalition that includes small and medium-sized enterprises who have
benefited from the neo-liberal reforms that globalisation has brought. The
fact that business is an important component of the party’s electoral base
is another attribute that naturally leads many commentators to interpret
the party as a party of the centre-right. It is also striking that the AKP
more than any other political party in Turkey has tried to forge close,
organic institutional links with its Christian Democratic counterparts in
Europe. In fact it has been granted observer status within the EPP (in
contrast, the CHP is a long-time member of the Socialist International, but
the party’s nationalistic attitude and inward-looking orientation mean its
links with the larger organisation are weak in practice). Institutionalised
links of this nature are a good example of how party politics is becoming
more globalised, and is likely to mean that a party such as the AKP will
be induced to observe international norms in order to become and remain
a member of the club.
At the same time, however, there are parallels between the AKP and
the ‘third way’ style of social democracy that has been popular in European
discourse, given the party’s apparent commitment to the principles and
values of cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, social justice and a properly
regulated market economy. A benign view is that the AKP wants to extend
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the boundaries of religious freedom and encourage religious diversity rather
than challenge the idea of secularism as a constitutional principle.
Moreover, in its policy rhetoric it seems to pay more attention to social
justice and the plight of the poorest than do Christian Democratic coun-
terparts in Western Europe, although its ability to accomplish anything
concrete in these matters is severely constrained by the financial discipline
that it has had to impose on public spending, in connection with the
IMF’s programme of support. Social democratic politicians in Europe, the
principal supporters of Turkey’s bid for EU membership, have tended to
be much more sympathetic to the AKP than to the CHP, its putative
social democratic counterpart in Turkey.
The AKP has effectively captured the ground that was previously occu-
pied by both the centre-right and the centre-left parties in Turkish politics.
It has the country’s financial and economic crisis to thank for that.
Representing a unique synthesis of reformism and conservatism, it has
been able to consolidate its power and popularity even further, both in
domestic and international circles, by displaying a mixture of pragmatism
– in terms of implementing fiscal discipline and neo-liberal economic
reforms – and radicalism, by implementing EU-related political reforms.
The result has been a mixture of economic recovery and a further opening
of the political space for democratic participation in Turkey. Evidence of
economic recovery is provided by the fact that the average growth rate
per annum over the course of the 2002–05 period emerged as 6.9 per
cent, while inflation rates fell to single-digit levels for the first time for
three decades. These trends were set in motion before the AKP came to
power, but by accelerating the momentum the party has been able to reap
much of the credit. More striking still, perhaps, has been a significant
shift of foreign policy behaviour away from a hard-line nationalistic stance
and towards a more balanced and pragmatic approach. This is clearly
evident in regard to the Cyprus problem, which has long constituted an
obstacle to Turkey’s aspirations to EU membership. The AKP government
was effectively the first government in Turkey to welcome a compromise
solution that would bring the dispute to a peaceful conclusion. A trend
towards more ‘balanced’ foreign policy behaviour was also evident in the
government’s attitude towards the US invasion of Iraq and in relations
with the United States, as well as relations with Israel and the Arab world.
Relations with all neighbouring countries have improved.
Putting the AKP experiment in broader context, what is striking is 
that Turkey’s Islamic identity had been identified by some as a source of
difference, providing an argument for exclusion from the European Union.
The typical line of argument here – drawing on Samuel Huntington’s
polarisation of East versus West – was a concern that Turkey’s true Islamic
identity would be lost sight of as the process of getting closer to acces-
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a moderate Islamist orientation has been the central political actor in
bringing secular Turkey closer to the centre of the European project.
Indeed, a seeming paradox is that moderate Islamists in Turkey have seen
the importance of EU membership for Turkey as a means of consolidating
and solidifying their own position against possible threats to them from
the hyper-secularism of the established state elites and important sections
of Turkish society. The boundaries of religious freedoms have been
expanded in the process. Hence, in a rather unexpected fashion the prospect
of European integration has become a mechanism for preserving Turkey’s
Islamic identity and making it more compatible with a secular, demo-
cratic and pluralistic political order.
With Turkey having gone through a process of radical reforms and
with the experience of the early years of the AKP government to draw
on, we are now in a stronger position to argue that the Turkish synthesis
of secularism and democracy in a predominantly Muslim setting can offer
a credible alternative to the rest of the Muslim world. An obvious qual-
ification is that the ‘secularism versus Islam’ divide and the debate over
the boundaries of secularism are still far from being resolved. And signifi-
cant elements both within the state and the society at large continue to
view the AKP’s moderate image with considerable suspicion. Indeed, the
government has by and large sidelined contentious issues such as the
wearing of headscarves by women in public spaces, so as to prevent an
increase in tension and avoid serious conflict.12 Certainly, the AKP’s own
commitment to ‘multiculturalism’ is open to question given that the party
has so far not been very receptive to the idea of extending religious rights
to Christian minorities as well as Muslim minorities such as the Alevis.
Perhaps it is fair to say that, after initial reservations, the international
community has been more receptive to the AKP government even while
serious divisions remain within Turkish society.
What is also critical in this context is that while the European Union
places a very high premium on secularism it does not offer a single blue-
print for concrete practice. Indeed, within the EU there exists a variety of
national models concerning the translation of the principle of secularism
to actual implementation. Hence, the EU has helped to push Islamists in
Turkey in a more moderate direction, by restricting the space within which
they can operate. However, this does not mean that EU membership by
itself can resolve completely the secularism–Islam divide in Turkey. The
issue will continue to arouse controversy, in Turkey and in Europe. In
Turkey there is scope to further extend religious freedoms, but progress
will depend on the ability to develop and agree upon compromise solu-
tions, without looking for some standard pattern from the EU. The fact
that the AKP government has so far been able to postpone dealing with a
controversial issue such as the headscarf issue does not mean that such
issues have gone away.
134 Ziya Öniş
Can the AKP maintain its electoral dominance?
By the end of 2004, the position of the AKP as the dominant force in
Turkish politics appeared to be secure for the foreseeable future. The deci-
sion of the European Council in December to start the process of accession
negotiations with Turkey by October 2005 was clearly a favourable devel-
opment that helped to bolster the AKP. A major setback on the EU front
in December 2004 could well have triggered a vicious circle of negative
reactions in the financial markets, leading to a serious economic down-
turn that would quite easily have undermined the comfortable standing
currently enjoyed by the AKP. It would be premature to predict that the
position still enjoyed by the AKP represents a kind of medium-term or
long-term equilibrium in Turkish politics. A number of developments both
on the domestic and external fronts could result in a political reversal.
The performance of the economy remains a critical factor. If it can continue
to grow at rates of 6 or 7 per cent per annum, then the distributional
conflicts that have been all too common in the past can be contained.
But this will require large inflows of foreign direct investment and signifi-
cant improvements in domestic savings, investment and productivity. 
The data indicate a striking increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in
the country in the post-crisis era. FDI inflows amounted to US$3.7 billion
in 2005, up from just US$1.1 billion in 2002.13 The investment climate
has improved in recent years as a result of the government’s strong 
commitment to fiscal discipline and the broadly favourable development
in relation to EU accession. Nevertheless international competition for
inwards investment will remain intense.
A low growth scenario, then, could have serious political consequences.
Furthermore the accession negotiations with the EU are likely to entail
making costly adjustments including restructuring the agricultural sector,
which accounts for 14 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and,
even more striking, still some 35 per cent of the workforce. Coming 
into line with EU standards and norms will mean implementing demand-
ing regulations. Hitherto, Turkish public opinion has been heavily in
favour of EU accession primarily because of the material benefits that are
anticipated from full membership. But if the economy falters and the
adjustment process demanded by accession negotiations imposes heavy
costs, the enthusiasm shown by significant sections of Turkish society
within and outside the business community could decline. A revitalisation
of the nationalistic and Euro-sceptic bloc in Turkey cannot be ruled out
in these circumstances. Indeed, the political contest in Turkey during the
coming years is likely to take place among the different segments of 
the centre-right involving the ‘Muslim Democrats’ and the nationalists, in
an environment where European-style social democracy still does not exist.
Signs that the electoral contest in Turkey might already be moving in this
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saw a marked improvement in the electoral fortunes of two nationalisti-
cally and Euro-sceptically inclined parties, the MHP and the DYP. The
fact is that the economic recovery that Turkey has experienced since 2001
has yet to translate into improvements in rural poverty and unemploy-
ment, especially youth unemployment. The magnitude of the problem
becomes evident from a brief inspection of the unemployment rate for the
educated youth – currently standing at 28 per cent, whereas the overall
unemployment rate is 10 per cent. Similarly, if the economy continues 
on a high-growth path, then small business is more likely to share in the
benefits, and distributional conflicts with large business units can be
avoided, but in a less dynamic economic environment small and medium-
sized business, too, may start looking around for alternative avenues of
political representation to the AKP.
In a deteriorating economic climate, then, the broad coalition that the
AKP represents could begin to crumble, especially if it is no longer able
to avoid facing up to the kind of thorny political issue of which the lifting
of the existing ban on the entry of girls with headscarves into universi-
ties is a good example. That sort of initiative might bolster its core support
but would cause serious opposition from the secular establishment. The
fault lines that separate Islamists and secularists in Turkish society have
certainly not disappeared. Indeed, whenever the AKP government has tried
to push sensitive identity-based issues on the policy agenda, the outcome
has been resistance and conflict with the secular political establishment.
Hence for the most part the approach in government has been cautious
and pragmatic. But in the course of time that could come to alienate its
core supporters. For those supporters there are alternatives: at the present
time there is the ‘Happiness Party’ (Saadet), which represents the linear
descendent of the Erbakan-style ‘National Outlook Movement’ (Milli
Görüş). This party captured just 2.5 per cent of the vote in the general
election of November 2002, but could yet take support from the AKP.
Another possibility is that nationalist parties erode the AKP’s present
dominance; they did well in the general election of April 1999, when the
ultra-nationalist MHP gained ground at the expense of the Virtue Party.
The MHP, with its special brand of nationalism and Euro-scepticism on
the one side and religious conservatism on the other, could well emerge
as a major rival to the AKP, if the different elements of the AKP’s under-
lying coalition of support begin to feel dissatisfied – for a variety of rather
different reasons – and change their party preference. The resurgence of
violence orchestrated by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and increasing
demands by the Kurds for greater political recognition may be other factors
that could contribute to a nationalistic backlash, presenting further chal-
lenges to the AKP in the coming years.
Also, we should not discard the possibility that external developments
might play a destabilising role with potentially negative consequences for
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the AKP specifically. The path towards EU membership will continue to
be an uphill struggle. Considerable divisions over membership by Turkey
remain within the EU, notwithstanding the accelerating pace and 
depth of reforms taking place in the country, and these divisions by and
large did not exist in the accession process of the new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe. By sending a relatively ambiguous and luke-
warm signal to Turkey, the EU actually renders the job of a government
committed to the implementation of EU-related reforms more difficult.
Added to this there is still the dispute over Cyprus, which could prove a
stumbling block in the accession process. Instability in Northern Iraq 
and deteriorating relations with the United States also pose challenges.
All these considerations suggest that the extraordinary success of the
‘Muslim democrats’ in the past few years does not necessarily represent
a stable equilibrium, given the fragile domestic and external context of
Turkish politics.
The broader significance of the Turkish experience
The central message of this chapter is that an Islamist political movement
can transform into a party promoting Western integration and liberal
democracy. At the same time, there is nothing inevitable about the
emergence and consolidation of liberal democracy in a predominantly
Muslim setting. The historical context matters, and the outcome depends
on the intersection of a combination of forces both domestic and external.
The case of Turkey illustrates how liberal democracy can take root and
flourish as an example of a secular state in a predominantly Muslim
setting, with the qualification that liberal democracy is still in the process
of being consolidated in Turkey. In retrospect, several factors have
contributed to the emergence of this benign development so far, in a
specific historical setting.
The constitutional order of the modern republic with its strong commit-
ment and arguably authoritarian interpretation of secularism was extremely
important in the first instance, by excluding the radical alternative of 
an Islamic state right from the very beginning. The principle of a secular
political order is a pre-condition for a liberal democratic order, although
the boundaries and the implementation of secularism in everyday life
constitute an area for political contestation. The Kemalist nation-building
project in Turkey with its own brand of secularist ideology made a posi-
tive contribution by helping to define the boundaries within which the
Islamists could operate, although it also played a repressive role in terms
of restricting the boundaries of political participation.
Representative democracy, in spite of its shortcomings, has been the
norm since 1945. There is no doubt that the Islamists in Turkey have
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the demands of the Islamists in a more moderate direction, realising 
that compromise solutions were vital for the effectiveness and very survival
of Islamists as a political force within the boundaries of the secular process.
Indeed, the learning process accelerated especially in the aftermath of the
‘February 28 Process’ – the ‘postmodern coup’ that effectively brought
about the collapse of the coalition government led by the Welfare Party
in June 1997 and the subsequent closure of the Welfare Party. This rapid
learning process was arguably at the heart of not only the AKP’s elec-
toral success but also its ability to consolidate its position after assuming
power in November 2002. Indeed, a kind of virtuous cycle appears to
have emerged in Turkey in recent years, with the democratisation of the
political regime leading to the democratisation of the Islamists themselves,
and then the Islamists, in turn, ironically taking up a key role in the
further democratisation and Europeanisation of the Turkish political
system.
Turning to the economic realm, the emergence of a significant middle
class or ‘counter-elite’ within the Islamist movement, including intellec-
tuals and businessmen as well as highly educated professionals who have
benefited from the processes of globalisation and neo-liberal economic
restructuring, have clearly helped to tilt the balance in a moderate direc-
tion. This new bourgeoisie has set its sights on enlarging the boundaries
of freedom and political participation and improving their social status
and access to state resources. An open clash with the secular establish-
ment is clearly not in their interests. Turkey’s empirical realities lend strong
support to the observation that the emergence of a strong middle class is
a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of liberal democracy.
Finally, the European Union has played and is likely to continue to
play a critical role in making Islam and liberal democracy compatible 
in Turkish setting. The role of the EU has been particularly striking in
re-shaping the outlook of the Islamists in Turkey, who increasingly came
to see the EU as a necessary safeguard for protecting their own identity
against the secular state establishment. Consequently, the Islamists or,
more recently, the Muslim Democrats have become the most vocal element
of the pro-reform or the pro-EU coalition in Turkey. The prospect of EU
membership helped to provide a common project for different elements
of the Turkish society and as a result helped to soften the fundamental
secular–Islamist divide in Turkish society.
Highlighting the importance of contextual changes inevitably suggests
that it would be misleading to think of the Turkish example as a ‘model’
that can easily be transplanted to the Arab Middle East. It is equally
wrong to argue that the Turkish experience holds no relevance for the
Arab Middle East, given that the elites there, for a variety of historical
reasons – the Ottoman legacy of imperial rule, the way that secularism
has been put into practice during the modern Republican era and Turkey’s
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single-minded orientation towards the West – have tended to distance
themselves and have been unenthusiastic about the idea of a ‘Turkish
model’. Both Turkey and the region as a whole are in flux and under-
going a process of deep-seated transformation, so past perceptions may
provide only limited guidance to future developments.14
So the relevance of the Turkish experience as an example (it is not an
exportable model) will depend both on the nature and speed of the polit-
ical liberalisation process in the Middle East region and on Turkey’s own
performance in economic and political reform, and on smooth transition
to EU membership. Certainly the more enclosed and authoritarian regimes
of the Middle East and Central Asia are likely to visualise the Turkish
experience as an existentialist threat and may well seek to distance them-
selves from this ongoing experiment as much as possible. In contrast,
regimes that are in the process of being liberalised are likely to be more
receptive to the Turkish experience. Interestingly, therefore, the greater
the degree of democratisation in the region, the greater will be the rele-
vance of the Turkish experience, which in turn should help to contribute
to the economic development and democratisation of the region even
further. Added to this, the fact that the recent ‘Europeanisation’ of Turkish
foreign policy has resulted in a more balanced foreign policy behaviour
towards Israel and the Arab states is also likely to increase the receptivity
of policy-makers and intellectuals to the ongoing transformation process
that Turkey has been experiencing.
Notes
1 See Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000, and on the historical context of Turkey’s
experience with secularism see Toprak, 2005. A good discussion of the distinc-
tion between secularism as a constitutional principle and the specific secularist
ideology of the Turkish state is Davison, 2003.
2 For an optimistic and yet qualified assessment of the compatibility of Islam
and democracy in Turkey see Heper, 1997.
3 On the nature of civil society activism and the role of intellectuals see Keyman
and Içduygu, 2005.
4 See in this context the important study by Daği, 2004.
5 On the need to take account of the role of the EU in transforming Islamist
politics in Turkey see Öniş, 2001, Taniyici, 2003 and Toprak, 2005.
6 The economic crises are discussed in Öniş and Rubin, 2003.
7 The key macro indicators are taken from Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (State
Planning Organisation), Temel Ekonomik Göstergeler (Main Economic Indica-
tors), Ankara, various issues.
8 On the role of the AKP see Ayoob, 2004 and Öniş and Keyman, 2003.
9 For more on the party system and the main parties see Heper and Rubin,
2002.
10 On the November 2002 general elections see Öniş and Keyman, 2003.
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12 The only exception has been the introduction, in May 2004, of the Higher
Education Bill, which extended opportunities for graduates of religious
secondary schools (Imam Hatip Liseleri) to attend university. The government
withdrew the proposal following strong opposition.
13 Treasury data. Online. Available www.hazine.gov.tr/stat/yabser/dyyt.xls
(accessed January 2006).
14 For evidence of a recent shift in perceptions regarding Turkey in the Arab
Middle East, see Jung, 2005.
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8 Globalising party politics 
in Africa
The influence of party-based 
democracy networks
M. A. Mohamed Salih
Introduction
African political party-based democracy is an extension of Africa’s colonial
and imperial legacy and post-independence incorporation into global policy
agendas, party-to-party and parliamentary partnerships and networks.
Paradoxically, despite myriad global influences, party-based democracies
have retained much of Africa’s nascent quasi-polyarchical traits, charac-
terised by ethnic, religious and regional cleavages, political patronage 
and weak internal party democracy. Specifically, this chapter compares
and contrasts the accession of the major political parties in Ghana, 
Kenya and Malawi to global party-based democratic networks, and 
their influence on political programmes and policy orientations in an era 
of neo-liberal globalisation. The chapter also examines which aspects of
African party-based democracy have, and which have not, been global-
ised. The view that Africa’s parties oscillate between globalisation and
localisation contradicts the idea that African political parties, and indeed
African political institutions more generally, are under threat of being
‘universalised’ as a consequence of the ascendancy of globalised party-
based democracy.
The emergence of political parties in Africa
African political parties emerged in the non-democratic setting of colo-
nial rule. A reformed colonial state after 1945 sought to include Africans
in the administration of their affairs. It created an educated political 
elite experienced in operating Western-style political institutions. And
Africans, under strict political surveillance, were allowed to establish polit-
ical parties in order to oversee the machinery of government when their
countries attained independence. In the urge to leave behind political insti-
tutions similar to those of the West, the departing colonial governments
exported to Africa their particular versions of parliamentary government,














































In practice, due to the speed with which developments unfolded, numerous
ethnically based parties appeared. They were encouraged by colonial rule
because ethnic groups offered organised groups that were instantly avail-
able for political party formation (Mohamed Salih, 2003: 2). However,
at that time the significance of ethnic divisions was secondary to the
synthetic nationalism whereby all the parties remained focused on attaining
the cherished goal of independence.
Political parties were established, assumed the structures and func-
tions of Western-style political parties and, in most places, managed to
see their countries through independence to self-rule. In some countries,
it took the emerging African elites less than a decade to go from estab-
lishing political parties to contesting elections and subsequently governing
their countries. However, in less than a decade of attaining independence,
and with the waning of the nationalism that was a short-lived conse-
quence of decolonisation, sub-nationalist and ethnic politics began to rise
(Sithole, 1959). Moreover, fuelled by the cold war and internal divisions,
party-based democracy was the first victim of the elite’s political excesses.
In some countries, the severe ethnic cleavages that fuelled sub-nationalism
led to civil wars, liberation movements and political instability.1 These
developments were the greatest obstacle to party-based democracy; author-
itarian regimes stepped in and banned political parties, curbed trade union
activities and civil liberties, and in some places introduced constitution-
ally sanctioned one-party states.
The colonialists viewed political parties as hostile, despite the fact that
some examples had joined alliances with colonial rule, participating in
constituent assemblies that were considered an extension of colonial rule
(Mohamed Salih, 2003: 3). To that extent, the constituent assemblies had
restricted powers, often overruled by the Governor General, and were
allowed to debate only those issues that posed no security threat to the
colonial state. For instance, in most British colonies Africans comprised
only a small fraction of the membership of the constituent assemblies,
which were also members of the Empire Parliamentary Association (Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 1976).
Certainly, African party-based democracy was born of the colonial state
coloured with the distinct hybrid of African political culture and Western
political thought. This meant that, on the one hand, the emergent polit-
ical parties championed independence and were considered hostile to
colonial rule and, on the other, adopted the dominant Western party-
based democracy and its ideological perspective of the time. There are
two significant implications of these origins of African party-based democ-
racy. First, the colonial era had sown the seeds of globalised party-based
democracy even before the emergence of the current wave of globalisa-
tion. It is therefore relevant to the contention that developing countries’
globalised political institutions have their antecedence in the colonial and
imperial expansions. Second, the consequences of neo-liberal globalisation
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for national political institutions and specifically political parties now do
not represent a simple rupture in political party development. Instead there
are twin processes of continuity and change, informed by the new global
context of political development.
Until the early 1990s, most African parties subscribed to one of two
dominant global ideological trends: socialism/communism and a vaguely
defined ‘liberal democratic’ form of government. Admittedly, there were
only a few African party-based democracies. For much of the period 
two-thirds of the continent endured authoritarian one-party states, mili-
tary socialism or military dictatorships. With the end of the cold war,
however, party-based democracy acquired prominence at the global level,
with multi-partyism becoming synonymous with democracy. In Africa, the
resurgence of multi-party democracy during the 1990s was a result of 
the triumph of the neo-liberal paradigm over various forms of authori-
tarianism (Horowitz and Plattner, 1993). ‘Institutionalism’ became the
dominant force informing economic and political liberalisation, as inter-
national financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF
preached the primacy of ‘institutionalism’ and, in the case of economic
governance, the market and New Policy Management (NPM). In respect
of political liberalisation, the rule of law and good governance (Desai and
Redfern, 1995) became the driving force behind the enshrining of the
ethos of global democratic governance.
If for many people in Africa economic globalisation has become synony-
mous with economic liberalisation, free trade and market principles, then
political liberalisation has become synonymous with democratisation, often
being directly linked with the prevalence of multi-party democracy, hence
party-based democracy. Globalised party-based democracy in Africa
cannot, therefore, be isolated from global developments and the influences
that have shaped its structure and policy orientations. In particular,
political liberalisation has invoked a series of political reform programmes,
which in most countries has included constitutional reforms to allow the
formation of political parties and civic associations. This has opened up
the political space for electoral competition and has reformed statutory,
penal and administrative structures that had once impeded political activ-
ities outside the confines of the ruling political party. Examples include
lifting the ban on forming parties outside the ruling party. These political,
legal and administrative reforms extended civil liberties previously curbed
under authoritarian one-party regimes, and allowed the emergence of
autonomous civil society and non-governmental organisations.
The following explores how political parties in Ghana, Kenya and
Malawi have reacted to neo-liberal globalisation – in particular, how they
translated their party manifestos into policy orientations informed by or
subservient to the neo-liberal global paradigm. This means examining
concrete examples of party principles, programmes and practice, rather
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future. It will underscore variations in political party responses in lieu 
of the economic and political factors that have informed their response
to global policy agendas, including democracy. Finally, it will help us
determine what aspects of African party-based democracy have not been
globalised.
Which aspects of African party-based democracies have 
been globalised?
The synoptic working definition of ‘globalised party’ informing this chapter
refers to an emergent globally informed quasi-polyarchy where political
parties subscribe to broadly defined party-based democratic principles. 
It refers to political party policies and programmes that are greatly influ-
enced by global, economic and social policy agendas, thereby contributing
to closer integration into neo-liberal economic policies, under the influ-
ence of global economic governance institutions such as the World Bank
and the IMF. Finally, it means an increasing connectivity and integration
into global party-to-party and parliamentary partnerships and networks
that advance and promote party-based democracy worldwide.
An emergent globally informed quasi-polyarchy
‘Polyarchy’2 refers to regimes that have been substantially popularised and
liberalised, are highly inclusive and are open extensively to public contes-
tation. A near-polyarchy can be relatively inclusive but with greater
restrictions on public contestation than a full polyarchy, or it might pro-
vide opportunities for public contestation comparable to those of a full
polyarchy but is somewhat less inclusive (Dahl, 1971: 5–8). In this sense,
many of the world’s democracies are, in fact, quasi-polyarchical: they fall
short of the ideals of democracy. The reference to quasi-polyarchy in the
African context is significant not only because it recognises that there 
are various degrees of adherence to the democratic ideals accepted as
characteristics of global party-based democracy but also because it high-
lights two main possibilities: first, that polyarchy is a welcome development
in countries where it signifies a move away from hegemonic regimes;
second, that in countries without recent experience of competitive politics,
the transformation of hegemonic regimes into polyarchy is likely to remain
a slow process, measured in generations (Dahl, 1971: 47). The relevance
of this to Africa (and developing countries more generally) is that their
democracies will exhibit certain characteristics unique to their political
culture; and attempts to reproduce and export blueprints of Western
democracies are likely to be unrealistic, and hardly practicable.
Without exception political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi have
subscribed to the overall ethos of polyarchy, both in terms of policy
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orientations and, to a large extent, in practice. The characteristics that
inform their political party programmes, policies and manifestos are:
[the] freedom to form and join organisations; freedom of expression;
right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political leaders to
compete for support; right of political leaders to compete for votes;
alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; and insti-
tutions for making government policies depend on votes and other
expressions of preference.
(Dahl, 1971: 5)
However, their democracies lean towards quasi-polyarchy even as the
parties have generally understood the requirements demanded by democ-
racy’s rules of the game and the various conditionalities imposed by the
strictures of global governance. Opposition political parties, noting that
governments do not always abide by democratic rules, demand full com-
pliance with the ethos of polyarchy. Unfortunately, once in government
even the former opposition parties have behaved in ways more reminis-
cent of quasi-polyarchical and at times exhibit non-democratic tendencies.
While it is very easy for opposition parties to preach reform and ask bold
questions, once in power they find themselves constrained by policy
environments in which they must respond to ever-increasing demands with
only meagre resources that governments have at their disposal.
African political parties acquiesce in quasi-polyarchy not only because
of external pressures exerted by global governance, democracy and human
rights activists but also because versions of polyarchy offer a safeguard
against dictatorship and a return to authoritarian rule. Its ethos opens up
the political space for competitive politics, which thus offers the possi-
bility of competing in elections and even governing if they become the
majority party in parliament. Little wonder, then, that globalised party-
based democracy in Africa is largely quasi-polyarchical, as in many other
democracies around the world.
Globally influenced political party programmes
African political parties, with the exception of a few socialist- or Marxist-
oriented parties, have embraced the major tenets of ‘liberal democracy’
as reflected in their party programmes, manifestos, charters and either
new or rewritten constitutions. The principles of free contestation and
participation in the political process meant that the need for ‘liberalising’
the political space was:
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2 demanded by political parties banned for decades from participating
in politics or newly formed political parties that offered themselves
as alternatives to the single ruling political party;
3 required by global governance, democracy and human rights activism,
bilateral or multilateral donor conditionality and global economic
governance under the influence and insistence of the IMF and the
World Bank in instilling the ethos of good or better governance and
political liberalisation on a global scale.
These developments have shaped the political programmes and policies of
the major political parties across Africa. To illustrate how neo-liberal
global economic and social policy orientations have influenced govern-
ments in the 1990s and the political parties’ responses, the examples of
Ghana, Kenya and Malawi will be cited.
The party composition of Ghana’s parliament since the commencement
of the Fourth Republic in 1993 is shown in Table 8.1. The distribution
of votes illustrates strong competition between Jerry Rawling’s National
Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Ghana
is evidently a two-party system. Since the 1993 elections, parliamentary
discussion and political elite debate has revolved around how the parties
could best respond to the economic policy reforms subscribed to by the
global finance institutions. There have been no dissenting voices within
the ranks of the two main parties, and no demands for government to
pursue alternative policies (Aryeetey, Harrigan and Nissanke, 2000). 
The NDC has been the champion of policy reform and earned a special
place with the global finance institutions for rigorously implementing the
‘globally’ framed economic reform agenda.
However, with the economic slowdown early in the 1990s, the NPP,
which formed the backbone of the opposition, gained popular support,
accusing the NDC of corruption and an inability to implement the eco-
nomic reform agenda diligently. In government the NPP is now pursu-
ing an economic policy traditionally associated with the NDC and will
perhaps succeed where the NDC has failed. But because no party offers a
radically different policy that could pose a serious challenge to the general
direction of Ghana’s economic reform, it is issues of human rights and the
rule of law that have become the focus for policy differences and political
contestation. The NDC stresses the primacy of food, shelter, clothing, edu-
cation and stability as the cornerstone of its human rights policy owing to
its socialist ideological orientation (in fact, it is the only Ghanaian party
to belong to the Socialist International). The NPP manifesto, in contrast,
emphasises the enjoyment of human rights to their full extent and respect
for the rule of law, rather than social justice. The competition between
different visions of ‘fundamental human rights’ and ‘social justice’ is shared
by a much more global debate between liberals and social democrats, but
it has particular importance for the NPP because it distances the party
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































from the abysmal human rights record of the NDC and its association 
with Rawling’s Military Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)
government (1981–92).
Unlike Ghana, which has undergone two unrestricted multi-party elec-
tions and where the NPP was able to replace the former incumbent in
power (the NDC), Kenya has undergone only one unrestricted multi-party
election since independence in December 1963. The electoral victory of the
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the 2002 elections, after a bitter
struggle by national and global democracy and human rights activists,
ended the 40 years of one-party rule by the Kenya African National Union
(KANU). Table 8.2 shows the results of the three multi-party elections that
have taken place during the post-political reform period. The elections of
1992 and 1997 were fraudulent, unlike the 2002 election, which was
relatively free and fair.
However, the NARC’s election pledge was centred on pursuing economic
policies different from those of KANU. It proposed to revive the economy
by a more faithful implementation of IMF and World Bank policies.3
Although the NARC comprised a coalition of 14 large and small polit-
ical parties with different ideological and policy orientations, in government
it has continued the economic liberalisation initiated during the closing
years of KANU supremacy, including the removal of import licensing,
price and foreign exchange controls. In retrospect, it is clear that the IMF
and World Bank’s suspension of financial support to Kenya in early 2001
– which was in response to the KANU government’s failure to implement
an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme, curb corruption and
privatise key inefficient economic sectors – dealt the ruling party a deci-
sive blow. It created a sense of paralysis in the implementation of the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Programme and Economic and
Public Sector Reform, which the international financial institutions had
previously promised to support. In the same year, Kenya experienced a
serious economic recession. Kenya’s GDP actually shrank by 0.3 per cent,
almost reminiscent of the negative growth rates of the mid-1990s.
In common with Kenya and Ghana, Malawi’s transition to multi-party
democracy came about as a result of popular struggles supported by the
proactive solidarity of global democracy networks and activists. President
Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the chair of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP),
which governed the one-party state for 30 years, accepted the 1993 refer-
endum that rejected the continuation of single-party rule and opted for
multi-party democracy. The first multi-party election took place in 1994
and the MCP, the incumbent party, lost (see Table 8.3).
The political programmes and manifestos of Malawi’s major political
parties and coalitions that have supplied the three governments since 1994
have all been informed by the dominant neo-liberal economic paradigm.
They are almost identical to those pronounced by the governing and

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































opposition political parties in Ghana and Kenya. Thus the UDF and MCP
in 1994, 1999 and 2004 offered similar approaches to trade liberalisa-
tion, privatisation, public sector reforms, democracy and the rule of law,
good governance (often dubbed ‘anti-corruption strategies’), economic
policy reforms, poverty reduction strategies, sustainable development, 
and gender auditing among others. However, while remaining aware of
the global context within which Malawi operates, the parties in govern-
ment have continued to pursue policy implementation with one eye on
the need to win public support and retain or improve their electability
(Englund, 2002).
In all three countries, what is significant here is not whether the parties
act on their electoral pledges and manifestos – nowhere do parties imple-
ment in full all their electoral pledges – but the election pledges and party
manifestos that have been made and that do inform the conduct of govern-
ment. In government, African parties operate under conditions of abject
poverty, high hopes and very limited resources, which can easily stifle
their good intentions to act on their promises; nevertheless, there is a
remarkable convergence in terms of the policies and programmes – the
dearth of alternatives and absence of choice – that they offer the electorate
in the economic policy domain.
African parties’ integration into global parliamentary and 
party networks
Global democracy networks comprise two types: parliamentary and party-
to-party. Both are paying-member networks – different from many of the
international democracy assistance institutions that, like the German polit-
ical foundations, tend to operate on a fraternal basis. Global party-to-party
networks espouse direct relationships between their partner institutions
and are open only to those political parties that share a similar ideological
orientation. This places them outside the recent trends among some democ-
racy assistant institutions to encourage co-operation among all parties
with a view to overcoming the suspicions and hostilities found in deeply
divided societies.
Global parliamentary democracy networks
The IPU is by far the oldest global parliamentary lobby network in the
world. It was established in 1889, during the height of colonial expan-
sion, as the International Organisation of Parliaments of Sovereign States,
and its members today include 140 parliaments. IPU is made-up of six
geopolitical groups (Africa, Asia–Pacific, Arabia, Eurasia, Latin America
and the 12-Plus Group consisting of Western and Eastern European
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parliamentary hearings and organising international events. Although some
members of the IPU do not adhere to liberal democracy (China, Cuba
and Cambodia), in 1997 it adopted the Universal Declaration on
Democracy.4 Although not actively engaged in fomenting agitation for
democracy, the IPU organises activities in support of the democratic process
once it is under way, and these reflect its adherence to the Universal
Declaration on Democracy.
The IPU Africa group consists of 39 members; Chad, Eritrea, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Somalia and Swaziland are not members. The parlia-
ments of Kenya and Ghana are active members of the IPU, currently
represented by parliamentarians from the governing political parties. The
IPU organises pan-African and sub-regional symposia on subjects such as
representative democracy, international peace and security, sustainable
development, human rights, education, science and culture, and women
in parliament. The stated objective of these is to aid democracy and
improve the quality of governance as well as enhancing worldwide parlia-
mentary dialogue and peace through the establishment of representative
democracy.
Of particular relevance to Ghana, Kenya and Malawi is the CPA,5 which
is the second oldest global democracy network, after the IPU. Established
in 1911 as the Empire Parliamentary Association, the CPA’s members
consist of 170 national, state, provincial and territorial parliaments, with
about 15,000 parliamentarians. The CPA mission is to advance parlia-
mentary democracy, enhance knowledge and understanding of democratic
governance, and build an informed parliamentary community able to
deepen the Commonwealth’s democratic commitment and to further 
co-operation among its parliaments and legislatures.
There is a distinct African group within the Commonwealth called the
Pan-African Commonwealth Parliamentary Group, which co-operates 
with the Pan-African Parliament.6 The governing political parties in 
Ghana, Kenya and Malawi are members. Generally, the new global context
of development influences the activities of global parliamentary networks.
Although parliamentary networks are mainly interested in improving 
the capabilities of parliamentarians and the capacity of parliaments, their
activities also influence political parties. This is not only because parlia-
mentarians represent political parties and the electorates who voted for
them but also because the strong presence of parties constituting the
governing majority has a strong bearing on government policy and pro-
grammes as well as adherence to democratic principles.7 With their histor-
ical antecedence and current functions, the global parliamentary networks
represent an element of continuity from colonialism and imperialism to
the current developments of the globalising world in which they operate.
Therefore they have to cope with this dual heritage and the new oppor-
tunities it offers as part of the global governance regime.
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Party-to-party partnerships and networks
The accession of African political parties to global-party-to-party networks
is a new phenomenon dating back less than two decades. It is a product
of the end of the cold war and the ideological schism between East and
West, the post-1990s transition to democracy and the opening up of the
political space for proactive transnational political, economic and social
networks. The subsequent evolution and maturation of these networks has
signalled the end of the state monopoly of inter-state relations and the
emergence of non-state actors such as civil society and non-governmental
organisations and political party networks.
African Christian Democrats Union (ACDU), part of the International
Christian Democrats Union (ICDU), is an association that consists of
Conservatives, Christian Democrats or so-called ‘like-minded’ political
parties of the centre and centre-right. ACDU activities are attended by
parliamentarians representing their political parties or the youth troika 
of the member parties. Ghana, for example, is represented by the New
Patriotic Party’s (NPP) Youth Wing (NPPY) and the Ghana Liberal
Students Association (GHALSA), Malawi by the Malawi Congress Party
(MCP), the United Democratic Front Youth (UDFY), and Kenya by the
Democratic Party (DP). The youth element is particularly significant for
recruitment, internalising democratic values and preparing the next gener-
ation of democrats.
In August 1997, eleven African liberal youth organisations founded the
Dakar-based Democrat Union of Africa/African Dialogue Group (DUA/
ADG) as part of the International Democrat Union (IDU). IDU member
parties organised regional networks, most of which came into existence
as new democracies established during the 1990s.8 The DUA/ADG pro-
vides a forum for parties with similar convictions to meet and exchange
views and experiences on matters of policy and organisation, so that 
they can learn from each other, act together and establish contacts. More
importantly, they agree on common positions to influence the direction
of global policies once they are in power and speak with one voice 
to promote democracy and centre-right policies around the globe. Ghana’s
NPP, Kenya’s DP and Malawi’s MCP are members of the IDU. While 
the NPP and the MPC are the main opposition parties in Ghana and
Malawi, respectively, the DP of Kenya is a member of the governing
NARC. Thus parties that share similar convictions have the opportunity
to meet and exchange ideas regardless of whether or not they are in
government.
The Socialist International is a worldwide organisation of social demo-
cratic, socialist and labour parties. Currently, it brings together 162
political parties and organisations from all continents. Twenty-three
African political parties are Socialist International members (19 full
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member, Kenya, which has more leftist political parties than any other
African country, has no representation there. For the sake of comparison,
the Green Party Federation of Africa is a member of the Global Green
Federation, which consists of 800 green parties worldwide. There are 15
African Green Party members, including the Mazingira Green Party of
Kenya. The general principles that bring Greens together include economic
wisdom, social justice, participatory democracy, sustainability and respect
for diversity and non-violence. Although the African Greens are yet to
exert significant influence on politics in Africa, they have considerable
solidarity with the global Green movement and its ecological campaigns
against oil and mineral extraction activities, industrial pollution and rain-
forest logging, and its campaign for the protection of biodiversity
(Mohamed Salih, 1999). However, such support has yet to translate into
parliamentary seats in any of the three countries.
The Liberal International is an association of parties, groups, co-operating
organisations and individuals that support and accept the liberal princi-
ples aimed at fostering the growth of a democratic society based on per-
sonal liberty, personal responsibility and social justice. The organisation
provides financial and human resources for the co-operation and inter-
change of information between member organisations and men and women
of all countries who accept these principles. Malawi’s UDF is a member
and it also belongs to the London-based African Liberal Network (ALN),
established in 2003 by 17 African liberal political parties. It is paradox-
ical that, although the policies adopted by most African governing polit-
ical parties have a neo-liberal economic orientation they do not openly
declare themselves liberal because they fear the criticism it will attract from
their political opponents. However, the UDF exceptionally does declare its
adoption of liberal international principles, without which Liberal
International would not accept it as a member. Similar rules on formal
acceptance of the organisation’s basic constitution apply to the other global
party-to-party networks.
Arguably, Africa’s political party integration into global parliamentary
and party-to-party networks illustrates that the emergence of a third gener-
ation of African party-based democracy is now an accepted fact (the first
generation being the colonial and the second a mix of one-party systems
and restricted democracies of the 1990s). This generation is more confi-
dent and open to the influence of global party-to-party networks and the
globalised democratic values they propagate. At least two scenarios might
be envisaged. On the one hand, global parliamentary associations and
political party networks, initiated by the longer established democracies
will influence further the development of party-based democracy in Africa,
by persuasion, training and exchange of ideas about strategy and policy.
The ultimate outcome of these networks and interactions could be the
creation of a global space for improved dispensation of democratic
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values. On the other hand, there is the view that the continuing presence
of powerful global democratic trends and universally inspired values could
deprive Africans of the opportunity to devise their own pathways to, and
models of, democracy independent of such external influences. The writer’s
belief is that the main contribution of global democracy networks currently
is the incarnation of a gentler political modernisation agenda under the
guise of modernisation revisionism and a dominant neo-liberal paradigm
(Mohamed Salih, 2001). Another outcome of externally driven globalised
party-based democracy is the widening of the gulf between elite-dominated
political institutions – which means the political parties and the parlia-
ments – and the masses of illiterate African citizens, who will come to feel
increasingly alienated by the conduct of their own society’s political elite.
The result of such a situation could well be widespread political apathy
and, even, political withdrawal.
Which aspects of African party-based democracies have not 
been globalised?
The dialectical ‘other’ of what is globalised refers to what is not global-
ised about African party-based democracy. Here, three aspects stand out:
the ethnic nature of political parties; the persistence of scaled-up patron–
client networks; and the absence of internal party democracy.
The ethnic nature of African political parties
Generally, African political parties remain ethnic in nature, created, organ-
ised and dominated by an educated elite, who exploit them to contest
elections and maintain control over the resources, personnel and the policy
of government (Mohamed Salih, 2001; Posner, 2004). Two character-
istics are common to the majority of African party-based democracies.
First, the political parties tend to be elitist, based on non-democratic struc-
tures and organisation, with irregular contacts between the leaders and
their electoral base. Contacts among party committee members are super-
ficial due to the top leadership’s control over party management. The
educational gap between party leadership and functionaries also inhibits
party members from voicing their concerns or having their concerns taken
seriously. Political contact with the electorate happens only periodically,
with the highest level of intensity during election campaigns.
Second, the majority of party members are politically illiterate (not
aware of the ideological bases on which modern political parties are
founded, that is liberal, social democratic or republican) and lack experi-
ence of how democratic institutions operate. In the circumstances, ethnicity
provides a strong ideological foundation based on ethnic systems of belief,
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If, globally, political parties are institutional mechanisms for capturing
and maintaining power, and elections are the institutional mechanisms
through which parties compete for power, then Africa’s parties are no
different. They engage in elections as institutionalised political activities
in which citizens exercise their sovereign will in choosing their repre-
sentatives, who eventually form or select the personnel and policy of
government. Also, in common with global democratic values, elections
facilitate the orderly transfer of power according to the will of a sover-
eign citizenry. However, a characteristic of African political parties that
distinguishes it from most Western counterparts is the visible presence of
ethnicity in their inclinations or orientation. In fact, the influence of
ethnicity in the parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi has become more
apparent with the onset of democratic rule, as ethnic groups have sought
to protect and advance their interests through the medium of regional
political parties. Table 8.4 shows the association of political parties with
region and ethnicity in the three countries.
For example in Kenya the major trend suggests voting on ethnic lines
although with a few exceptions often influenced by the extent of linguistic
and cultural similarities shared by the dominant ethnic groups. The same
applies to Malawi’s Northern, Central and Southern regions. The UDF
dominated in the Southern region and was able to encroach into MCP
territory in the Central region. AFORD also shared Northern region votes
with the UDF. However, although the whole population identifies itself
as northerners (‘wakumpoto’), in reality they belong to diverse ethnic
groups, mainly the Chakufwa, Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko, Yao, Lomwe,
Sena, Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde (Chirwa 1994; Kalipeni 1997; Kamwendo
2002). Similarly in Ghana the NDC enjoys strong support from the
Akan/Ewe and the Ga-Adangbe but also enjoys the support of a variety
of smaller ethnic groups, while the NPP has been unassailable among the
Ashante, Fante and Akuapem.
Interestingly, all presidential candidates during the most recent presi-
dential elections in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi gained a majority of their
votes from their own ethnic group constituencies. The potential implica-
tions for the formation of government, distribution of ministerial positions
and chairpersons of parliamentary committees are very serious. At the very
least it has contributed to venomous criticism of the governments of the
respective presidents, citing nepotism and corruption as major problems
besetting governance. Where members of the same ethnic group routinely
vote for one ethnic or regional political party only, the ethnic groups assume
some permanence, and the elites who manipulate this arrangement also
acquire a permanent foothold in inter- and intra-ethnic politics. For the
African electorates, it is ethnic groups, and not modern Western ideology,
that have become the ideological markers for a political leadership devoid
of the concept of the circulation of elites, which has been central to Western
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Table 8.4 Ethnic character and voting behaviour of major political parties in
Ghana, Kenya and Malawi
Major political party, coalition Ethnic or regional support
or elite pacts
Ghana
New Patriotic Party (NPP) Largely Ashanti, Akuapem and Fante;
also won votes in some NDC
strongholds in the north.
National Democratic Congress Akan/Ewe, Ga-Adangbe; also gained 
(NDC) support from a variety of smaller
ethnic groups.
Kenya
National Rainbow Coalition Substantial support from the Luo 
(NARC) ethnic group. Luo educated political
elite forms the majority of ministers in
the NARC government, including
President Kibaki.
Kenya African National Union Alliance of small ethnic groups with 
(KANU) substantial Kikuyu support for Uhuru
Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta (the
first president of independent Kenya), 
a failed presidential candidate in 2002
elections.
Forum for the Restoration of The only strong remaining faction of 
Democracy – People (FORD-P) FORD 1992, which was created by
Oginga Odinga (Luo and various
ethnic groups from the Nyasa, Central,
Western and Rift Valley Provinces).
Malawi
United Democratic Front (UDF) Southern region (Yao), with MCP
encroachment in some constituencies
(Chewa).
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) Central and adjacent Northern region:
mainly, Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko,
Yao, Lomwe, Sena, Tonga, Ngoni,
Ngonde.
Republican Party (RP) Dominant in the Northern and
Southern regions (Yao and mainly
Tumbuko ethnic groups); gained votes
from some ethnic groups in the north
loyal to the MCP and AFORD. Also
encroached on UDF constituencies in
the south.
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) Northern region: Tumbuko, Tonga and
Chakufwa ethnic groups, strong rivalry
with the MCP.
Sources: Compiled by the author from various sources, in respect of constituency/district
and ethnic groups’ voting behaviour.
thinking about party-based democracy. This African phenomenon has also
entrenched the line of patronage and contributed to the poor record of
internal democracy inside Africa’s political parties. In the very worst cases
it has fuelled violent ethnic conflict, where party-based democracy had
expanded the terrain of ethnic competition.9 Conflict then tends to harden
ethnic boundaries and further strengthen the relationship between elite and
ethnic groups: in short, a vicious circle.
Patron–client relationship
An important feature wherein party-based democracy has not been global-
ised is the strong presence of client–patron relations between party leader-
ship and party operatives. Political party tycoons and oligarchies create
patronage relations through financial ‘kick backs’ in order to secure central
government support and mobilise political support at the local level. In
this sense, a client–patron relationship is fundamentally a relationship of
exchange in which the client also provides support for the patron (Clapham,
1985: 58–9). As if the troublesome presence of ethnic divisions is not com-
plication enough for African democratisation politics, Berman (1998)
traced the linkages between ethnicity and patron–client networks to colo-
nial rule grounded in the latter’s alliance with local chiefs. According to
Berman (1998: 305), ‘patron–client networks remain the fundamental state-
society linkage in circumstances of social crisis and uncertainty and have
extended to the very centre of the state’.
Also, Tangri (1999) among others has shown that the politics of
patronage seeps through state–private sector relations as a facilitator of
access to resources and economic opportunities, even when the state in
principle responds positively to globally sourced neo-liberal economic
policy designs, such as privatisation. But globalisation has transformed
local level leaders or chiefs and their subjects’ patronage relations in the
sense that such traditional authorities are becoming increasingly impov-
erished materially and excluded from power, unable to respond to the
demands of modern politics. At best they now play an intermediary 
role between the central elite and the voters rather than command signifi-
cant power resources themselves. They will use their proximity to the
grass roots of society to deliver votes to presidential or parliamentary
candidates in exchange for financial and other types of support. In this
way, patronage still does benefit some chiefs and a few other indi-
viduals among different ethnic groups, but many are left out. While
opposition politicians and governments trade criticisms over one another’s
capability to fulfil the ‘good governance’ conditionalities that are indi-
cated globally by the international financial institutions, African polities
have witnessed the growth of new patronage arrangements connecting
those very financial institutions on the one side and on the other, their
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ruling political parties who determine public policy and the dispensation
of government resources.
Internal party democracy
Internal party democracy – in respect of the selection of candidates, leader-
ship contests, regular membership conventions, and internal rules to
discipline party leadership and hold it accountable to party members – is
in short supply in all major political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi.
Invariably, a core of members in small committees decides party affairs
and policy. African political parties are not democratic; they exclude ordi-
nary, mostly uneducated people from the political process, are elitist and
non-transparent. In the case of some parties that have gained power, non-
elected but wealthy and powerful members have made a bid to control
the party, and where successful the outcome is an executive with little
real accountability to legislative or wider political checks and balances.
Without exception the political parties in Kenya, Ghana and Malawi
do not engage in regular and periodic consultation with the grass roots.
And although the situation differs from one African country to another,
it is quite usual for ‘absentee’ party representatives and committee members
to surface for the purpose of mobilising voters during election times only,
avoiding visiting their constituencies between election campaigns. The
internal party structures also lack accountability and transparency in
matters of party finance. Despite the fact that many countries have devel-
oped legislation to regulate party financing (donations, election campaign
expenditures and audit of political party accounts), financial exchanges
are often difficult to verify, and can involve hidden interactions between
those whose support for a party rests on its purported political beliefs,
those who expect a financial payback and those who are merely pursu-
ing their own personal political ambitions. Invariably just a small group
of individuals, business entrepreneurs, foreign donors, party-to-party
networks and fraternal organisations are relied on for funding party activ-
ities. In many cases the same individuals have taken part in politics over
many years dating back to the period of one-party rule, subsequently
defecting from the ruling party and in some cases establishing their own
party. Others were released from their ministerial duties, or disagreed with
their former political mentors and then joined the opposition.10 But in
most cases the personal wealth of the leader at best, or the public coffers
at worst, has accounted for their capacity to run election campaigns –
and, often, lead lavish lifestyles as well. In such circumstances, the party
leader becomes the party boss with unquestioned authority over party
committees, policies and decisions (Mohamed Salih, 2005). However, it
can be argued that the institutionalisation of greater intra-party democ-
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and the ability of civic associations to exert influence on parties from the
side (Chiroro, 2005: 2).
Conclusion
African party-based democracy acquires its meaning from the influences
of global governance, which have shaped the current wave of multi-party
democracy and the new global context within which political parties
operate. In common with political parties in other parts of the world,
African political parties are well aware of their position in the geopolitics
of development, which characterises their political programmes and policy
orientations.
In the new global context of development, political party discourses,
programmes and relations with the electorate straddle the contours of 
the globally informed neo-liberal economic paradigm, albeit with local
variations and without formally barring parties and civil society activism
with a vocal anti-globalisation message from emerging. This is no different
from other parts of the world where the challenge to neo-liberalism comes
from the very democratic forces that it has unleashed.
Globalised party-based democracy does not mean universalised party-
based democracy. That is, African political parties subscribe to the broadly
defined global paradigms reflected in their political manifestos without
becoming fully Westernised. Evidently, there will always be points of
convergence and divergence between globalised and localised forms of
political engagement. African political parties also exhibit some elements
of localised or national political culture, such as the absence of internal
party democracy, persistence of patronage arrangements and strong party
affiliation with ethnicity, religion or region, which alert us to the fact that
African party-based democracy has, generally, retained the form but less
of the content of Western party-based democracy.
Regardless of their ambivalence towards internal political party democ-
racy and the knowledge that they exhibit quasi-polyarchical characteristics,
African political parties have successfully canvassed considerable human
and financial resources, both from abroad and at home. They are also
able to maintain themselves as political organisations with a set of broadly
defined values, mobilise popular support, and win and lose elections, as
well as form and, in a few cases, initiate motions of no confidence in
government. Measured by these formative political party characteristics,
African political parties are part of a globalising party-based democracy
because they generally assume universal political party functions – or have
become quasi-polyarchical.
In addition, global party-to-party and parliamentary networks are
promoting party-based democracy, in a bid to bring Africa as well as
other developing countries into conformity with the ethos and core values
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of ‘Western’ party-based democracy. Generally, bilateral and multilateral
democracy promotion institutions promote global democracy with the aim
of strengthening democratic institutions, including, of course, national
parliaments and political parties in issues such as the rule of law, good
governance and other aspects of state-building. Given these external inter-
ventions and the conditionalities that come from dealing with the global
financial institutions, it is doubtful that Africa could develop political
norms, values and institutions of party-based democracy radically different
from those of the established Western mature democracies. But this has
not prevented Africa’s parties from retaining much of their own ethnic-
ally inclined and other distinctive institutional arrangements that occupy
the middle ground between globalisation and localisation.
Notes
1 Most notably, there were civil wars in Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and more recently in Sierra Leone, Liberia
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
2 ‘Polyarchy’ is used because much of the current jargon on ‘good governance’
was rehashed from this notion and, in most cases, without even referring to
it, although Robinson, 1996 is a notable exception.
3 As the initial success of these policies waned between 1997 and 1999 Kenya’s
Enhanced Structural Adjustment programme was introduced with the aim of
revitalising economic policy reform, reforming the civil service and strength-
ening anti-corruption efforts.
4 This was at the 161st session, held in Cairo, 16 September 1997. The United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration on Democracy
in its 51st session on 20 December 1996. Article (1) of the Declaration states:
‘democracy is a universally recognised ideal as well as a goal, which is based
on common values shared by peoples throughout the world community irre-
spective of cultural, political, social and economic differences. It is thus a basic
right of citizenship to be exercised under conditions of freedom, equality, trans-
parency and responsibility, with due respect for the plurality of views, and in
the interest of the polity.’
5 The Constitution of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association was
adopted in Cyprus in 1993 and revised in Canada in 2004. The author held
interviews with African parliamentarians involved in the Ghana Workshop to
Strengthen Legislatures in West Africa, Agona Swedru, 11–14 February 2005.
6 Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and four sub-regional parliaments – the East
African Legislative Assembly; Southern African Development Community
(SADC) Parliamentary Forum; the Economic Community of West African
States – Parliament (ECOWAS-P); and the Maghreb Union Assembly (UMA)
– provide Africa’s regional and sub-regional parliamentary networks.
7 The suspension at various times of Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Fiji and Pakistan from
the Commonwealth when they reverted to military or similarly authoritarian
rule is illustrative. The CPA used its political clout to discipline members.
8 Other African parties belonging to IDU are: Cape Verde (Movimiento para
la Democracia (MD); Cameroon (Democrat Progressive Party of Cameroon);
Congo (Brazzaville) (Movement for Democracy and Solidarity); Congo (DR),
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et le Progress (UDP) Party); Mauritius (Democratic Union of Mauritius) 
and Madagascar (FANORENANA). Three observer parties are from Morocco
(Istiglal [Independence] Party), Mozambique (Mozambique National Resist-
ance) and Uganda (Democratic Party).
9 For the association between democratisation and ethnic conflicts in Africa see
Glickman (1996).
10 President Kufuor of Ghana was Member of Parliament and Deputy Foreign
Minister in 1969; President Kibaki of Kenya was Vice-President (1978–88);
and Bakili Muluzi, the first President of Malawi during multi-party democ-
racy, was Minister of Education (1976–77) and Minister of Transport and
Communication (1977–81).
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9 Party assistance and the crisis of 
democracy in southern Africa
Roger Southall
The end of the cold war was to bring about significant changes at the
political level in Africa. No longer prepared to prop up dictatorial regimes
that had served their strategic interests in a battle against communism,
Western powers now turned their attentions to the promotion of ‘democ-
racy and good governance’ as an accompaniment to the neo-liberal
‘structural adjustment’ programmes of economic reform that they had
been imposing upon client states since the 1980s. The prodding of one-
party and military governments into moving towards competitive multi-
partyism consequently became increasingly central to donor countries’
activities from the early 1990s, with the logic of such ‘democracy assist-
ance’ requiring that recipient countries redesign their political institutions
to reflect the liberal-democratic values that now became the global referent.
The outcome was uneven, not least because many countries in Africa
remained mired in internal conflict and vicious wars. Nonetheless, there
was a broad shift throughout the continent towards democratisation, not
least because the opponents of incumbent regimes took good advantage
of the increased political space to challenge governments, and in a substan-
tial number of cases, to displace them by defeating ruling parties in
competitive elections (see Chapter 8). Yet donor-driven reform programmes
do not always work out as originally intended. Hence, while democracy
assistance in Africa has sought to steer diverse countries towards compet-
itive multi-partyism, the new rules of the game have been simultaneously
manipulated by governments to consolidate their support: the universal-
ising norms of liberal democracy are thus now utilised to buttress distinctly
illiberal regimes. Meanwhile, the continent faces a new challenge in the
form of the renewed interest of global powers in Africa’s resources, notably
of oil, energy and minerals, the scramble for which may overwhelm the
aims and objectives of ‘democracy assistance’.
This chapter illustrates the argument above by reference to southern
Africa. This focus has been selected for two reasons. First, southern 
Africa is the region within which the shift to democratisation was most
pronounced. Second, a set of recent studies of political parties and demo-














































Institute for Southern Africa allows for systematic comparison. Nonethe-
less, although regionally bound, the thrust of the argument is likely to
have a much wider relevance.
The crisis of democracy in southern Africa
The author has argued elsewhere that there is a developing crisis of democ-
racy in southern Africa which is characterised, first, by an increasingly
explicit clash between an authoritarian culture of national liberation and
hopes for participatory democracy and, second, by a closely related model
of state power which, even if obscured under democratic garb, entrenches
elites and promotes highly unequal patterns of accumulation and devel-
opment. The argument was illustrated by reference to developments in
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It proposed, first, that ‘once having
attained national independence, the inexorable logic of national liberation
seems to be to suppress rather than liberate democracy’ (Southall, 
2003a: 256). This means that while having ‘created’ nations among peoples
struggling against the oppressions of colonialism, victorious ruling parties
now strive for a monolithic national unity that tends to denounce unwel-
come ethnic, social, cultural or political diversity, often in racialised or
xenophobic terms, in the interests of constituting their countries into
dominant-party states under their own hegemony. It also means that having
captured state power, national liberation movements tend to promote a
culture in which opposition to established leadership and its ideas is
regarded as both illegitimate and reactionary. And finally it means the
deeply rooted legacies of inequalities in post-colonial societies have lent
themselves to regime-driven accumulation strategies pursued by the new
political class, which can easily be disguised as the pursuit of a much
wider social equality.
The author’s second major contention, following Good (2002), was that
while many advances have been made since 1990, the globalising liberal
democratic model that has been implanted, revolving around periodic
elections, has allowed elitism and inequality to increase. Voting for govern-
ments and politicians is absolutely necessary, yet it is also manifestly
insufficient as a means of empowering citizens to control elites. Hence,
ordinary people are becoming increasingly disillusioned with electoral
democracy, which has done little or nothing to improve their material
comforts yet leaves autocratic elites untouched. Indeed, Good (2002) views
the liberal democracies of southern Africa as all uncomfortably alike, even
if countries such as Namibia and South Africa present far more amiable
faces to the world than the one provided by contemporary Zimbabwe.
All three regimes operate through dominant parties, centralising presi-
dencies and the limitation of opposition. Protests about human rights
violations and the abuse of constitutions in neighbouring countries are
suppressed out of respect for their governments’ ‘sovereignty’.
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This perspective does not deny the forward momentum brought about
by the successful conclusion to national liberation struggles, by the move
to peace in such previously conflict-torn countries as Angola, Mozam-
bique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), by the replacement
of authoritarian one-partyism or military rule by multi-partyism in coun-
tries such as Tanzania and Lesotho and, of course, by the establishment
of post-apartheid South Africa as a constitutionally established democ-
racy. Furthermore, it attempts to acknowledge the considerable historical
and situational variations that provide for differential democratic deficits
and prospects across the countries of southern Africa. Certainly, the 
writer has argued elsewhere that ‘party dominance’ in South Africa is 
to some extent constrained by an alternative internal party tradition 
of debate, constitutional limitations and limited capacity of the state to
‘impose itself upon society’ (for instance Southall, 2001). Furthermore,
the tendencies identified here are determinate and may well summon up
counter-movements.
However, while these observations are applicable to most of the coun-
tries of southern Africa (the authoritarian kingdom of Swaziland being
an obvious exception), the principal divergences from the model occur in
‘second generation democracies’ such as Zambia and Malawi. There, 
long-ruling nationalist parties were displaced by oppositional challengers
in the early 1990s. The latter have proved hitherto unable to establish
their political dominance and rely very much upon state power to defend
their fragile control. Nonetheless, despite such qualifications, it can be
argued that while the national liberation movements and the ideas, insti-
tutions and implementations of electoral democracy were harbingers of
greater freedoms for the large majority of people(s), they simultaneously
carry the seeds of their own negation. This is especially so when they are
associated with a present trajectory of capitalist development within
contemporary Africa that remains heavily centred around free market
strategies encouraging a ‘new scramble’ for resource extraction and the
attraction of foreign rather than the mobilisation of domestic capital and
savings. This clearly poses major questions about the nature of democ-
racy assistance within the region as a whole.
Democracy assistance in southern Africa hitherto
According to Carothers (1997), the basic strategy pursued by recent US
democracy assistance programmes has consisted: first, of promoting the
capacity of countries to hold free and fair elections; second, of assisting
with the democratisation of governing institutions, the adoption of consti-
tutions providing for political representivity, accountability and human
rights, promoting judicial reform, and enabling parliaments to become
more effective; and third, of strengthening civil society, notably those
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election monitoring groups), as well as supporting trade unions and
promoting media development. Most of the other actors involved in the
globalising project of democracy assistance operate from basically the same
menu.
Among these actors, Western political foundations and think tanks are
prominent as part of what Scott (1999) calls a ‘transnational democracy
issue network’. Political foundations, of which the foremost in southern
Africa are the German Stiftungen (see Chapter 10), Scott describes as
established by, but semi-independent of, states. They serve to connect 
state actors with a multi-centric world, whereas think tanks (such as 
the Carter Center in the US) are independent, and stand apart from the 
NGO sector while serving to link them to states. While there are important
distinctions between them, their key activities fall into four categories:
first, they make grants for activities directly supportive of democracy;
second, they fund and engage in analysis of democratisation with a view
to advocating specific policies; third, they facilitate interaction among
democracy-oriented groups; and fourth, they engage in active democracy-
building via such activities as training political parties and NGOs, and
monitoring elections. While such efforts are generally mutually reinforc-
ing and advance a broadly consistent form of liberal democracy, Scott
concludes that the most significant consequence of their activities is the
‘transnational norm-building’ which serves as a modifier of states’ sov-
ereignty by specifying ‘proper’ – that is, globalising Western liberal
democratic – norms of behaviour.
Such general profiles provide a good summary of the universalising
thrust of democracy promotion work in southern Africa in recent years.
However, they fail to speak to the particular history whereby the libera-
tion movements, trade unions and civil society organisations of the region
were subject to strongly partisan assistance by competing aid-givers who
in many cases had contrary agendas.
The complicity of major Western governments, multinational corpor-
ations and conservative parties and organisations in the maintenance of
white supremacy and apartheid in southern Africa is well known. Basically,
such actors took a strongly hostile stance to the liberation movements
that were engaged in armed struggle and that could conveniently be
denounced as Marxist. In contrast, because these Western governments
and their associates were compelled to decry colonialism, white supremacy
and apartheid (often even while lending them covert support), their initial
‘democracy assistance’ favoured southern African political parties, NGOs
and other actors that, of a liberal if not conservative persuasion, argued
against armed struggle and economic sanctions, favoured constitutionalism
and argued that capitalist development would erode political oppressions
over the long term. Meanwhile, they justified their stance by reference to
the fact that liberation movements such as the African National Congress
of South Africa (ANC), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and
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the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) received direct
support from the regimes in Moscow and Eastern Europe or in Beijing.
To some extent, of course, this stance was counterbalanced by the more
enlightened positions of the Scandinavian governments, which lent direct
support to the liberation movements (Sellstrom, 2002), by the international
trade union movement, which assisted the development of democratic
trade unions (Southall, 1995), and, of course, by the international anti-
apartheid movement, a conglomerate of organisations and popular move-
ments that provided strong solidarity support to the various liberation
movements. These latter strategies contributed to the growing strength 
of pro-democracy forces, which by the mid 1980s began to render South
Africa ‘ungovernable’. Subsequently, therefore, Western donors began 
to see NGOs as increasingly legitimate vehicles for channelling funds to
victims and opponents of apartheid, one estimate suggesting that the
European Commission alone directed some 2 billion rand – 11 rand was
the equivalent of approximately £1 in 2006 – to such bodies between
1986 and 1991, by far the largest amount given to any single country in
the region in that period (Masterson and Letsholo, 2005: 85).
Following the triumph of the various liberation movements and their
move into government, democracy assistance activities have been over-
whelmingly directed towards the consolidation of multi-party democracy
via support for elections, the strengthening of parliaments, and the encour-
agement of relevant civil society organisations. A review indicates a familiar
set of activities.
Donor conditionality linked to ‘good governance’
Donor pressure for market reforms to state dominated economies has been
strongly linked since the early 1990s to pressure for political liberalisa-
tion, multi-partyism and ‘good governance’. In some cases – notably that
of Tanzania, whose return to multi-partyism in 1995 was partly prompted
by ruling party fears that other donor aid would be affected if it did not
introduce political reform (Karume, 2004a: 42) – this was indirect, but
more usually it has been direct, with Zambia, for instance, becoming 
one of the largest recipients of donor aid in Africa in 1991 in return for
making an early exit from one-partyism to multi-partyism. However, as
the new government of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD),
which won the 1991 elections, became more authoritarian and corrupt,
donors increasingly began to link their aid to ‘good governance’.
Zambia’s move to multi-partyism was viewed as a pilot project, and
donors wanted to demonstrate, through extensive support, the benefits of
democratisation (Karume, 2004b: 42). The persuasiveness of donors 
was assisted by the fact that some countries in southern Africa are among
the world’s poorest and hence among the most heavily dependent on
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to multi-partyism in 1993) is dependent on aid for more than 35 per cent
of its recurrent budget and for around 90 per cent of its development
budget (Kabemba, 2005: 50). Similarly, although donor interest in Lesotho
(which transited from military rule to multi-partyism in 1993) has always
been low, the government receives more than half its national budget from
foreign funding (Kabemba, 2003: 40). Meanwhile, a positive association
between conditionality and democratisation is suggested by a weak donor
presence in Swaziland, where political parties are banned; total external
assistance to that middle-income country stands at below 5 per cent of
GDP (Kabemba, 2004: 35). In Zimbabwe, democracy aid packages in the
early 1990s were directed not so much at stimulating political changes
but at increasing the efficiency of state institutions, good governance and
electoral administration. However, the current crisis has resulted in many
donors reducing their assistance to government, pulling out completely or
redirecting it to humanitarian aid or assistance for civil society. It now
stands at around 15 per cent of Zimbabwe’s GDP. While the connection
between donor assistance and democratisation is more complex than this,
it is worth noting the observation of a local commentator: ‘without donor
assistance one can forget about democracy in Malawi’ (cited in Kabemba,
2005: 51).
Electoral process assistance
Support for ‘free and fair’ elections has been central to democracy assist-
ance in southern Africa. Very direct support for the establishment of an
independent electoral commission and the framework of elections was
offered by the Commonwealth, European Union and national donors in
Lesotho in 1993. This set the scene for the much more extensive opera-
tion that was undertaken in South Africa in that country’s first democratic
election in 1994, when major funding was directed to assisting the elec-
toral process: the USAID alone expended US$250 million on those
elections, compared with the US$100 million that it spent on the Angolan
elections in 1992 and the total of US$15 million it spent on the elections
in Botswana (1994), Lesotho (1998) and Malawi (1994) (Masterson and
Letsholo, 2005), although most certainly in South Africa’s case the bulk
of such expenditure was directed at civil society rather than the official
electoral machinery. Considerable aid was devoted to voter education and,
of course, to electoral monitoring, which rapidly established itself as a
standard feature of the African electoral landscape (Daniel and Southall,
1999). Subsequently, however, donor assistance to elections has become
more carefully calibrated to individual situations.
First, where possible, there has been a tendency for electoral process
assistance to become indirect, with donors urging governments to demon-
strate commitment to democratisation by taking financial and other
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responsibility for their own electoral bodies. Thus international financial
support to South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has
declined from 24.2 million rand in 1994 to 6.6 million rand in 2004,
with the international community deciding that South African elections
are now so well established and fairly run that they no longer need a
significant presence of international monitors. Similarly, the cost of the
elections on mainland Tanzania that was covered by donors fell from a
third of the total incurred by the National Electoral Commission in the
1995 elections to 14 per cent in 2000. Meanwhile, the electoral commis-
sion in Botswana has long remained overwhelmingly funded by its own
government, donors not only deeming that country sufficiently wealthy to
do so but also presenting it as a beacon of democracy.
Second, assistance for elections has remained extensive in countries that
are too poor to bear the full costs themselves and where the electoral
process continues to be fragile. Hence Lesotho’s elections of 1998 and
2002 remained heavily dependent financially and logistically upon external
assistance (US$2.8 out of a total of US$4.4 million of democracy assist-
ance funding was devoted to electoral administration alone during the
period 2001–03) (Kabemba, 2003: 42). And donors’ enthusiasm for yet
another new start in Zambia in the elections of 2001 (alongside, doubt-
less, the government’s bankruptcy) led to the electoral commission receiving
substantial donor funding (22.4 billion kwacha out of a total of 89 billion
kwacha) for the first time (Karume, 2004b: 44). The Malawi elections of
2004 were also largely financed from external sources (US$5.5 million
out of US$7.4 million final expenditure) (Kabemba, 2005: 52).
The third approach seeks to use electoral assistance (or its withdrawal)
strategically where the freedom and fairness of the electoral process is in
severe doubt. It therefore often runs up against the hostility of local
governments that view their independent control of elections as an expres-
sion of their sovereignty. There are presently three flashpoints in the region
in this regard. One of them is Swaziland, where donors responded gener-
ously to the holding of elections in 1993 following a review of the electoral
system. Although the amended tinkhundla system remained indirect,
continued to exclude political parties and was still dominated by the 
chiefs, there was hope that it constituted a step towards democratisa-
tion. However, donors were rapidly disabused of such notions, and their
aid came to a virtual halt in subsequent elections (donors preferred to
direct their attentions to a promised constitutional review) (Kabemba,
2004). A second case is provided by Zanzibar, which although part of
Tanzania, possesses its own Electoral Commission (ZEC). This oversaw
a highly controversial election result in 1995 featuring a victory for the
ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Donors suspended almost all aid
in response to the resulting popular upheaval, and provided no support
whatsoever for the following elections in 2002. However, following the
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parties in 2001, donors were expected to make generous contributions
towards the holding of the elections in October 2005 (Karume, 2004a).
The third case is Zimbabwe, one aspect of whose political crisis has been
the systematic subordination of the electoral machinery to the government
of Robert Mugabe. The various electoral bodies are now entirely financed
by the government, and donor aid has been directed towards electoral
observation and to the support of credible NGOs. However, given that
such aid has incurred retaliatory action by the government, at least one
donor, the UK’s DFID, has temporarily stopped all its democracy pro-
grammes in favour of overtly humanitarian interventions. Any such
financial leverage as remains therefore presently lies in the hands of multi-
lateral organisations, notably the United Nations Development Programme,
a body that the government views as less susceptible to the machinations
of Western imperialism.
Support for conflict resolution
Conflict management is an important responsibility of authorities in 
a region where political violence results from perceived injustices and
systematic inequalities generated by governments. The very logic of demo-
cratisation is designed, in part, to establish a system of government in
which conflicts between opposing political groups can be resolved peace-
fully. Traditionally, democracy assistance in the region has been directed
towards prodding enemies to institutionalise their hostilities: for instance,
the arrival of the UN and later the European Community (EC) and the
Organization of African Union observers at a key moment during the
South African transition (after the Boipatong massacre and the Bisho
killings in 1992), when negotiations had broken down, signalled that the
international community was determined that both sides should resolve
their differences. As elections themselves are devices for managing polit-
ical competition, the bodies that administer them necessarily take on
conflict management. Some, such as Botswana, have done so relatively
successfully (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie, 2005: 25–7), but others have
not, and have accordingly been constrained to accept external help.
The most dramatic instance concerns Lesotho, when in the wake of the
opposition parties riotously disputing the outcome of the 1998 election,
South Africa backed mediation with military intervention, and thereafter
– with critical international donor backing – prompted adversaries into
negotiating an acceptance of a mixed member proportional electoral
system. In replacing the existing first-past-the-post system and providing
for fairer political representation, this laid a basis for a more legitimate
electoral outcome in 2002 and subsequent political stability (Southall,
2003b).
In contrast, Commonwealth shuttle diplomacy between the CCM and
the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) after the 1995 election in Zanzibar
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is judged to have failed precisely because the CCM saw the negotiations
as donor driven. It was only after the conflicting parties met face to face,
in a process that had committed backing from Tanzania’s political leader-
ship, that the parties concluded the Muafaka II agreement allowing for
substantial reforms to electoral law and administration. Even so, there
were repeat protestations concerning electoral unfairness by the CUF
following the elections in October 2005. Yet the greatest challenge lies
ahead in Zimbabwe, where South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ has been as
ineffective as Western pressure has proved counterproductive, and where
future mediation may well have to be provided by the UN.
Support for parliaments
Recent studies of parliaments in southern Africa, conducted on behalf of
the South African Institute of International Affairs, provide ample evidence
that while these bodies in many ways perform admirably in difficult circum-
stances, they face numerous challenges. In most countries, parliamentary
procedures are subject to the dictates of dominant parties; oppositions are
weak, unskilled and unable to hold strong executives to account; committee
systems tend to be ineffective; Members of Parliament (MPs) lack infor-
mation, research capacity and have limited law-making expertise; civil
society and the public generally have inadequate access to parliament. All
parliaments display a massive gender imbalance (even though South Africa
has one of the highest proportions of women in parliament in the world).
And at least in some countries, MPs have irregular contact with their
constituents or voters, and are regarded as prone to corruption. Not
surprisingly, there are a variety of donor initiatives designed to address
such weaknesses, the major criticism of them being that their efforts,
where they do not induce a sense of dependence, make relatively little
impact. In such circumstances, democracy assistance can only be some-
what hopefully addressed to the long term: in short, it is a Sisyphean
task.
Support for civil society, the media and women’s political 
participation
Support for NGOs and unofficial media has become a staple of official
democracy assistance, in large measure because donors wish to compen-
sate for the lack of effective constraints imposed upon dominant party
governments by what are typically weak, divided and multiple opposition
parties. Southern Africa’s second wave of independence, from the Zambian
election of 1991 onwards, featured the arrival in power of a number of
political parties that had either grown out of, or enjoyed the massive
support of, civil society organisations. Most of these had emerged to
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by structural adjustment programmes. Typically they were funded by
donors to undertake activities concerned with human rights, voter and
civic education, election related conflict management, consideration of elec-
toral reform, election monitoring, promotion of political participation by
women, and so on.
The extent of support offered to anti-apartheid and pro-democracy
organisations in South Africa before 1994 may have been exceptional, yet
it was otherwise not atypical. The EC donated about 2 billion rand between
1986 and 1991 to South African NGOs, by far the largest amount of
money given to such organisations in any country in the region in that
period. Indeed, Masterson and Letsholo (2005) claim that around 5,200
out of some 10,000 NGOs that existed in 1994 were completely dependent
upon the assistance of private and international donor support. Although
the onset of the negotiation process and the preparations for the first
democratic elections saw a significant shift of funding away from civil
society organisations to political parties and the IEC, NGOs involved in
democracy work continued to receive substantial funding. International
donors also worked closely with the new government to bring about
amendments to the tax laws, which, under the apartheid regime, had
severely hindered civil society. However, for all that a much larger 
number of NGOs qualified for significant tax exemptions, many of them
continue to rely upon external funding of projects related to democratic
governance.
This continuing high level of dependence of civil society organisations
upon donors is replicated throughout the region. There are widespread
complaints that the agendas of NGOs are dictated from outside, that
recipients are tied to procurement and other conditions that vary markedly
between donors, and that the programmes of the different donors often
conflict. There is also concern that civil society organisations will become
primarily accountable to the international community rather than to their
local society. Only recently have civil society organisations in Tanzania
started to mobilise local citizens to pressure their government rather than
appealing to donors as guardians of democracy (Karume, 2004a: 62).
In countries that are perceived as broadly democratic, donors are
generally anxious that their assistance should be seen as neutral between
government and opposition, and between different opposition parties. 
In contemporary, crisis-torn Zimbabwe, however, as was much the case
in apartheid South Africa, this is increasingly difficult, for civil society 
has become deeply politicised. Indeed, Olaleye (2005: 32) suggests that
the concentrated critique of ZANU (the ruling party) – which emerged in
the early 1990s from academics, the labour movement, human rights
groups, professional bodies and NGOs – did so in some measure as a
result of ‘prodding’ by the donor community. Precisely because there were
severe restrictions placed upon such groups, democracy assistance initia-
tives were vital in strengthening their capacity to challenge the government.
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To that extent, they contributed significantly to the launch of the oppo-
sition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the party – headed by
former trade union leader Morgan Tsvangirai – that seriously damaged
the legitimacy of ZANU at the 2000 parliamentary and successive elections.
Yet such politicised aid has had the inevitable outcome that pro-democracy
organisations and the MDC have been pilloried by the government as
agents of Western subversion, which in turn leads to multiple difficulties.
Not least of these is the requirement, from September 2003, that all
NGOs should register under the Private Voluntary Organisation Act of
1995. This enabled the government to police the spending of donor 
funds. Although no organisation has yet been banned under this Act, the
present environment in which NGOs are operating can be described as a
war zone, with numerous activists joining MDC supporters as victims of
official harassment and violence. Indeed, the relationship between the
government and both NGOs and many donors is now so hostile that a
number of the latter have opted to disengage, either by withdrawing,
reducing their support to NGOs or eliminating the democracy compo-
nents from their aid packages altogether (Olaleye, 2005: 32–6). Official
democracy assistance requires legal or officially tolerated political space
in which to operate.
Support for political parties
Whereas in the ‘struggle years’, liberation movements such as South
Africa’s ANC were assisted directly by sympathetic governments and by
supportive solidarity funding and activities, democracy assistance has
subsequently sought to assume a neutrality between competing political
parties, and help has been directed at enabling them to consolidate multi-
party democracy. Such assistance has taken two principal forms.
First, responding to the new importance attached to the funding of
parties if democracy is to be sustained, some governments have contributed
to official funds – usually distributed by electoral commissions – that are
allocated to parties to enable them to conduct their electoral campaigns.
Although opposition parties regularly complain that the formulae adopted
to determine the allocation of funds (which are usually constructed around
parties’ level of representation in parliament) work to reproduce the domin-
ance of ruling and larger parties, they tend nonetheless to be highly
dependent upon such support. Such funding has therefore sometimes 
served to ‘buy’ parties’ agreement to participating in parliaments and
formal political processes (Kabemba, 2003: 44). However, where donors
feel that parties should be able to fund themselves (as in South Africa),
or consider that there is insufficient transparency accompanying such offi-
cial processes, or where they agree that allocation formulae are manifestly
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on the sidelines. Overall, donors are wary of becoming embroiled in
funding the expenditure of ruling and other parties that probing later
reveals was provided covertly by the state or other governments or even
business groups (such as the Taiwanese and Chinese in Lesotho) seeking
political favours.
The dilemmas posed by direct funding of parties can in part be resolved
by resort to the funding of local NGOs that assist parties with deploying
polling agents, fielding female candidates, countering biases in official
media, participating in conflict resolution and upgrading parties’ capacity
to perform effectively. Although welcomed by parties, there are regular
expressions of dissatisfaction that such aid is donor-driven and, given the
quality of service delivered by local NGOs, is ineffective (Karume, 2004b:
55). Parties on the whole prefer direct funding, but donors generally prefer
the distance that indirect funding places between themselves and their
recipients.
Where to now?
This chapter has shown that support to political parties is only one rela-
tively limited aspect of democracy assistance strategies pursued in southern
Africa since the early 1990s. While prior to that, donors tended to back
horses according the political jockeys they were carrying, the shift to multi-
partyism and the liberation of South Africa have seen them wanting to
act as neutral backers of new democracies. Yet this new situation has
brought its own dilemmas.
First, multi-partyism, many of its procedures and even some of its values
(notably the legality of opposition) are formally established but subject
to the dominance of ruling parties that, in most countries, marginalises
opposition parties and their capacity to hold governments to account. 
This is either because ruling parties continue to possess a popular majority,
as expressed in elections, or because if they do not, they deny and obscure
that fact, and refuse to give up power. SWAPO, the ANC and the Lesotho
Congress for Democracy are all prime examples of the former, ZANU by
far the most explicit example of the latter (but look out for the Botswana
Democratic Party, whose ‘liberal authoritarian’ rule is draining substan-
tial popular support yet seems increasingly to be backed by the military)
(Good and Taylor, 2005). Such parties may still offer ‘free’ elections, 
but ones that may be ‘unfair’. For the moment, ‘democracy’ implies 
the possibility of change of government only in those poorer countries
(Malawi, Zambia) where the hold of ruling elites is or has been severely
challenged by internal party revolts.
A related point is that in a region where in most countries the economy
is impoverished, significantly dependent upon foreign aid and dominated
by external capital, politics – or rather, control of the state – continues
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to provide the principal route for accumulation by elites. Currently this
is most dramatically illustrated by Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, where ZANU’s
grip on government continues to enrich key party loyalists, despite the
downward spiral of the economy. Land seized from white farmers has
been distributed to placemen, the armed intervention in the DRC in 1998
allowed senior military officers to appropriate and illegally export valu-
able natural resources, and access to power simultaneously provides access
to scarce foreign exchange, which the politically favoured purchase at arti-
ficially low rates with a near worthless local currency. But corruption and
misuse of resources is endemic to the region. In Namibia, former President
Nujoma has aped Mugabe by building a vast luxury presidential palace.
In both Namibia and Botswana, former heads of state have been provided
with munificent retirement packages, which in the latter case probably
amounts to a value in excess of 2 million pula (around 2.5 million rand)
a month. In South Africa, the ANC is presently wracked by a crisis
resulting from the jailing of ‘crony capitalist’ Shabir Shaik, whom the
presiding judge described as having formed a ‘generally corrupt relation-
ship’ with (then) Deputy-President Jacob Zuma. Alongside other simultan-
eously unravelling cases, ‘corruption within the (formerly ruling) National
Party is beginning to look like a tea party’ (Kadalie, 2005: 16).
It is not surprising, then, that there is substantial disillusion with demo-
cracy as it exists. Bratton, Chikwana and Sithole (2005) report that 
support for democracy as the preferred form of government in Zimbabwe
has slumped from 71 per cent in 1999 to 48 per cent in 2004 (and, worse,
that fully 83 per cent indicate a high level of fear). They also record that
support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa more generally has slipped
from 69 per cent to 64 per cent between those years. Such disillusion 
regularly takes the form of declining participation rates by voters at elec-
tion time (even if, as in South Africa, where the 75.7 per cent turnout in 
2004 was lower than the 86.7 per cent turnout in 1999, voters continue 
to register greater enthusiasm than in most established democracies). 
Where democracy is viewed in large measure instrumentally, its failure to 
deliver in terms of jobs, education, health and other goods may well to lead
to widespread distrust in politics, apathy, or support for non-democratic 
alternatives.
Nor is there significant prospect that economic growth will transform
this situation. To be sure, there are some encouraging developments. The
ANC government in South Africa is lauded for having achieved macro-
economic stability and for having facilitated consistent year-on-year growth
since 1994, and for having delivered impressive benefits such as housing,
water, sanitation, and social grants to the poor. It is also responding to
the limits of its post-1996, market-led strategy by turning to more inter-
ventionist and expansionist policies, which indicate that it is preparing to
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the reluctance of private capital to invest in job-creating ventures (Southall,
2005). Yet against this, the present rate of growth is insufficient to provide
rising per capita incomes, and the government is unable to meet many of
its development targets.
Certainly, compared with a decade ago, southern African economies are
manifestly healthier. Apart from South Africa, countries such as Mozam-
bique, Angola, Tanzania and even Lesotho are recording impressive growth
rates, much of it fuelled by post-conflict infrastructural development (and
it is hoped that the DRC is on the verge of similar progress). Increasingly,
too, they are being opened up to foreign investment and to external com-
munications (the growth and use of cell phones and even satellite televi-
sion over the last decade has been phenomenal, even if Africa still lags far
behind with regard to use of the internet). Yet for all the talk of Mbeki’s
commitment to promoting good governance regionally and continentally
as an attraction to foreign investment, no government within the region,
except for South Africa, has yet signed up to the African Peer Review
Mechanism (the process attached to the New Economic Programme for
African Development, designed to assess the quality their quality of govern-
ance, to which governments are invited to voluntarily subject themselves),
and some, notably Zimbabwe, regard it with total contempt (Masterson,
2004). Growth and development prospects are also compromised not only
by concurrent crises of mass poverty and some of the highest rates of
HIV/AIDS in the world, but by a ‘new scramble’ for Africa’s resources –
notably oil, energy, water and minerals – in which South Africa is engaged
in spiralling competition with (especially) American and Chinese, but also
European, capital (Daniel and Lutchman, 2005). Indeed, this suggests that
the region is about to witness a new informal imperialism in which domestic
elites become increasingly linked to external forces, and which confirms
the lowly global status of local economies as externally dependent sup-
pliers of raw materials to the advanced and rapidly industrialising parts
of the world. There seems little prospect, in short, that sustained economic
‘growth’ will underpin democracy.
How does this alarming situation speak to the issue of democracy
assistance to regional political parties in an age of rapidly advancing
globalisation?
Certainly, it seems that after the excitements of the ‘second wave’ of
democracy in southern Africa in the early 1990s donors are having
increasing doubts about the effectiveness of their governance assistance
packages: policies and activities with mainly constructive yet uncertain
and largely immeasurable outcomes. Donors, notably the influential Ger-
man foundations, therefore, are reported as re-assessing their options 
(see Chapter 10). During the early years the Stiftungen (notably the social-
democratic Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) worked closely with African socialist
parties and national liberation movements and sought, in essence, to
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fashion them into their own image as mass-based parties, only to find
subsequently that they became authoritarian, non-participatory and often
corrupt. Hence their shift, along with official aid agencies, to non-partisan
support for political parties, and for rendering multi-partyism legitimate,
free and fair, accountable, woman-friendly and participatory. But once
again, if the analysis in this chapter is correct, they are facing a devel-
oping crisis of democracy. How should they now respond?
The immediate answer is: ‘with caution and expecting considerable
difficulty’. First, of all, it must be stressed that for all their shortcomings,
the present packages of democracy assistance remain absolutely essential
to the maintenance of democracy (such as it is) in all southern African
countries. Within this context, direct and indirect aid to parties is vital,
notably for keeping the spirit of opposition alive, ensuring that elections
adhere to reasonably adequate standards, that parties facilitate popular
participation, and that they contribute to the demand for accountability.
Of course, precautions need to be taken to ensure that parties are genuinely
representative of some segment of society and that they are not simply
vehicles of private interest. Similarly, much present experience suggests
that more attention should be given to building the internal capacity of
parties between elections and assisting them to extend their structures
beyond the urban centres and to communicate more regularly with their
rural constituencies. Nonetheless, such common sense does not in itself
address the core problems of the looming crisis.
These problems are presently most acute in Zimbabwe, where opposi-
tion parties, notably the MDC, are subject to a systematic narrowing of
the legal and political space in which they operate. Legally, for instance,
MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai has had to face a succession of charges
of treason that, while ultimately unsuccessfully pursued by the state, kept
him tied down for months. Politically, the MDC is hamstrung, not merely
by its strategic miscalculations (which in the second half of 2005 produced
acute internal divisions around whether to participate in elections for a
newly created Senate, to be conducted under conditions that were grossly
skewed in favour of ZANU) but by the terror visited upon those deemed
to be opposition supporters. Following the regime’s deployment of food
aid (in a now starving country) to bludgeon voters in election campaigns,
it went on to engage in a ‘pogrom’ against the poor, in which the shanty
dwellings of some 200,000 people in urban areas were destroyed in a
‘clean up’ that has seen their informal livelihoods as much as their impov-
erished homes destroyed.
In this appalling circumstance, it is inevitable that democracy assistance
should have become politicised, that is, that it is directed at pro-democracy
NGOs and political parties opposed to the incumbent regime. As noted
above, this carries the costs that recipients of aid are accused of being
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be no other way, and this surely points the way forward for any future
strategy for assisting political parties in southern Africa.
There are likely to be two poles to such a strategy, ranging from 
formal neutrality to a partisan, pro-democracy stance. The neutral posi-
tion is largely described by the mutually supportive democracy assistance
activities, inclusive of direct and indirect aid to political parties, which
have been analysed above. It may be characterised as seeking to contain
the worst effects of the dominant party state by seeking to ensure freedom
and fairness in elections, sustaining opposition, promoting accountability,
encouraging political participation and so on. At its best, it should be
directed as much at the ruling parties as at the opposition, for it needs
constantly to be remembered that while entities such as SWAPO and the
ANC seek to maintain their dominance of the political arena, often by
means that are more foul than fair, they are themselves composite organ-
isations whose culture combines liberatory traditions with the drift to
authoritarianism. External assistance should therefore be directed at pro-
moting intra- as much as inter-party democracy, designed to keep alive
the ideals that guided such parties in the struggle for liberation. This is
a necessary corrective to the elite domination of democracy of which Good
(2002) is so critical. Attention, too, needs to be given to enabling social
movements, such as those presently emerging in protest against ‘delivery’
failures in South Africa, to participate within political structures and to
stretch their democratic potential, rather than resorting to a destructive
populism which can so easily invite an authoritarian response.
The second, partisan pole of party assistance needs to learn from the
struggle against apartheid, most notably in the 1980s. Such a strategy
requires that those offering democracy assistance make difficult political
choices (which in turn will imply that strategies adopted may have polit-
ical costs). While there may be broad unanimity that an incumbent regime
is unjust, oppressive, unpopular and must at some time be removed, it is
very possible that different donors will back different horses (among
political parties as among NGOs). This always carries the danger that
external intervention can prove divisive (for instance, in South Africa
conservative support for the Inkatha movement and minority black trade
unions was often deliberately designed to weaken support for the ANC)
and in the present era, Western governments are likely to be ambivalent
about democracy promotion if that might endanger their strategic economic
interests. Nonetheless, it is similarly likely in such circumstances that a
leading pro-democracy movement or party will emerge and possibly assume
the mantle of a regime in waiting.
In such circumstances, the lead in democracy assistance must surely be
taken by broadly progressive forces. That means social democratic parties,
sympathetic governments and their associated foundations and trade
unions, as well as the more progressive churches. Their responsibility is
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to promote unity within the pro-democracy movement, assist it to become
hegemonic internationally (far from easy in a situation where Mugabe 
can bang the anti-colonial drum to mobilise local support from African
governments), and work closely with the movement’s external organisa-
tions, supporters and allies. Just as a body such as International Defence
and Aid directed covert aid inside South Africa to fund legal cases and
to support victims of apartheid, so a major aspect of support for a pro-
democracy movement must be the defence of human rights alongside
humanitarian aid, often working in collaboration with exiled networks of
refugees and party supporters. Importantly, too, the objective must be to
enable the pro-democracy movement to survive, to endure inevitable
setbacks, and to view its struggle as a long-term process – whose outcome
may not be an outright victory, but rather a difficult transition in which
it needs to be ready to make strategic compromises with the regime it is
opposing, without conceding fundamental ground. Yet even if such a tran-
sition results in a ‘second best’ solution, democracy assistance should be
directed not merely at resolving conflict and preventing the relapse of a
Zimbabwe into a failed state, but also at installing protective institutions
within a reformed polity that maximise rights and freedoms, and minimise
the scope for corruption and unaccountability.
Party support, at this pole, demands participation in the construction of
a solidarity network in which committed political activists link up with
the democratic movement globally in offering moral, material and strategic
assistance. In this, certainly, it would seem that the new global commun-
ications network of email and the internet will facilitate interaction, even
though authoritarian regimes will seek to block it. Such solidarity networks
will often be in advance of official democracy assistance, which is perpet-
ually constrained by diplomatic caution, and in the Zimbabwean case, by
a South African government reluctant to take firm action against a fellow
regime with a ‘liberation’ background. Meanwhile, the terrain may well
be complicated by the increased levels of official aid being provided by
China to local regimes, none of which has as yet a specific democracy com-
ponent and most of which appears designed to promote Chinese strategic
interests. Worse, where the new Chinese engagement in Africa runs in
direct competition with Western interests, it is likely that the latter’s com-
mitments to democratisation will come second to their scramble for scarce
minerals and other resources.
At this pole, therefore, assistance for a popular movement must often
be as much directed against complicit governments as against an offend-
ing regime itself. In other words, this suggests a distinction between 
‘official democracy assistance’ (offered by governments) and ‘solidarity
assistance’ (offered by bodies prepared to assume something of a more
politically explicit ‘vanguard’ role), which, while they may be comple-
mentary, may also imply a greater willingness by the latter assistance to
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Is this history repeating itself? And will a popular movement that
achieves power with solidarity support subsequently reproduce itself as a
dominant party? Perhaps, but at least in a globalising world it is less easy
for repressive regimes to shield themselves from sight, and more easy for
progressive forces to combat them with wider global support, and to
engage in the struggle for democracy as an unending battle.
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10 Hesitant bedfellows
The German Stiftungen and
party aid in Africa
Gero Erdmann
Introduction
There is very little research about the German political foundations avail-
able in English (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991; Mair, 2000a) – not to mention
that it is equally sparse in German. Even though the foundations belong
to the German political parties, their international activities are not well
understood by either politicians or the general public. The foundations
themselves have only recently started to make an effort to inform the
public about their activities, which is partly due to the fact that their
activities have been, and continue to be, a sensitive issue in German politics
(Mair, 2000a: 128; 148).
Despite this widespread ignorance the fact remains that the foundations
have been extensively involved in some very important political transi-
tions: in Portugal, Spain, Chile, South Africa and Namibia. Some observers
rank them among the major providers of political party aid (see Chapter
4); and among the European foundations that provide democracy assist-
ance they possess by far the largest annual overall budgets (Van Wersch
and de Zeeuw, 2005: 7).
With all due respect, however, the foundations should not be perceived
as party promoters in the usual sense. The aim of this study is, first, to
try to correct the main misunderstandings about the nature and purpose
of the work of the German political foundations. Second, the chapter
analyses the challenges that the foundations face in sub-Saharan Africa
as well as describing the activities that are related to political parties in
Africa. Finally, the chapter will attempt to assess whether the foundations
actually address the African challenge adequately.
German political foundations in context
The German political foundations are usually identified with the ‘partisan
approach’ (or ‘fraternal’ or ‘sister’ party work) meaning that they colla-
borate only with parties of kindred ideological direction: liberal, social














































however, is only partly true.1 Actually, the very idea of a ‘partisan approach’
to party aid could cause legal problems for the foundations. The inter-
national support of political parties is a legally ill-defined area for the foun-
dations. For instance, in Germany itself, where the political foundations
operate in the civic education sector, German party law proscribes support
to any political party. However, the legislation is unclear as to whether the
law also applies to the operations of the foundations abroad. Instead, 
the international operations of the foundations appear to be controlled 
only by the accounting rules laid down by federal parliament and the
Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development (Bundesministerium
für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ). According to
BMZ rules, foundations are not permitted to directly sponsor political par-
ties and trade unions or electoral contests and labour disputes (BMZ, 2005).
Furthermore, it is also stipulated that their activities should not harm
German interests, which means that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
to scrutinise all foundation projects and programmes, although it does 
not have the final say. In a sense the foundations are, on the one hand, 
an arm of German foreign policy – ‘clandestine diplomats’. But on the 
other hand they are supposed to be ‘autonomous’, with the upshot that 
they sometimes operate in areas that the official policy wants to avoid.
This legal grey zone provides room for a spectrum of interpretation,
which the various foundations make good use of. Some foundations inter-
pret the rules quite liberally and therefore co-operate more closely with
particular political parties, while others are more ‘conservative’ and keep
their partners at arm’s length.
The political foundations are not ‘party foundations’. But their posi-
tion has to be understood as ‘close’ to one of the political parties. After
being represented in the German Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag)
for two consecutive elections each party is entitled to receive funds from
the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Education for civic
education in Germany. For their international work they receive funds
mainly from the BMZ and some from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Naturally, in their activities the foundations are subject to the legal restric-
tions of each country in which they operate.
There are currently six political foundations: the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
(FES, founded in 1925), which is close to the Social Democratic Party (SPD);
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS, founded in 1956) which is related to
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS,
founded in 1996–97),2 which is linked to the Greens (Bündnis 90/Grüne);
the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS, founded 1958), which is close to
the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP); the Hans Seidel Stiftung (HSS,
founded in 1966), which is related to the Christian Social Union (CSU),
the Bavarian sister party of the CDU; and the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
(RLS), which is close to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the
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successor to the former state party of the German Democratic Republic,
which existed before the elections of 18 September 2005.
The overall amount available to each foundation is based on the size
of the associated parliamentary party and their respective status as an
official parliamentary group, although the amount that each foundation
receives is not exactly proportional to the number of parliamentary seats
that the associated party has. At present, the proportions are: FES, 35
per cent; KAS, 32 per cent; the remainder divided more or less equally
among the smaller foundations. The RLS is also recipient of additional
funds.3 The foundations do not receive a lump sum to dispose of at will,
but rather have to apply to the BMZ for specific amounts for particular
programmes and purposes. In all, over the last five years the BMZ provided
on average €162.4 million (equivalent to around £112 million) per year
to all the foundations (BMZ, 2005). Additional funds are received from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Union.
Each foundation, however, has its own regional distribution of funds.
FES is by far the most active foundation in Africa followed by HBS and
HSS together with KAS, and finally FNS (see Table 10.1). The amounts
given here cover only BMZ financing and do not include financing for
the foundation’s activities in Germany. It is important to observe that
these amounts are not to be equated with assistance to political parties,
but comprise their total democracy assistance budget.4
The African challenge
‘Unknown’ objects: political parties in Africa
There is a general agreement among scholars as well as development and
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Table 10.1 Regional distribution of German political foundations’ spending,
2001–05 (percentages)
FESa KAS HBS FNSa HSSb
Africa (south of 25 14 17 13 15
Sahara)
Asia 19 17 19 26 34
Latin America 20 24 19 12 12
Middle and Near East/ 12 9 14 13 17
Northern Africa
Othersc 24 36 31 36 22
Source: Figures provided by the foundations (partly author’s own calculations).
Notes: a 2001–04 only; b 2004 only; c includes spending in Southern, Eastern and Middle
Europe, in Eurasia and in Brussels, although the distribution among these destinations differs
from one foundation to another.
RLS did not provide any data.
particularly challenging task (Burnell, 2001:188–204). The reason is
simple. Political parties in young democracies have certain features that
distinguish them from parties in well-established democracies: (1) fewer
members; (2) weaker organisations; (3) fewer distinct programmes; (4)
weaker linkages with (civil) society; and (5) weaker party identification.
Hence the electoral support will be very volatile (Mainwaring, 1998; Von
Beyme, 2000; Schmitter, 2001: 67–89). From a functionalist perspective,
this means that those parties will, most likely, fail to adequately perform
the ‘core functions’ of political parties in a democracy: (1) provision of
ideological orientation and political goals (symbols); (2) socialisation and
mobilisation; (3) aggregation and articulation of interests; (4) elite
recruiting and government formation; (5) organisation of loyal opposition
(and formulation of political alternatives).
Moreover, the experience of political party promoters and the models
upon which party aid is based is that of the industrialised countries. But
the appropriateness of this experience needs to be examined. For a start,
it is a very specific model of the ‘mass-party’ of Western Europe during
the first half of the twentieth century, which is not even applicable to the
United States. Carothers (in Chapter 4) calls this model ‘mythicised’ And
even in Europe the ‘golden age’ of the mass party passed away some time
ago and has been replaced by the ‘catch-all party’, the ‘cartel party’ or
various ‘electoralist parties’ such as the post-materialist Green Party. These
parties are quite substantially different from the mythical mass party (Katz
and Mair, 1995; Gunther and Diamond, 2001).
As a caveat, it is not only political party promoters who are wrong-
footed by the model of the mythical mass party but a great deal of political
science, which is still very much dominated by the history and model of
political parties in Western Europe. Although the discipline is waking up
due to the development of political parties in the young democracies that
do not match the familiar picture, we still lack an adequate alternative
conceptual framework. In a sense, only our awareness of the problem has
increased. Research on political parties in Africa is particularly affected
(Erdmann, 2004).
Although systematic research is only now emerging, some basic features
of political parties in Africa appear to be well known: (1) they have barely
distinguishable programmes; (2) they have weak bureaucratic organisa-
tion, which in many cases is only temporarily in operation; (3) they are
characterised by informal relations, partly based on clientelist relations
and patronage that dominate the party structures; (4) the formal internal
structures are dominated by strong personalism; (5) they have a high
degree of factionalism; (6) they are characterised by a lack of internal
democracy; (7) data for party membership are unavailable or unreliable,
because there is either no formal membership or, very frequently, there
are multi-memberships (card-holding of several parties) – thus ‘member-
ship’ is weak apart from a small group of staunch party cadres; (8) they
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have predominantly regional and/or ethnic-based membership and voters;
(9) the funding base is weak and is not based on contributions of a broad
membership, but on the purposeful donations of rich individuals; (10)
formal linkages to civil society are weak (Erdmann, 2004: 65).
There are, of course, exceptions to these features. In particular some
of the former ‘state parties’ of the one-party regimes still have a compar-
atively stronger bureaucratic organisational form; and ruling parties often
appear to be better organised than the opposition parties. However, here
one must still be cautious because ruling parties may not only make use
of state finances for their own benefit but may also make good use of
government structures for their operations. But evidence suggests that these
parties do not as a rule invest very much in the party organisation. The
dormant and even derelict headquarters of ruling parties strongly suggests
this – and it is particularly acute once a party loses power.
Cross-country comparisons of Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and
Zambia based on the author’s own researches including interviews with
party functionaries give an even clearer picture of the state of political
parties in Africa:
1 In general, parties are essentially electoral associations that become
active only for elections; between elections they are mostly dormant.
2 Generally only the bigger parties have bureaucratic structures, and
where such structures exist they are mostly confined to the head-
quarters in the capital and in a few major cities.
3 Only one or two of the major parties have offices at the district level,
and these may not even be operational or linked to the party head-
quarters.
4 There appear to be no visible operational party structures below the
district level (but that does not mean they do not exist).
5 In most cases, local party organisations depend on the national head-
quarters from which they do not usually obtain any support. In some
instances local level organisations rely on irregular contributions of
one or a few rich local party members.
6 Larger parties in general do not lack of funds; but those they have
come from famous party ‘well wishers’ and are only partly used for
the party. These private funds are never properly accounted for and
mostly used by individuals to promote their own personal political
(or business) career.
7 The parties do not provide any civic education about the democratic
process; at most they only inform the electorate about the technical-
ities of voting.
8 Only the General Secretaries of the political parties in Ghana were
able to place their parties in well-known ideological left–right schema
on their own initiative; the middle-level functionary could hardly tell
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9 Clientelism, originally thought of as supplementing the weak bureau-
cratic organisation, plays a far less important role for party organisation
at the district and grass-roots level; it is, however, important at the
top level of the party hierarchy in keeping the elite together.
10 Finally, aggregate electoral data as well as individual data from an
opinion survey suggests that – except for Botswana which is ethnic-
ally fairly homogenous – ethnicity or ethnic affiliations play a crucial
role for party formation and electoral behaviour, although not in the
usually envisaged way for a highly fragmented party system.
Categorising the African parties can be done with Gunther and Diamond’s
(2001) universal party typology (linked to the social basis/cleavage), which
includes the category of the ‘ethnicity based parties’ (Erdmann 2002:
259–85; Erdmann, 2004: 70–3). For this type of party two sub-types can
be distinguished: an ‘ethnic party’, which is based on one ethnic group
only; and an ‘ethnic congress party’, based on an elite coalition of several
ethnic groups. The latter form is the most frequent in Africa.
One of our major problems is that we have very little reliable know-
ledge about the dynamics of these types of parties and how they support
the consolidation of democracy. Only Horowitz (1985) has discussed this
issue to some degree. In order to highlight the problem from the perspec-
tive of the party promoters, in a handbook on democratic party-building
produced by the Netherlands IMD – a prominent actor in international
party support – ethnic congress parties are not even mentioned. Instead
the perspective of this handbook is clearly that of traditional ‘mass party’
and its organisational and representational function (Institute for
Multiparty Democracy, 2004: 11). But it fails to capture the specific mech-
anisms and dynamics of political parties linked to ethnicity.
As regards the role of African political parties in democratic consoli-
dation, the academic literature does not offer a very positive account but
at the same time is not overly pessimistic (Randall and Svåsand, 2002b;
Van de Walle, 2003; Mozaffar, Scaritt and Galaich, 2003). Despite some
diverging views, some of the authors seem to agree that contrary to the
general perception of the dangers related to ethnicity in party politics,
there is a culture of compromise within the multi-ethnic parties of Africa.
Others caution against passing judgment prematurely, citing positive devel-
opments in Ghana, Senegal and Botswana (Randall and Svåsand, 2002b).
Another problem in Africa is the prevalence of the dominant party and
the (pre)dominant party systems (Bogaards, 2004: 173–97). Again, the
literature is quite sceptical about this ‘awkward embrace’ of one party
that tends to promote a return to authoritarian rule (Pempel, 1990;
Rimanelli 1999). Overall, the case for ‘intervention’ for the strengthening
of political parties seems to be justifiable.
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The demand side
The success of political party assistance is dependent, of course, upon
demand. However, we have no detailed knowledge about the sincerity of
the demand. It is quite possible that party assistance is accepted simply
because it is offered. As one analyst observed, in many countries ‘the
prevailing domestic attitude towards party assistance was one of “benign
neglect”’ (Kumar, 2005: 517). However, the writer is unsure whether this
statement adequately captures the situation in Africa. For in the course
of his own research on political parties in five African countries, he was
regularly confronted with complaints by party leaders that international
donors support all sorts of NGOs but not political parties. These leaders
also questioned the political legitimisation of NGOs, and they stressed
that it was important that political parties were legitimised by the elec-
torate and that their members were sitting in parliament and taking up
responsible positions in government. In short, they desired equal treat-
ment by the donor community.
A survey of 14 party leaders of 11 political parties in nine African
countries revealed the following picture.5 Asked whether political parties
should receive such support from foreign donors, only two said that parties
should not receive support from abroad while all the others said ‘yes’.
The two who did not want foreign donors to support parties were Nigerian
and Mauritian; another Nigerian from the same party, however, wanted
outside support. It should be noted that most of the resident directors of
the foundations report a ‘high demand’ for party assistance, although in
different degrees; and most local observers confirm that the foundations
operate to a large degree according to local demand (although there are
some exceptions) (Hanf, Hofmeier and Mair, 1995: 76–7; Mair, 2000b:
50). A second question concerned the mode of assistance they would
prefer: either ‘partisan’ or ‘non-partisan’. Again, the results were quite
clear. Out of the fourteen leaders, eight wanted only ‘non-partisan’ support,
while only two preferred ‘partisan’ aid. Another two preferred a combi-
nation of both non-partisan and partisan aid at the same time – an option
that was not offered in the questionnaire but was written in by the respon-
dents. And asked about the kind of assistance they wanted, the responses
were largely ‘material’: finance and equipment.
Although the survey is anything but ‘representative’, three points should
be emphasised. First, the positive reactions from the questionnaire together
with the complaints noted above and the general response to the supply
of party assistance confirm that there may be a general demand for party
assistance. Second, seven of the parties involved in the survey participated
in government, while one was a former ruling party; six of the party
leaders were the secretary generals of the parties. A reasonable assump-
tion is that party assistance would be more controversial on the side of
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they command government resources and are rather hostile to foreign
interference, especially if it involves supporting their competitors. However,
the evidence contradicts this, underscoring the fact that most of the 
parties, including the ruling ones, are in severe financial difficulties. Third,
there is a clear preference for ‘non-partisan’ assistance, which, again, gives
support to the previous point. Finally, the demand for assistance in ‘money’
and ‘kind’ seems to reflect a general problem of the political parties in
Africa, namely a lack of, and disinterest in, ideological and programmatic
commitment – something that poses a challenge to the donors as well.
Activities of the political foundations in Africa: misguided 
perceptions
Historical experience as party supporters
Carothers’ (2002: 19) emphatic argument that because it is an essential
element of democracy assistance ‘much greater attention to political party
development should be a major part of the response’ made by the democ-
racy promotion community has been taken up by the political foundations
for quite some time now. Their engagement with political parties in Africa
dates back to the 1970s. Although the foundations had already begun
their work in the 1960s, it was only for ‘nation building’ and the export
of the ‘German model’ of economic and social policy. It was only after
Willy Brandt was elected president of the Socialist International (1976)
that FES intensified its collaboration with political parties in Africa, espe-
cially with socialist orientated parties in Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal.
In fact, FES made contact with the liberation movements in southern
Africa in the early 1970s, backing the ANC in South Africa, FRELIMO,
Namibia’s SWAPO and the Zimbabwe African National Union and
Zimbabwe African People’s Union, which later combined forces in ZANU-
PF (Patriotic Front), ‘with all means . . . except for arms’ – a move that
was highly controversial inside FES, the Social Democratic Party and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hillebrand and Vinai, 2002: 134–5). FES, for
instance, financially supported an ANC and SWAPO office in Bonn with
the official approval of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs.
These activities of FES do not mean that all the activities of all the
German political foundations in Africa are directed at supporting polit-
ical parties. First, none of the other foundations was very heavily involved
in party aid in Africa, which differs from the situation in Latin America,
for instance. With the exception of the FNS, the other two foundations
at the time (KAS and HSS) co-operated with authoritarian state parties
as well. Second, and this includes the FES, during the 1970s party collab-
oration was only one aspect of foundation work. Third, up to 1996, all
the foundations had two budget lines, one for ‘civic education’ (gesell-
schaftspolitische Bildung) and one for the conventional ‘socio-economic
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development’ (Sozialstrukturhilfe). The budget for ‘socio-economic devel-
opment’ accounted on average for about one third of the foundations’
spending alone during the 1990s (BMZ, 2005). Before the changes of the
1990s, the major focus of activity was with conventional ‘apolitical’ and
‘technical’ social and economic development aid, rather than with party
assistance. It included supporting civic and adult education, co-operative
societies, or generally ‘commonweal activities’ (Gemeinwirtschaft), pro-
moting business associations and supporting trade unions. In the 1980s,
the promotion of the media and an attempt to foster intellectual capacity-
building that would strengthen the role of the academia in engaging in
political dialogue and political agenda setting became an additional 
focus of the work of the foundations, which, in many cases, was not very
successful (Hillebrand and Vinai, 2002: 137). Fourth, during the 1980s
even FES’s interest in party assistance declined, because many of the 
parties were then perceived not to be democratic. More generally there
was a perception (including inside FES) that FES’s attempts to intensify
the co-operation in membership training with African political parties 
bore virtually no fruit. The only exceptions were the co-operation with
parties in two multi-party regimes, Botswana and Senegal, the Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP) and the Parti Socialiste (PS).
The winds of change that swept Africa in the 1990s resulted in a re-
orientation of foundation work. The foundations now became part of the
‘mainstream’ promotion of democracy and human rights that focused on
civil society organisations. By the mid-1990s, the BMZ budget line ‘socio-
economic development aid’ for foundation operations was completely
scrapped, with funds being shifted to ‘civic education’. This was, of course,
due to the paradigmatic shift in development aid towards the creation 
of a favourable political framework, the promotion of human rights and
democracy.
It is remarkable that in the mid-1990s political parties did not feature
on the foundations’ list of priorities (Mair, 2000a: 134). Instead, the foun-
dations concentrated their work on non-governmental organisations, 
and, to different degrees, collaborated with state institutions such as the
legislature and judiciary. Civic education was, however, a top priority.
Nevertheless it is quite clear that the foundations supported political parties
in Africa, although to different degrees. However, as of the mid-1990s,
there has been increased awareness by the foundations of the importance
of parties (Erdmann, 1996: 145–57; Mair, 2000b: 31, 64).
New challenges – hesitant responses
The six foundations currently operate in 29 countries with local offices in
22 of them. Only in South Africa do all the foundations have an office.
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local staff), and in five other countries only three foundations are resident
with offices and a German representative (see Table 10.2). Interestingly,
of the six foundations only three (FES, KAS and FNS) presently have pro-
grammes or projects that are designed for collaboration with political
parties.
The HBS, close to the Greens, does not work directly or indirectly with
any political party in Africa (although it collaborates with representatives
of parties on other continents). As an organisation with a post-materialist
value orientation it is difficult for them to find congenial political parties
in developing countries more generally. The family of Green parties is
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Table 10.2 Project activities and offices of German foundations in African
countries, 2005
FES KAS HBS FNS HSS RLS
Angola X Xa
Benin X Xb Xb
Botswana X
Burkina Faso Xa Xc
Cameroon X
Cap Verde Xa
Côte d’Ivoire X Xc
DR Congo X X
Ethiopia X Xa
Ghana X X X Xa







Namibia X X Xa X Xa
Niger Xa
Nigeria X X X
Senegal X X Xc
Somalia Xa
South Africa X X Xb X X Xb
Sudand X Xa Xa
Tanzania X X Xc X
Togo Xa Xc
Uganda X X Xa Xa
Zambia X Xa
Zimbabwe X X Xa Xc
23 19 11 6 11 2
Source: Author’s compilation following interviews with foundations.
Notes: a: no office; b: regional office; c: local staff only; d: at FES the Sudan office belongs
to the Near East/North Africa Department.
very small, particularly in Africa. For this reason the HBS has continued
to focus its assistance on civil society organisations but is closely watching
party development.
The HSS, close to the Bavarian Christian Social Democrats, does not
presently collaborate directly with any political party in Africa although
it did so during the time of one-party regimes (for example in Togo). 
The foundation now concentrates its democracy promotion on civil society
associations, among them trade unions, business associations and rural
co-operative societies. The target group of these programmes and projects
are ‘local political multipliers’, including priests, teachers and mayors, of
whom some will be politicians elected to public office or party represen-
tatives; the latter are included by chance, not by purpose, as ‘party agents’.6
The youngest German political foundation, the RLS, which is close to
Party of Democratic Socialism (successor of the communist party of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), operates only in Namibia and South
Africa and works with civil society organisations (trade unions), but not
with political parties. The foundation has started to consider collabora-
tion with auxiliary organisations close to the South African Communist
Party (SACP), and, in fact, they are already assisting in the establishing
the Chris-Hani-Institute, which is to be the think tank and civic educa-
tion centre for the Congress of the South African Trade Unions and SACP.7
As indicated above, assistance to political parties is only one aspect of
the foundations’ assignment. Of the three foundations that collaborate with
political parties, none is in a position to indicate how much assistance is
provided for this specific field of democracy promotion; no aggregate data
on party collaboration is available at the German headquarters. It is, there-
fore, almost impossible to assess the efforts that the foundations are making
or to compare foundations to other forms of democracy assistance. Related
to this is the basic question of how ‘party assistance’ is defined. One can
use a very narrow definition that includes only those activities or projects
that are directly and exclusively linked (contractually) with one or 
more political parties; or one can use a wider definition that comprises the
collaboration with the parties’ affinity groups (Kollateralorganisationen:
kindred civil society organisations/groups) or, more broadly still, all sorts
of activities that benefit the party system as a whole. This could even
include projects related to the electoral system. Regardless of the definition
used, there will still be problems of demarcation because none of the foun-
dations works with a clear concept (the FES, however, is working on a
definition for reviewing its activities in Africa).
When pressed to give an estimate of the foundations’ share of party
assistance, the following figures were provided. The estimate for FES was
‘between one quarter and one third’ of their activities; this would include
the support for parliamentary groups. For KAS it was ‘less than 20 per
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the largest proportion, of ‘one third to 50 per cent’ of their activities.
Rather than definitive sums these are estimates of the amount of ‘work’
that each office puts into party assistance; and the figures relate to Africa
as a whole.
According to the three foundations party assistance has a high priority,
and increased after the mid-1990s. Nevertheless it is, at most, only 25 per
cent – and probably closer to 20 per cent – of the democracy promotion
budget of all the three foundations. Hence it is difficult to see even these
foundations as predominantly ‘agents of party aid’; only the FNS explicitly
sees itself as a ‘party promoter’.
There are several reasons for this neglect of party assistance during 
the early 1990s. One is the ‘bad experience’ of the collaboration with 
the state parties during the 1970s and 1980s, which affected not only the
FES. Second, the post-1989 era was the era that has been called the ‘resur-
rection of civil society’, in both theoretical and practical terms. Promotion
of democracy meant (almost exclusively) promotion of civil society organ-
isations, and the foundations were no exception to that kind of thinking.
It took quite a while for the international debate to rediscover the exist-
ence of political parties. Third, it is difficult for the foundations to find
congenial or even convenient partners in Africa that share their political
and ideological orientation. Fourth, the perception is that most of the
newly emerging parties have little in common with the parties they know
from home. This is, of course, an acknowledgement of the unknown
‘otherness’ of most of the parties in Africa, and it relates, for example,
to the lack of internal democracy in many of them, which makes the
collaboration dependent on a few, sometimes erratic, leaders. Successful
collaboration at this stage cannot be established without the consent of
the leadership, but that can cause problems of its own because these
leaders might try to use the collaboration not so much for the benefit of
their party but for the promotion of their own position within the party.
Fifth, and closely related to the previous point, collaboration with polit-
ical parties is regarded as ‘risky’. This means it requires a high and
long-term commitment to gain trust on which a beneficial collaboration
can be developed. But this kind of engagement can run into severe prob-
lems if one partner changes its political orientation (although that could
still be a positive contribution to building party politics and democracy).
Moreover, a too close involvement might create problems on both sides.
All this reflects the weakness of political parties in Africa, but at the same
time it also indicates some weaknesses on the side of the foundations.
Attempt at an assessment: versatility and conceptual 
weaknesses
Given the particular features of political parties in Africa, the key ques-
tions are, first, whether these distinguishing features have been identified
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by the foundations as a special challenge, and second, what approaches
would address these challenges adequately.
High versatility
The following approaches in party assistance have been identified, which
are used here as a heuristic tool in the absence of a proper evaluation of
the foundations’ party assistance: (1) party-to-party or partisan; (2) multi-
partisan; (3) cross-party dialogue; (4) institutional focus; and (5) inter-
national party linkage approach (Burnell, 2004: 14–17). Additional
information from interviews and the writer’s own observations will be used
to supplement earlier evaluations of the general work of the foundations
and their support of parliaments in Africa in particular (Hanf, Hofmeier
and Mair 1995; Mair 2000b). Before discussing the various approaches, it
should be pointed out that the foundations do not officially provide finan-
cial support or assistance in kind such as computers, vehicles and the like.
The ‘partisan approach’ means working with sister or fraternal parties
that share the same ideological orientation. This collaboration builds 
upon trust and mutual understanding and is designed for a long-term
commitment. In one sense it is the most ‘politicised’ as well as the most
controversial approach. Germany’s foundations are most often seen as the
well-established practitioners of this approach – a perception that is only
partly true as it is only one component of their party assistance. In fact,
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Table 10.3 Bilateral partners of German political foundations in Africa, 2005
FES KAS FNS
African National Democratic Party (DP), Democratic Alliance 
Congress (ANC), Uganda (DA), South Africa
South Africa
South West Africa Comité d’Action pour Parti Démocratique 
People’s Organisation le Renouveau (CAR), Sénégalaise (PDS), 
(SWAPO), Namibia Togo Senegal
Frente de Libertação de Parti National Ensemble Civic United Front 
Moçambique (FRELIMO), (PNE), Benin (CUF), Tanzania
Mozambique
Movimento Popular de Mouvement National MDC, Zimbabwe
Libertação de Angola de la Societé de 
(MPLA), Angola Développement 
(MNSD), Niger
Movement for [New Patriotic Party 
Democratic Change (NPP), Ghana (1992–99)]
(MDC), Zimbabwe
Source: Author’s interviews.
four to five political parties in Africa (Table 10.3). In the case of the FES
these partners are, with one exception, still the ‘traditional’ ones, the
parties of the former liberation movements that have become dominant
parties. This poses a special challenge for party aid. Often the collab-
oration, apart from direct talks and advice, is conducted ‘indirectly’
through the assistance of a think tank or research institute that is close
to a political party, or, quite frequently, through parties’ affinity groups
(Kollateralorganisationen).
Most of the party assistance provided by the foundations for Africa is
clearly directed towards what is termed the ‘multi-partisan approach’
(multi-party or cross-party), which is the internationally most common
and most favoured approach applied by organisations such as USAID and
the Netherlands IMD. As can be seen from the list of bilateral collabo-
ration in Table 10.3, the foundations collaborate with ruling as well as
with opposition parties, although in most cases the assistance started when
the parties were in opposition (particularly in the case of the former liber-
ation movements). It does not make sense to stop collaboration as soon
as an opposition party comes to power; the formerly weak party struc-
tures do not become strong overnight once an opposition becomes the
ruling party. The promotion of internal party democracy is particularly
important for ruling parties. However, in authoritarian or hybrid regimes
the natural partners of assistance are usually opposition parties.
The multi-party approach of the foundations does not imply assistance
to all parties. It means, instead, the identification of ‘relevant’ parties;
anti-democratic parties are excluded. In a democratic setting ‘relevant’
parties usually include parties represented in parliament. To base the selec-
tion of recipient parties on this criterion is not opportunistic as long as
the representation is based on free and fair elections; the support of parties
is then ‘objectively’ related to the choice of the electorate. However, in a
pre-transition situation when no founding elections have taken place,
gauging the strength of the various parties is not so easy and has to be
based on informed guesswork. The usual way the foundations operate 
in this situation is through workshops, training seminars, foreign visits
focusing on particular issues (media, parliamentary work, identifying
programmatic and ideological orientation, code of conduct, special political
issues such as decentralisation) relevant to these parties.
‘Cross-party dialogue’ is the third approach and difficult to distinguish
from the multi-party approach. Although this model is in its entirety asso-
ciated with the IMD (Burnell, 2004: 17) it has been long used by the
German foundations. It is not only applied in countries with a history of
violent conflict but also in many transition processes and in conflict-
prone situations. It is a useful approach to avoid high-tension situations
escalating into violent conflicts. The foundations frequently provide the
forum (and perhaps the mediator) to help people talk to one another and
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create mutual trust between hostile party members. The idea is to make
political tolerance and the democratic ‘rules of the game’ a practical experi-
ence. This is done partly by the foundations themselves as an aspect of
their local activities or by a third ‘party’ supported by the foundation. In
some respects, the approach is even part of their routine collaboration
with parties and not confined to conflict situations. Even many years after
an actual transition to democracy the foundations regularly invite repre-
sentatives of the major parties to all sorts of workshops and conferences
to discuss particular issues that are of current national political relevance.
Fourth, the ‘institutional approach’ refers to the larger context of the
institutional setting that influences the party system, such as the electoral
system or the relationship between the executive and the legislature, 
which is manned by party representatives. The collaboration with these
contextual institutions is also part of the foundations’ operations and
projects. The foundations assist the electoral commission, the office of the
speaker of parliament, support parliamentary parties or provide training
seminars for members of parliamentary committees. The relationship
between the electoral system and political parties or between parliament
and political parties might not be considered as crucial for party assist-
ance, but there is little doubt that the electoral system has a bearing on
the party system. As Burnell (2004: 18) has pointed out, weak parlia-
ments lead to weak parties, which again can be related to a specific feature
of presidential systems.
Finally, there is international cross-party collaboration at the sub-
regional, cross-regional and pan-continental levels, which provides the
possibility of discussing common problems and sharing experiences of
party development. Again, the foundations support these encounters 
and joint activities by organising international conferences attended by
party leaders of various countries, or by assisting regional federations of
parties, such as the Union des Partis Africains pour la Démocratie et le
Développement (UPADD) – comprising 17 member parties from 17 coun-
tries – by KAS, or the network of liberal parties by FNS.
Taken together, the foundations are not confined to the ‘partisan
approach’, but instead display a variety of approaches and a high degree
of flexibility, two features that have been recommended as a condition
for an effective party assistance (Burnell, 2004: 14, 20). The flexibility
becomes possible because of an almost singular feature these foundations
have when compared to other political party promoters: in most coun-
tries in which they operate they maintain a permanent local office run,
in most cases, by a German resident representative of the foundation.
This reliance on resident representatives has its advantages and dis-
advantages, but the advantages clearly stand out. As project managers
they enjoy a high degree of autonomy; they are responsible for drafting
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and they report directly to headquarters. Hence the success of the foun-
dations’ operations is very much dependent on the quality of the local
representative. The long-term commitment to the post – usually at least
three years in one country – enables foundation representatives to acquire
a deep knowledge of the political situation and the dynamics of the civil
society and party system, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
potential partners. Representatives not only act as project managers 
but also as political advisors to all kinds of local actors, who need not
themselves be ‘contracted’ project partners. This situation permits the
representatives to establish long-term relationships with a wide network
of local political actors, which again deepens their knowledge of the local
politics. This enhanced network also makes it possible to engage poten-
tial partners in a close dialogue about prospective future activities and
programmes and adapt to new or shifting demands in a way non-resident
donors cannot react.
A final aspect, usually not discussed in this context, is the special capacity
of the foundations to link up civil society with political party assistance.
The crucial role that civil society organisations can play in relation to
political parties as a critical companion, a corrective force or in agenda-
setting needs further elaboration. The possibility of furthering this is quite
obvious in relation to the FES assistance to trade unions for which they
run special programmes. But this opportunity does not as yet seem to be
consciously elaborated in the strategic policies of the foundations. Thus
the representative of FNS was the only one to explicitly mention this point
as part of the strategy. One of the weaknesses of African civil societies
is quite often that they do not engage political parties systematically, but
instead try to avoid them (apart from the ruling parties).
A few remarks on the partisan versus non-partisan approach are neces-
sary here. The idealised conception of a partisan approach, based on a
pluralistic supply side that offers the local parties the freedom of choice
as provided by the German political foundations,8 is difficult to find in
practice. As indicated above, there is only one country in Africa that hosts
the whole ideological spectrum of the foundations; and only six out of
29 host all the three foundations that provide party assistance: conserv-
ative, liberal and social democratic (see Table 10.2). There are many
political situations in which a partisan approach may be completely inap-
propriate, while in others it is the only feasible possibility. In a transition
period it makes little sense to support a ruling party that has only reluc-
tantly agreed to democratic elections and that controls all the campaign
means that are at the state’s disposal. The concern that a partisan approach
‘blurs the distinction between assistance and manipulation’ (Kumar, 2005:
520) might be justified in some cases, where there is only one donor and
that donor insists on pressing its own political beliefs on its partners.
However, this is not usually the case. Moreover, we should not underes-
timate the self-consciousness of the leadership of African political parties,
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at least of the major parties, and their ability to choose with whom they
want to collaborate. This is not to deny the existence of opportunism
among party leaders, especially among smaller parties that do not have
a large following. At the same time, neutrality ignores the amount of
partisan money that is poured into political parties from private coffers,
from individuals, the famous ‘well wishers’, as well as national companies
and international corporations. Compared to the latter, the assistance
rendered by international aid organisations, especially by the German
foundations, is, in financial terms, small – in many cases, negligible. Even
so, Mair’s (2004: 131–5) point cannot be so easily dismissed that in some
situations a partisan approach helps to clarify the recipients’ value and
norm orientation, particularly in parts of Africa where most parties display
no clear ideological and political profile. By comparison with other donor
organisations the clear (partisan) ideological orientation of Germany’s
foundations is quite often explicitly lauded by African observers and part-
ners; they are not perceived as ‘ideological missionaries’ (Hanf, Hofmeier
and Mair, 1995: 76–7). It should be remembered, however, that in the
writer’s own small survey most of the party leaders preferred a non-
partisan approach.
Conceptual weaknesses
While the German foundations’ assistance to political parties provides a
high degree of versatility and flexibility, the foundations do exhibit a
number of weaknesses, which can be summarised as follows:
1 None of the foundations has a policy or strategy paper that deals
with party assistance in general.
2 None has such a policy or discussion paper that addresses the specific
issues of political parties in Africa.
3 None has either a particular post or a department that is concerned
with political parties; FES entertains a post that is responsible for
collaboration with ‘trade unions’.
4 None runs a specific budget line for assistance to political parties,
either overall or for specific continents or countries.
5 None has something like a ‘tool-kit’, ‘guidelines’ or a ‘handbook’ that
gives some practical ideas on how to tackle the specific question of
party aid; in the 1980s, FES had a handbook for party organisation
that is now considered out of date and is no longer in use.
6 None has systematically appraised their particular collaboration with,
and assistance to, parties, either internally or by external experts
(although there have been various internal and external evaluations
of certain other programmes of their work or of their work in general,
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7 All acknowledge the lack of systematic knowledge about their work
with political parties; FES, however, has recently taken up the cumber-
some task of defining, stocktaking and systematising their party-related
activities in Africa.
8 Even the ‘bad experience’ – the dark shadow of party collaboration
with the state parties of the 1970s and 1980s – has not been appraised
in any substantial way.
Viewed from this perspective, the foundations appear not to be in a posi-
tion to address the particular challenges of party promotion adequately,
either in general or in Africa specifically. The foundations are certainly
not distinguished in party promotion. This, however, does not imply that
the assistance to political parties is ineffective or useless. There is a long
practical experience with party assistance, but it is very personal and has
yet to become institutionalised.
At the same time, the local representatives cannot be regarded as ‘party
experts’, although some might have knowledge about the practical work
of political parties from their private experience of being a party member
back home. Generally they are employed as ‘political technocrats’; they
do not necessarily have backgrounds in party work or as active members
of the related party. A few join the ‘mother party’ only after joining the
foundation.
Nevertheless, given this context, the lack of policy guidelines and
strategic planning combined with the autonomy and flexibility of the local
representative means there is a danger that some of the foundations’ advan-
tages could turn into disadvantages, by courting arbitrariness, opportunism
or simple lack of relevance.
Conclusion
The German political foundations are often portrayed as the genuine
‘partisan’ promoters of political parties. This is only partly true. While
African political parties have increasingly enjoyed the attention of the
foundations, only three of the six foundations – the social-democratic 
FES, the Christian democratic KAS and the liberal FNS – are engaged in
political party assistance, and at most perhaps just 20 per cent of their
efforts are devoted to this field of international democracy promotion.
Moreover, their party assistance is by no means confined to the ‘partisan
approach’ as perceived by international observers. In fact, the foundations
have only a small number of ‘partisan partners’ among African parties.
Instead, they display a high variety of approaches. This, together with
their special feature of working through resident representatives and their
ability to combine political party with civil society assistance, gives the
foundations a versatility that, compared to many other donors, is unique
and can be seen as the most appropriate approach to political party aid
198 Gero Erdmann
in Africa. At the same time, discussions about the partisanship or non-
partisanship of party assistance seem to be misguided if they are only
based on principle and ignore the context. At least the foundations are
not perceived as ‘ideological missionaries’.
Overall the reluctance to get too close to political parties is one reaction,
among others, to the particular ‘otherness’ – commonly called ‘weakness’
– of political parties and party systems in Africa. A characteristic feature
of this ‘otherness’ is the lack of clear-cut ideological and political orien-
tation of the ‘partisan work’ of the foundations. Although this reluctance
is understandable, it reveals a crucial weakness of the foundations: none
has a strategic concept or policy outline to address the particular chal-
lenge to party assistance in Africa. Even the practical experience acquired
in collaboration with these parties has not been translated into system-
atic institutional knowledge. This fact is crucial because it greatly affects
the capability of the foundations to function effectively; and a lack of a
clear policy makes evaluation of performance extremely difficult.
This summary of shortcomings taken with the indications given earlier
in the chapter provide a rough outline of the issues and tasks ahead that
need to be addressed in order to make party assistance more meaningful.
It seems clear that we need to avoid a ‘one size fits all’ strategy. However,
the necessity for highly specific approaches does not mean that we have
to eschew general strategic considerations about how to focus party assist-
ance in general. In sum, the problems that the foundations have with
political party assistance in Africa are not specific to each and every foun-
dation, but affect all promoters of political parties.
Notes
1 For a general overview of the foundations’ mandate and role in foreign policy
see Mair, 2000a.
2 The HBS is the successor of Stiftungsverband Regenbogen, founded in 1988,
a federation of three smaller foundations close to the Green Party.
3 After being in two successive parliaments since 1990, following the elections
of 2002 the PDS had only two MPs and therefore lost the official status of
a parliamentary group.
4 See also: www.fes.de; www.kas.de; www.boell.de; www.fnst.de; www.hss.de;
www.rosalux.de.
5 The survey, using a confidential questionnaire, was conducted by the author
at an international political party conference in Accra, Ghana, sponsored and
organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in collaboration with the Insti-
tute of African Affairs, Hamburg, Germany. The party leaders involved came
from Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia,
Nigeria and Tanzania.
6 Klaus Liepert, Head of Africa Department, HSS, telephone interview, 6 June 2005.
7 Jörg Schulz, Deputy Head International Relations, RLS, telephone interview,
18 May 2005; www.rosaluz.de.
8 This point is made generally in favour of the ‘German approach’ of the
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11 Looking to the future
Practice and research in party 
support
Peter Burnell
A number of the conclusions that follow from the preceding chapters may
seem unremarkable: some of them reinforce existing knowledge. Many
interesting questions remain. Notwithstanding globalisation, the universe
of democracies is not approaching uniformity; there is no universalism in
the sphere of party politics. The party systems remain diverse; some are
far less competitive than others, and in many cases the situation may be
too unpredictable to call. Moreover as research carried out by Gunther
and Diamond (2001) into political parties suggests, there is no conver-
gence on a single model of political party. In fact they indicated that a
typology of five broad types – elite, mass, ethnicity-based, electoralist and
movement parties – and 15 different species is needed to capture the diver-
sity of party types around the world. Yet party politics has evolved and
continues to evolve in different ways in different countries. Öniş’s caution
against extrapolating from the success of Turkey’s Justice and Development
Party in crafting a coalition of Islamic and secular forces cutting across
different socio-economic groups to the Arab countries in the Middle East
bears repetition. Indeed Turkey’s own ability to sustain this particular
party, let alone the party model it represents, far into the future is uncer-
tain, especially if the country’s prospects of gaining EU membership were
to recede and reverberations from that played out in domestic politics.
Meanwhile in Africa the persistence of clientelistic state–society relations
whereby parties mobilise political support even while proposing to imple-
ment globally sourced neo-liberal economic solutions, warns us against
taking too seriously some of the more exaggerated claims made on behalf
of narrowly economistic notions of globalisation and its political reper-
cussions.
On the side of party assistance, the conclusions are definitely mixed.
The case studies appear to confirm that among the many international
influences that might have a bearing on party politics inside emerging
democracies, party support has been a relatively very minor factor to date.
The fact that much aid has concentrated on the parties themselves to the
neglect of the domestic forces and factors that influence party politics is
only part of the weakness. Whatever the benefits such aid might deliver
– and the evidence collected by Carothers shows these have been modest
but not negligible – the effects can so easily be outweighed by other and
more critical features of both the regional and the global environment.1
That can mean deliberate interventions in a country’s politics that turn
out to be misguided attempts to promote political change or, conversely,
structural forces, institutions and trends that are wholly unconnected 
with democracy promotion but nevertheless affect the society, economy
or government and thereby impact on the party politics. The Balkans 
offer some good examples where Gallagher depicts the adverse effects on
democracy generally and party politics specifically of a number of external
factors other than economic integration, and to which the societies’
economic marginality in the world makes them more vulnerable. Giving
a higher priority to international co-operation for addressing the imper-
atives of state (re)construction might be justifiable, but only if it is done
well: if done badly, that, too, can damage the chances of healthy party
politics taking root. Elsewhere in East-Central Europe, from now on the
general economic and social effects that EU membership exert on the
recent accession states can be expected to supersede whatever influence
direct assistance to the parties had in the recent past.
Party support
The organisations that provide democracy support might reasonably
wonder whether they do not have enough to grapple with already, without
worrying about the potential significance of every aspect of globalisation,
especially if the countries they are involved in are currently among the
least globalised in economic terms. After all, purely domestic pressures
can be expected to dominate the politicians’ horizons there, both during
the drama of democratic transition and later on when urgent constituency-
level demands arising out of poverty gain political voice, or if conflict
between different sub-national communities still threatens peace and
stability. However, the question can only be rhetorical where the commit-
ment is to help build parties and party systems that can serve democratic
purposes facing the strong probability that globalisation will continue to
advance, extending its reach to more societies and to fresh domains of
human activity. That understanding is essential if the party elites are to
relate effectively to globalisation as subject as well as object.
The established literature on party politics gives some credence to the
idea of path dependence: the kind of party and party system that emerges
in a new democracy will be influenced by the preceding situation and by
how the democratic transformation came about. Similarly, international
approaches to supporting party politics for democratisation should
consider the implications of globalisation, in order to avoid building in
limitations now, or missing opportunities now, or overburdening parties
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For once they have been formed, party politics – like political institutions
– can become ‘sticky’ or resistant to change. At the same time, global-
isation and our understanding of globalisation, too, will exhibit a dynamic
whose likely effects can barely be guessed. Southall’s hint that China’s
growing integration into the global economy – which means that increasing
trade and investment links with Africa could weaken the ability of Western
actors to influence party politics or other political trends on that conti-
nent – is illustrative.
But in a ‘shrinking world’ where ‘the sites of power and the subjects
of power quite literally may be continents apart’ (McGrew, 2005: 23),
can democracy support help to build a justifiable confidence by society
in party politics’ capability to serve democratic purposes? The task does
look daunting – perhaps even more so than the challenge of reversing the
erosion of trust in parties and the integrity of the politicians that we read
so much about in societies in the West. Perhaps democracy assistance
practitioners should accept the notion that parties in many of the emerging
democracies are unlikely ever to be the force they reputedly once were in
the established democracies. If we recalibrate our assessment of what
parties can do for democratisation then no one need be either perplexed
or disappointed if international party assistance strengthens political parties
only very marginally.
A more practical response in some cases would take the form of helping
parties organise at the level of transboundary and supraterritorial govern-
ance and penetrate the decision-making processes that operate there. 
Here, the EU offers exceptional possibilities: independent support to parties
in the new accession and prospective member states can help them nego-
tiate the terms of closer inter-party engagement – managing their exposure
to ‘Europeanisation’ – in ways that ensure the new relationships with
Western Europe and its parties and the EU institutions themselves reflect
their own and their own society’s distinctive needs. A possible inference
from Ágh’s account of East-Central Europe is that the linked goals of
learning how to represent their society’s interests in Brussels and avoiding
the negative consequences that accession can imply for party politics at
home offer mutually reinforcing opportunities for the transnational pooling
of advice. An inference from Gallagher’s claim that the engagement of
Western European parties with prospective partners among parties in the
Balkans leaves much to be desired is that other democracy assistance
actors must take a lead.
The EU is unique. Is some dedicated framework of governance such as
a regional parliament endowed with formal powers not essential if party
networking on a transnational basis is to have some substance? If not
even the EU can claim to see the emergence of genuinely transnational
parties, then what hope is there for meaningful collaboration between
parties in regional and continental forums such as those Mohamed Salih
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describes in Africa? The idea of a sort of collective African peer review
by political parties, both offering mutual support in learning how to 
cope with the pressures of globalisation and also holding one another’s
commitment to democratic values to account, is a brave one. But if contacts
at that level are to move beyond the superficial, must there not be a
shared sense of political community, at minimum what globalisation theor-
ists such as Scholte refer to as the growth of ‘communities of fate’? Are
the activities that the existing party internationals already cater for not
as good as it gets?
As major sites of important decision-making seem to be becoming
increasingly remote from society’s grass roots, and as lines of commun-
ication lengthen, so new strategies to (re)connect party elites with the
people are badly needed. The moral here is that endeavours that prompt
parties to look upwards and outwards should not mean neglect of renewed
efforts to encourage parties to look inwards and downwards, too. That
encompasses a wide range of issues, from those relating to gender equality
to structures for intra-party participation and voter outreach. For the
danger well flagged up by party analysts such as Katz and Mair (2002)
and Poguntke and Webb (2005) – observing the established post-industrial
democracies – is that the ‘internationalisation of politics’ and a greater
orientation by party elites towards the institutions of supra-territorial
governance could simply strengthen existing tendencies (seen in South
Africa’s ruling African National Congress, for instance) for power within
parties (especially parties in government) to become increasingly concen-
trated at the top. The party elites, including leaders of opposition parties
with governing potential, simply become yet more autonomous from party
control as well as from societal influence more broadly (Raunia, 2002,
sees this happening already within the EU context; Poguntke and Webb,
2005, detect evidence throughout many OECD countries). Democracy
support that encourages political parties in emerging democracies to ‘look
global’ should be mindful, then, of the possibilities of producing or accen-
tuating this unfortunate effect. And yet the two orientations – upwards
and downwards – are, or should be, intimately connected. A party’s ability
to demonstrate genuinely strong popular support is a power resource 
that, together with specialised knowledge and technocratic expertise, can
strengthen its capability to exert influence in or on the institutions of poly-
centric governance. Ways of making the upwards/outwards and inwards/
downwards orientations mutually reinforcing for the benefit of demo-
cratisation demand creative thinking and innovative practice. The challenge
of developing parties as functioning multilevel organisations in their own
right should not be underestimated: so far, much party aid (from the 
US, anyway) appears to have concentrated technical assistance on party
headquarters and found it difficult to engage with the lower levels 
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party aid should do more to encourage a form of co-operation between
parties and civil society organisations that goes beyond the largely elite-
oriented participants in the policy communities, and instead reaches out
to more broadly based and participatory movements in society, is highly
significant.
Greater encouragement to civil society to do more to anchor parties
firmly in society offers a large, relevant canvas for international democ-
racy assistance. In at least some of the emerging democracies, the civil
and the political seem to be not only separate worlds but rivals for
resources and attention. Democracy promoters can single out for support
those NGOs and INGOs whose purpose or mission inherently promises
some clear benefit to the development of democratically organised party
politics. Some obvious examples are transnational networking among elec-
tions observation and monitoring organisations and support for pressure
groups and journalists committed to raising politically impartial stand-
ards in the media. Of course, the usual caveats must apply: any programmes
of support ‘should seriously study local conditions before deciding assist-
ance approaches’ (Kumar, 2005: 515). And indigenous capacity-building
should be privileged, to discourage continued reliance on external help
and guidance. There are countries where progress will be made only by
working with the government to ensure that both NGOs and opposition
parties are allowed the necessary freedoms and political space. Democracy
support foundations may even have to choose between providing assist-
ance to a party in power that is using its position to erode civil liberties
and helping its partners in the civic sphere. Zimbabwe is an example. But
helping to build the capabilities of NGOs to do policy research and offer
policy advice, especially where the policy field is neither simply domestic
nor foreign but cuts across or overarches both, need not be a zero sum
game for the political parties. On the contrary, it offers a lifeline to oppo-
sition parties where the government (and thereby the ruling party)
monopolises much of the country’s own policy research expertise. In terms
of whether economic globalisation’s effects include narrowing the policy
space in which political parties in emerging democracies can realistically
offer the electorate meaningful programmatic alternatives, a ‘partisan’
approach to party aid by political foundations and parties in established
democracies offers more of a counter than do the alternatives, although
even its potential will be limited if these alleged effects of globalisation
really are universal. Finally, of course, democracy assistance practitioners
could factor a willingness to become more globally aware into the selec-
tion criteria they use when deciding which parties to favour with assistance
and which parties to leave out.
Because the importance of the intermixing of politics and money is
recognised by all analysts whether their interest is in party politics, in
democracy more broadly, in democracy assistance or in globalisation, there
is much still to be done in respect of how to resource parties and party
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politics in emerging democracies. The difficulty lies in devising arrange-
ments that give parties the necessary degree of independence from their
sponsor while consolidating a basis in society. If the argument that global-
isation spells growing corporate dominance of politics is correct, then 
the conundrum is even more taxing in countries such as Russia or several
African countries where substantial and increasing revenues flow to the
state from the export of oil or some other valuable commodity. This can
all too easily have a distorting effect on political funding, whether by
rendering all parties dependent on the state or through partisan alloca-
tions that give advantage to the ruling party. It can make ruling parties
even more determined not to lose office even if the electorate turns against
them, that is to say, it can make ruling parties less committed to play 
the electoral process by the democratic rules of the game. A suspicion
that parties are subordinated to special or sinister interests through the
funding chain, or perceptions that parties purchase power through bribing
the voters, are equally bad for democracy. No less pernicious is the practice
observed in some new democracies for the victorious parties in elections
to turn to recouping their campaign expenses through the corrupt use of
public office. Thus the joint exploration by democracy assistance actors
and political parties of alternative models of funding party politics seems
well justified, as are collaborative measures taken at the inter- and supra-
governmental levels to check the laundering of illicit or criminal money
from international sources through political channels. Complementing
International IDEA’s knowledge bank on party funding regulation, for
instance, the World Bank Institute’s new ‘transparency reform scorecard’
contains several interesting proposals for the public disclosure of politi-
cians’ assets, incomes and contributions to political campaign expenditures.
Pursuing the research agenda
Political party aid remains a subject where advances in our understanding
and advice on future action could benefit from greater collaborative
research among the practitioners, academics and independent analysts in
think tanks and policy research institutes. Indeed, Erdmann in Chapter
10 expressly recommends close collaboration ‘because many of the prob-
lems encountered in party aid are in part the issues raised in party research’.
Academia looks to practitioners to provide primary information about
their experience and for their insights into the difficulties they encounter.
In turn, academics have more freedom to investigate the larger systemic
issues, studying the interactions among the many different variables 
that influence the development of party politics and conducting compara-
tive analysis of the role parties and party systems play in democratisation.
The acknowledgment by a senior practitioner of democracy aid that 
‘our support for parties outruns our theory’ underlines the case for more
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According to Carothers (1997: 122–8), for instance, it is academics who
can lead practitioners to pay more attention to the ‘missing link of power’
that strategies for democracy assistance strategies have so often neglected
in the past. Given their local knowledge, political analysts inside the coun-
tries in receipt of democracy aid must also be part of the loop. Research
collaboration, then, should both cut across the professions and take place
on a transnational basis. This is important, not least if the existing tendency
for global asymmetries in knowledge production and dissemination to
harden into asymmetries of influence and power is to be countered.
Apart from being neglected as a subject for research, political party aid
appears to have differed very little from the more general separation of
democracy assistance and academic inquiry that Carothers (1997: 117–18;
2004a: 263–4) has written about in the United States and that probably
applies to Europe, too. He makes sense of this state of affairs by saying that
academia tends to look back, searches for explanations and almost invari-
ably fails to reach agreement, whereas in contrast practitioners are more
focused on discovering how to shape the future. This should give pause for
thought: more research collaboration might be beneficial, but how much
and what kinds, and could there be some disadvantages?
Assistance practitioners might view much of the very substantial aca-
demic literature on political parties as being of little relevance, confined as
it is to more established democracies. Many of the most recent contribu-
tions are absorbed in the issue of whether parties are in decline, which
hardly speaks to a professional interest in strengthening or building parties
in the newer democracies. Also, academic analysts may worry about being
harnessed to practitioner agendas – ones to which they do not necessarily
subscribe. This is not necessarily a comment about the politically moti-
vated drivers of democracy aid or democracy promotion in the larger sense,
or a reference to the particular country/regional priorities that different
democracy assistance organisations choose to specialise in, although these
considerations certainly can be an issue. Instead, it means that practitioners
are interested in what they can influence and how to do it. Nowadays most
publicly funded organisations are mindful of the imperative to show results,
and the sooner the better. Democracy aid organisations that either directly
or indirectly receive their funding from official sources are no exception.
Even the most autonomous of them should be committed to a culture of
rigorous self-evaluation. The accurate recording of outputs and attempts
to assess the effects must seem more pressing requirements than any amount
of abstract theorising about party politics and democratisation in the longer
run. Moreover the burden of accountability (being held to account) inclines
most aid bureaucracies to be risk-averse; again, democracy assistance agen-
cies are no exception. They each have their reputations to guard and their
own ‘take’ on ‘best practice’ to defend. Evidence of friction among dif-
ferent sponsors or suppliers of assistance from the same country to polit-
ical parties and civil society organisations in a country is not hard to find
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(River Path Associates, 2005). The competing arguments about the merits
of bipartisan, multipartisan, and cross-party patterns of co-operation with
parties mentioned by both Carothers and Erdmann also illustrate the point
nicely. But highly political issues are bound to arise out of party support
whether given in the context of election campaigning, strengthening the
accountability of governments or in ‘post-conflict’ situations where rela-
tions among different communities, their political representatives and
(para-)military groups may be extremely delicate. In such situations one
can easily anticipate how a more open, focused and shared commitment
by practitioners and others to exploring what party aid really means for
changing the distribution of power inside a country could become just 
‘too political’. Willingness to share insights and information could then be
compromised.
It is also true that the more normative aspects of democracy promo-
tion and/or the particular institutional models that new democracies are
being encouraged to adopt are questioned by at least some parts of
academia, including some academics in the democratising countries them-
selves. This kind of critical interest in democratisation, or in democracy
assistance more specifically, might well outlast the political appeal that
the idea of supporting democracy promotion or specific ideas about how
to do it currently enjoy among political leaders in the West. For some
analysts of party politics (or, for that matter, of democracy promotion)
there could be a genuine concern that too close an association with one
or other democracy assistance organisation might make their own inde-
pendent data-gathering more difficult – and not only in societies where
critics see the globalisation of party-based democracy as just another form
of imperialism, or where the political elites react badly to any suggestion
that they might benefit from political party training. The issue of whether
the democracy assistance agencies are at all accountable to the partners
they work with in the prospective and new democracies is difficult to
avoid here, although of course somewhat comparable concerns do apply
to any unethical ‘mining’ and appropriation exclusively for the export of
local research material by foreign academics as well. The African coun-
tries that are deemed to be candidates for Southall’s proposal of partisan
‘solidarity support’ to pro-democracy actors offer an outstanding example
of where some of these delicate issues regarding collaboration between
academic researchers and some democracy support agencies might come
to the surface. Care might have to be exercised over how much distance
they visibly maintain from one another.
Political science can be expected to want to place the implications that
party support has for parties, and even for democratisation, in a wider
perspective than meets the proximate concerns of the democracy assist-
ance industry. This is a reference to such issues as national political
integration, political stability and social justice, which are no less com-
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are undeniable. Differences between parts of the academic and democracy
promotion communities are magnified where the reasons why support to
parties or national legislatures is seen to be so important rest largely on
their potential usefulness for implementing agendas such as better economic
governance and responsible fiscal behaviour, originating in powerful global
governance institutions that lie well outside any democratic control. By
the same token, political scientists and analysts of political parties specific-
ally are interested in cases of non-assistance and in what can be learned
from party politics in societies that do not receive democracy support. In
sum, collaborative research should proceed on the understanding that
academics will continue to be interested in the larger set of influences on
parties, which should include globalisation. They will also study the impli-
cations that stable party politics mean for many other things – which
should extend to globalisation – anywhere and without being committed
to a particular way of providing party aid in emerging democracies, or
even subscribing to the ethos of ‘actually existing’ democracy support.
Conclusion
In a globalising age there are at least three possible arenas for promoting
party-based democracy: first, work with the parties and the immediate
influences on them at the level of and below the nation and state; second,
fashion and install new designs of transnational democracy such as the
ideas for cosmopolitan democracy that are bruited in some of the literature,
either to infuse greater legitimacy and accountability into the consolidating
structures of polycentric governance or by substituting some more radical
institutional solution;3 third, manage the forces of globalisation in some
other way. No one type of international actor, including the organisa-
tions that provide democracy support, can be held responsible for taking
action in all three arenas. But on present evidence the democracy practi-
tioners are still toiling in the foothills of the first. And no powerful entity
has even begun to think about developing approaches to the third, or
even started to put the second into place, leaving aside the interrupted
progress of EU attempts to deal with its internal democratic deficit (even
within the European Parliament, the transnational party groupings appear
to count for little relative to national party politics in determining how
most parliamentarians actually vote on important issues, other than in
roll call votes which account for around one-third of them). Indeed, even
the political scientists who are most concerned about the armies of ‘disil-
lusioned democrats’ they claim to see in today’s post-industrial democracies
have yet to come up with convincing designs for a direct democracy that
could replace party-based models of political representation that are
claimed to be in crisis or approaching terminal decline. As even the highly
critical Power to the People (Power Commission, 2006: 187) concluded,
‘we do not believe that the era of the party per se is over’. The double
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challenge of working out how to both democratise the institutions of
regional and global governance and empower them vis-à-vis other supra-
national and transterritorial forces that increasingly influence people’s lives
– ranging from transnational corporations and media groups to the fears
generated by international terrorism – is something for everyone to ponder.
Failure to make real progress only places a greater responsibility on the
shoulders of democracy assistance and its efforts to help party politics
earn society’s confidence in the ability of political parties to make a mean-
ingful difference in the emerging democracies. If party aid practitioners
want to know what practical things they can suggest to help parties in
emerging democracies come to terms with globalisation – in the interests
of both democratising globalisation and making democracy in a global-
ising world more worthwhile at the country–state–nation level, then for
a start they need look no further. Scholte (in Chapter 3), in particular,
offers a useful checklist of concrete areas where country-based parties
could be doing more, or doing better, before going on to identify addi-
tional steps at the transterritorial level. Even if these early thoughts on
the subject need more detailed elaboration, they most definitely should
not be the last; at the same time they do lay down markers. When the
time comes to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of democracy assist-
ance more rigorously the methodology for doing so should be grounded
in an up-to-date appraisal of what parties can and cannot do for demo-
cratisation in the presence of the challenges, constraints and opportunities
posed by globalisation.
Notes
1 Credible scientifically-grounded assessment of the effectiveness and impact of
democracy assistance of all kinds is scarce, and in respect of party aid in
particular, assessments have hitherto been virtually non-existent. For what it
is worth, a recent path-breaking quantitative study of expenditure on ‘demo-
cratic governance’ by the United States Agency for International Development
in 195 countries over the period 1990–2003 found a statistically significant
positive effect on democratisation both in total and in respect of the spending
category ‘elections and political processes’ (party aid was not disaggregated
from this or from the expenditure category for civil society, where the evidence
was similarly positive) (Finkel et. al., 2005).
2 Comment made at a multinational workshop of democracy aid practitioners
and academics on how to evaluate democracy assistance, held in The Hague,
Holland, March 2005.
3 McGrew (2002: 216–25) surveys the alternatives offered by liberal inter-
nationalism, radical democratic pluralism, cosmopolitan democracy and
deliberative democracy. He advises that although the first seems to offer the
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Öniş, Z. 126, 200
Open Society Foundation 104




Organisation for Security and 




Parliamentarians for Global Action
(PGA) 63
parliamentary networks 63, 151–2,
160, 161n6; see also Commonwealth
224 Index
Parliamentary Association;
Parliamentary Network on the
World Bank
Parliamentary Network on the World
Bank (PNoWB) 63
party aid see international party
support
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS,
Germany) 182–3, 191, 199n3
Party of European Socialists (PES) 65
party internationals see political
parties; individual internationals
patron-client relations see clientelism
Peru 78
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. 37
Poguntke, T. 9, 29, 203
Poland 94, 95, 98, 100, 103n6
political funding see political parties
Political Islam 13, 123, 129, 137; see
also Turkey
political parties: and civil society 25,
34, 37–8, 55, 61, 76–8, 116–18,
160, 204; and democratisation 4, 5,
16, 17; and diasporas 61; funding of
7, 24, 43, 76, 159, 173–4, 204–5;
and globalisation 2–3, 5, 9, 14n8,
19–20, 26–44, 46–68; global parties
66–7; international networks 7,
62–4; models of 71–2, 184, 200;
party elites 21, 28, 30, 35, 82, 91,
155, 164, 203; party internationals
37, 62–3, 203; and personalism 30,
45n7, 184; and ‘presidentialisation’
29; in post-conflict situations 5,
18–19, 20, 25; regional parties 
64–5, 67, 68; roles 55–62, 184;
surrounding influences 5, 22, 
23–44, 83; and trade unions 40,
45n10, 55, 77; transnational 
parties 66–7, 68, 202; and uncivil
society 34–5; in the West 2, 18, 
32, 33, 35, 71, 113–14, 184, 202;
see also individual parties;
international party support; 
political party system
political party system 16, 17, 44n1,
200; and ‘choiceless democracy’
14n8, 27, 29–31, 40, 44, 50, 83,





poverty reduction strategies 31, 42, 78
Power Commission report 44n5, 114,
208
Pridham, G. 9, 15n9, 37, 90
Putnam, R. 32
Randall, V. 13n1, 16, 40, 186
regional assemblies 64, 65–6




Republican People’s Party (CHP,
Turkey) 125, 131, 132
Republika Srpska 108, 109
Robinson, W. 9, 161n2
Romania 10, 59, 107, 111, 112, 116;
Coalition for a Clean Parliament 
117; and democracy aid 81, 106,
111; EU influence on 112–13,
119–20; non-governmental
organisations 117
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung 182, 191
Russia 80, 81, 205
Schmitter, P. 9




Serbia 10, 20, 115, 117, 118;
democracy aid for 115; 
international pressure on 115–6;
2000 elections 115
Sinn Féin (Ireland) 23
Slovakia 10, 37, 98, 100, 103n6
social capital 32, 96
Social Democratic Party (SPD,
Germany) 182
Social Democratic Party (PSD,
Romania) 113, 117, 119
Social Democratic Party (Sweden) 
79
Socialist International 63, 64, 118,
132, 146
social movements 18, 19, 32, 34, 37,
61
South Africa 10, 12, 164, 165, 167,
172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 189, 190,
203; elections 168–169
Southall, R. 165, 167, 170, 200, 207
southern Africa see Africa, sub-Saharan
South West African People’s

















































Stiftungen 6, 7, 11, 37, 70, 73, 81,
166, 176, 181–99; constraints on
182; country representation 189–90,
195–6; income 182, 183; and
partisanship 181–2, 193, 194–5,
196, 197, 198; party aid from
188–9, 190, 191–2; spending by 
8, 191–2, 197, 198; weaknesses
197–8; see also individual 
Stiftungen
Svåsand, L. 13n1, 16, 40, 186




Tanzania 167, 169, 170–1, 189–90
transnational civil society see civil
society
Transparency International 41
Turkey 10, 13, 42; democratisation in
122–5; economic prospects 135–6;
and EU 12, 42, 125, 128, 132–4,
135, 137, 138; and globalisation 12,
15n12, 122–3; Higher Education Bill
140n12; Independent Industrialists
and Businessmen Association
(MÜSI·AD) 128; Kemalist legacy
124, 137; Kurdish issues 136; and
Middle East 122, 123, 125, 126,
133, 138–9; military intervention
126, 138; and Political Islam 123,
124, 126, 133–4, 137–8; financial
crisis (2000–1) 123, 130; see also
Justice and Development Party,
Virtue Party, Welfare Party
Uganda 19, 190
United Cities and Local Governments
50–1
United Democratic Front (Malawi) 50,
154, 156
United Nations 49, 66, 161n4
United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) 6, 41, 45n11,
70, 170
United States 11, 35, 41, 71, 78, 104,




Institute; United States Agency for
International Development
United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) 6, 7, 36, 105,
109, 168, 194, 209n1
Vachudova, M. 11
Van Biezen, I. 14n4, 19
Van Cranenburgh, O. 13n1
Van Wersch, J. 7, 11
Venezuela 80
Virtue Party (FP, Turkey) 125, 126,
127, 128, 129
Ware, A. 24
Washington consensus 5; post-
Washington consensus 31
Webb, P. 9, 29, 35, 203
Weiss, L. 28, 50
Welfare Party (RP, Turkey) 124, 125,
126, 127, 128, 129
Westminster Foundation for
Democracy (WFD) 6, 7, 13n3, 14n6,
21, 110, 111
World Bank 29, 41, 42, 50, 59, 88,
143, 146, 148
World Bank Institute 41, 205
World Social Forum 61
World Trade Organization (WTO) 29,
49, 59
Yugoslavia 30, 104, 106; Dayton
Peace Agreement (1995) 108, 109,
119, 120; see also Balkans; Serbia
Zambia 165, 167, 169, 190
Zeeuw, J. de 7, 11, 23
Zimbabwe 11, 80, 168, 170, 171, 172,
173, 175, 176, 177, 190, 204
Zimbabwe African National Union




We now offer special low-cost bulk subscriptions to
packages of eBooks in certain subject areas. These are
available to libraries or to individuals.
For more information please contact
webmaster.ebooks@tandf.co.uk
We’re continually developing the eBook concept, so
keep up to date by visiting the website.
eBooks – at www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk
A library at your fingertips!
eBooks are electronic versions of printed books. You can
store them on your PC/laptop or browse them online.
They have advantages for anyone needing rapid access
to a wide variety of published, copyright information.
eBooks can help your research by enabling you to
bookmark chapters, annotate text and use instant searches
to find specific words or phrases. Several eBook files would
fit on even a small laptop or PDA.
NEW: Save money by eSubscribing: cheap, online access
to any eBook for as long as you need it.
www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk
eBooks 

